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Abstract 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to achieve a better understanding of tax planning in practice, 
identifying and taking account of the multiple arenas within which it operates, and 
thereby highlighting its social and institutional dimensions. In the current rapidly 
changing business and regulatory environment, in which tax is an extremely 
important source of revenue for governments around the world, an enhanced 
understanding of tax planning in practice benefits and has implications for taxpayers 
and tax policymakers alike. The four research questions posed in this study address: 
the organisation and strategic alignment of the tax planning function in multinational 
corporations (MNCs); performance measurement of this function; tax risk 
management; the nature and impact of the relationship between the tax planning 
function within MNCs and the external environment within which it operates. 
Empirically this study focuses on US MNCs, primarily in respect of mainstream 
corporation tax planning. In line with the interpretive inductive methodological 
approach adopted, face-to-face interviews were conducted with senior tax executives 
in US MNCs, and tax advisors to such companies. A theoretical framework is 
developed which combines core themes and theoretical constructs within three 
strands of literature, namely, tax planning, new institutional sociology and 
endogeneity of law. This framework provides a powerful explanatory lens through 
which the findings are presented and interpreted. 
The role of power and powerful actors is an important and recurring theme, and partly 
explains prevailing tax planning practices through the intensity of professional and 
social interaction between tax executives. Increasingly tax risk management is more 
important and there is evidence that this may change the way in which the tax 
planning function is given strategic recognition and integrated operationally with 
business units. The focus on tax risk management results in an isomorphic trend 
towards conservatism in tax planning, and competitor and peer company influence are 
significant in shaping tax risk management mechanisms. Measuring the performance 
of the tax planning function is found to be variable, although there was a view that the 
effective tax rate (ETR), although an important external measure of corporate 
performance, was inappropriate as an internal measure. 
Tax laws are often portrayed as exogenous factors, however this study has found that 
companies invest heavily in external affairs and direct lobbying to secure changes in 
the law to suit their purposes; evidencing its endogeneity. Networking costs, 
reputational risk management and lobbying costs therefore represent non-tax costs 
that are difficult to measure, but are important components of tax planning activities, 
overlooked in the current tax planning literature. 
In addition to the findings themselves this study contributes to knowledge through its 
interpretive methodological approach which provides a new and rich perspective on 
tax planning in practice, highlighting some shortcomings of the positivistic approach. 
It also develops a theoretical framework which uniquely combines theoretical 
constructs from three strands of literature. 
X1 
Introduction 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Questions 
The aim of this study is to achieve a better understanding of tax planning in practice, 
identifying and taking account of the multiple arenas within which it operates, and 
thereby highlighting its social and institutional dimensions (Hopwood and Miller, 
1994). Following calls in the literature for such a perspective on accounting 
(Hopwood, 1983) many studies have followed (Hopwood and Miller, 1994). Despite 
the importance of tax planning for organisations (Mills, Erickson and Maydew, 
1998), and the rich social, political and economic context of the tax arena, there has 
been very little attention given to this extremely important aspect of accounting, 
which takes an institutional sociological perspective (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Scott, 2001; Zucker, 1991), as is the way that has been done 
in this study. This study provides important insights and knowledge on how tax 
planning is managed, through addressing the practice and process of tax planning, in 
the context of the internal and external environments within which it operates. This 
study comes within the accounting research tradition within taxation research, ' 
recognising taxation as `a specialist practice area of accounting' (Lamb, 2005: p. 55) s 
Tax is a cost that needs to be accounted for and managed. 3 As noted by Shackelford 
and Shevlin (2001), `the literature suggests that financial accounting management and 
' The terms 'tax' and 'taxation' are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
2 See Lamb, Lymer, Freedman and James (2005) for a detailed review of the accounting and other 
research traditions within tax research namely legal, economic, political science and social policy. 
'Throughout this thesis the term 'tax' refers to the discipline of tax or the tax department or function 
within an organisation, as the context requires. 
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tax management are not independent and neither consistently dominates the other in 
decision making' (p. 327). 
Empirically, this study provides a focus on US multinational corporations (MNCs) 
and is concerned primarily with tax planning in respect of corporation tax namely tax 
on the income streams of companies, and to a lesser extent indirect taxes. It 
addresses four specific research questions as follows: 
Research Question One: How is the tax planning function organised and conducted in 
MNCs? 
This question is concerned with understanding the organisation of the tax function 
within MNCs, incorporating the profile of the in-house tax department, the resources 
at the tax department's disposal, and the relationship between the tax department 
(through its executives) and other departments, including accounting. This question, 
critically, is also concerned with the strategic alignment of tax, its embeddedness 
within an organisation and the principles guiding the tax executives' overall approach 
to tax planning. 
Research Question Two: How is the performance of the tax planning function 
measured in MNCs? 
This question is concerned with establishing what quantitative and qualitative 
performance measurements are applied in practice to assess the performance of in- 
4 State taxes within the US were not specifically addressed. 
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house tax executives. It specifically examines the importance and role of a company's 
effective tax rate (ETR) in this context and the extent to which business units (BUs) 
are measured on a post-tax basis. This question investigates the process of 
performance measurement (PM) and its associated problems. The impact of 
performance measurements and the process applied in other organisations is also 
examined. 
Research Question Three: How is tax risk managed in MNCs? 
This question investigates the importance of tax risk management (RM), the types of 
risks facing in-house tax executives, the mechanisms of tax RM being employed and 
the extent to which the tax RM process is formalised in MNCs. It is also concerned 
with understanding the nature and drivers of the tax risk profile of in-house tax 
executives, particularly in the current context of an increased focus on regulation and 
corporate governance generally. 
Research Question Four: What is the nature and impact of the relationship between 
the tax planning function within MNCs and the external environment? 
This question is concerned with providing an overview of the key organisations and 
actors that make up the external environment, the `tax arena', as part of the `social 
reality' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) within which tax executives operate. The 
influence of the external environment on the practice and process of tax planning 
within MNCs and the influence of in-house tax executives and MNCs in the wider tax 
arena, including the tax legislature and administration, are of particular interest within 
3 
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this question. The nature, extent and effectiveness of networking and tax lobbying 
activities engaged in by tax executives directly and via professional representative 
bodies are considered. 
These research questions were unpacked into a number of objectives within each 
question which are set out in section 3.2. The remainder of this chapter is set out as 
follows: section 1.2 describes the background to and motivation for the study; section 
1.3 provides a tax and business context for the study; section 1.4 provides an 
overview of the research design; section 1.5 sets out the contribution of the study; 
finally, section 1.6 describes the layout of the thesis. 
1.2 Background and Motivation 
Tax planning is important for many organisations as is partly evidenced in part by 
research conducted by Mills, Erickson and Maydew (1998). They found a negative 
relationship exists between investments in tax planning and tax liabilities. Rego 
(2003) also provided evidence in support of economies of scale to tax planning. 5 
Picciotto (1995) posited that '[no] major deal by transnational corporations (TNCs) 
takes place without consideration of the tax implications and optimal tax 
arrangements' (p. 25). Taxation is an extremely important source of revenue for 
governments and thus significant political and social importance is attached to it. 
Indeed, there are many `players' engaged in tax activities. On the one hand there are 
taxpayers and tax advisors engaged in tax compliance and tax planning, while on the 
s Rego (2003) believes her study `responds to Collins and Shackleford (1999), who cite a lack of 
empirical evidence regarding the ability of multinational corporations to pay less income tax than 
domestic-only firms' (p. 828). 
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other hand there are various public servants (i. e. government finance ministers and 
department officials) engaged in tax policy formulation and implementation. These 
various players have different objectives but they are all looking to the one tax system 
with a view to satisfying these objectives. Taxpayers, with the aid of their tax 
advisors, attempt to engage in effective tax strategies (not necessarily tax 
minimisation) concerning all aspects of their own businesses. In contrast, tax 
policymakers, have a much broader range of economic and social objectives which 
must be met through the tax system. They must also consider the demands of special 
interest and other constituency groups when formulating tax policy, and endeavour to 
develop a tax system that has minimal economic distortions. This obvious lack of 
goal congruence presents opportunities and costs for both sets of players. 
Tax legislation, however, is not without its problems. Indeterminate or uncertain tax 
laws (see section 1.3 which addresses uncertainty of tax laws further) frequently gives 
rise to exploitation of loopholes in the tax legislation by taxpayers. Such exploitation 
is usually not unanticipated by the legislature and it amounts to taxpayers working 
within the law technically but against the spirit of the law. Many tax reduction or 
elimination opportunities presented to businesses are not planned, or indeed 
anticipated, by tax policymakers. Exploiting these opportunities, however, is legal 
and many compliant taxpayers do so frequently. Such compliance exploitation 
essentially undermines the policy behind the legislation and in itself becomes a 
problem for policymakers. The response of the tax policymakers, sometimes which 
may involve introducing more legislation (commonly referred to as anti-avoidance 
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legislation), can be a long, costly, difficult and sometimes ineffective way of 
implementing desired tax policy. It is also generally not well received by the 
taxpaying community. If tax policymakers had a better understanding of the practice 
and process of tax planning within corporations - the subject matter of this thesis - 
they might be more effective in implementing the desired tax policy. 
Such an understanding may also assist tax policymakers in dealing with the rapidly 
changing technological environment, globalisation and Europeanization. This would 
encapsulate the need for policymakers to understand the extent to which tax 
considerations drive business decisions. In support of this viewpoint, Hines (1999), 
when noting the importance of information on the responsiveness of taxpayers to, for 
example, worldwide tax rate differences and international tax rules, argues that such 
responsiveness, `in turn carries implications for the design of domestic as well as 
international tax policy' (p. 305). There is some evidence to suggest tax policymakers 
and administrators are interested in understanding business better. For example, the 
Irish Revenue refers to the need for its goals to be `rooted in the reality of our 
business environment' (Revenue, 2003). 6 In the UK, the Inland Revenue has also 
identified a need for tax inspectors to better understand `business drivers' and `to 
improve understanding of developments in the changing business environment in 
which multinationals operate' (Inland Revenue, 2001). Such understandings have 
benefits for both taxpayers and tax policymakers. The Revenue's ability to make 
6 The Revenue in Ireland comes under the ambit of the government's Department of Finance. It is 
responsible for the tax administration and has some input to tax policy. Its UK counterpart is the Inland 
Revenue (now Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs following the merger with Her Majesty's Customs 
and Excise in 2006) and its USA counterpart is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
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more efficient use of its resources, to anticipate tax avoidance behaviour and products 
and to more effectively manage the taxpayer thereby ensures that the appropriate 
Exchequer returns will be enhanced. The taxpayers may enjoy faster resolution of 
issues, improved tax planning capabilities and greater certainty with regard to future 
tax liabilities. This study provides important insights and knowledge on tax planning 
in practice in US MNCs. 
My interest in the discipline of taxation developed primarily from my time as tax 
advisor at consultant and subsequently at manager level with Price Waterhouse, a 
predecessor firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). During this time I provided tax 
advice to large MNCs on a wide variety of business decisions and this experience has, 
in part, shaped the focus of the research questions posed in this study. I was always 
aware of seeing only one side of the picture i. e. the one portrayed to me by the MNC 
employees I dealt with. On occasions, I was aware that our tax advice was only partly 
acted on, and sometimes never acted on, but we were not always told why. This gave 
rise to my interest in seeking to understand the practice and process of tax planning 
from the MNC perspective. I became very aware of the potential importance of 
relationships between tax advisors and clients, and, more importantly in the context of 
this study, between in-house tax executives and their colleagues within their 
respective own corporations and their counterparts in other corporations and with 
Revenue officials. As a member of a professional institute (the Irish Taxation 
Institute), I was acutely aware of tax lobbying activities but only from a tax advisor's 
perspective. I was always interested in the extent to which MNCs engage directly or 
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through representative groups in tax lobbying and the degree to which such lobbying 
is considered necessary and effective. As a tax advisor, one can easily overrate the 
influence of tax on business decisions. I was keen to understand from the client's 
perspective the role of tax in business decisions, how the strategic alignment of tax 
with business decisions was managed in practice and, ultimately, why tax seemed to 
matter more in some MNCs than others. 
My subsequent move into academia provided me with the opportunity to consider the 
above issues from an academic, and arguably, a more objective perspective. It was 
during this time, through my reading of academic literature and keeping up to date on 
topical matters within the tax arena, that it became apparent that the areas of tax risk 
management and performance measurement warranted further study, particularly 
from the taxpayer's perspective. It was during this time also that I became very aware 
of the growing recognition that tax policymakers and their administrators need to 
understand business better, as described above. This study was motivated, in part, by 
my desire to enhance this understanding and thereby contribute to tax policy 
formulation and debate. 
In addition to the above, as a full-time academic with a strong interest in developing 
the taxation research agenda, I was highly motivated to undertake this study by the 
need to make a significant contribution to knowledge when exploring the above areas 
of interest. This study makes such a contribution in a number of ways as described in 
section 1.5. 
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1.3 Tax Context and Business Environment 
This section draws attention to a number of contextual matters relating to taxation and 
the wider business environment within which tax executives operate. They constitute 
an important backdrop to this study and were taken into consideration at all stages of 
the study. 
Uncertainty of Tax Legislation 
It is important to be aware from the outset of the uncertainty of many tax laws. 
McBamet (2001a) referred to the fallibility of drafting law, leaving law frequently 
open to interpretation. Arguably, some uncertainty is intended and some is not. 
According to Edelman and Suchman (1997) `the history of regulation is replete with 
unintended consequences' (p. 488). It is this very uncertainty that gives rise to 
challenges and opportunities for tax executives in business and has explanatory power 
in terms of understanding some of the findings of this study on the practice and 
process of tax planning. Such uncertainty or indeterminacy within tax laws is not 
necessarily a bad thing. For example, Picciotto (1995) posited, when referring to the 
meaning of company residence for tax purposes that `key elements of ambiguity as to 
its scope have provided a flexibility which appears to have suited both the Inland 
Revenue and corporate tax planners, at least during the period of international 
economic expansion in the 1950s and 1960s' (p. 29). 7 The uncertainty of tax laws is 
an important and recurring theme throughout this thesis. 
In the UK. 
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Silicon Valley 
This study focuses on MNCs based in the Silicon Valley (SV) area of California. This 
is not a formal geographical area but is understood to encompass the area between 
San Francisco and San Jose, California. 8 There is a concentration of high-tech 
companies and service providers to these companies located in the area. Importantly 
in the context of this study, which draws on NIS, as noted by Kenney (2000), SV `is 
indeed a rich prize for social science theories' (p. 1). 9 All of the companies in this 
study are public corporations and the corporation tax system in the US is, as 
expressed by Slemrod (2005), an `extra burden' which `may, at the margin, be a 
disincentive to being public' (p. 92). 
Planning Versus Compliance 
This study is concerned with tax planning in practice and focuses on US MNCs. As 
noted in section 2.2.4, there are many references to `tax planning', `effective tax 
planning' and `international tax planning' which are not explicitly defined. For the 
purposes of this study, a simple definition of `tax plan' is provided as `the tax 
aspects/structure of any business activity or plan'. Interviewees who participated in 
this study agreed with this definition. Tax planning refers therefore to any activity or 
process concerning the consideration of the tax aspects/implications of any business 
activity/transaction. Tax planning is frequently equated with tax avoidance and the 
1 As described in the Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group website: http: //www. svtdg. org/ 
9 See Kenney (2000) for an informative read on the history of SV, and some observations and 
explanations around critical institutions and organisational routines for the region. 
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latter term is frequently associated with exploiting opportunities presented through 
inadequate legislation. Importantly, however, tax avoidance is not illegal. 10 
It is important to note from the outset that, while this study focuses on tax planning as 
described above, it became apparent very early on that in-house tax executives are 
frequently involved in both tax planning and tax compliance work, and have 
important and insightful views on the definitional differences between planning and 
compliance, with one interviewee believing the distinction to be, for the most part, 
`blurred' (TE 22). " While compliance is largely understood to refer to administration 
(incorporating, for example, data collection and completion and filing of tax returns), 
interviewees see them as inextricably linked. TE 9 believes `you kind of have to be 
involved in the planning sometimes to do the compliance and vice versa'. He posits: 
Really good planning ought to spring in some ways from what you see when 
you are doing compliance: understanding why you are paying more tax, 
identifying opportunities to not pay as much tax when you are doing that 
compliance... Tax planning that is done by people who don't, have never done 
a tax return for a living and in some cases don't even know what a tax return 
looks like, often has fatal flaws in it. 
TE 24 referred to there being a significant overlap between planning and compliance 
where the tax personnel are integrated and `cross-train'. It was not surprising, 
therefore, to find that in practice, in-house tax departments are not organised along 
planning and compliance lines. It tends to be based on jurisdiction (e. g. US) or tax 
10 This contrasts with tar evasion which is illegal and involves paying no tax or reducing one's tax 
liability outside the law. I recognise that in practice the concept of `tax avoidance' is not always simple 
or certain. Some further discussion takes place on this matter in section 2.2.4. A more detailed 
discussion of this matter however is outside the scope of this study. 
11 'TE' denotes tax executive. 
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speciality (e. g. income tax or sales tax). See section 4.2 for detailed findings on the 
profile of in-house tax departments. 
TE 11 referred to a former boss of his who defined tax planning as `the ability to 
change the facts' whereas tax compliance is `after the facts' or according to his 
current boss, `making the best of the facts as they are'. TE 21 defined tax compliance 
as `the sort of day-to-day bread and butter functions that you have to do' whereas 
planning refers to `the things that you can do to minimize your tax cost'. The latter 
would involve, according to TE 7, restructuring, going for advance rulings from the 
tax authorities, negotiations with foreign governments and so on. While tax 
compliance was therefore discussed to some extent therefore in the interviews, the 
focus of this study and the findings as presented in Chapters Four to Seven inclusive 
are primarily focused on the practice and process of tax planning. Direct reference to 
tax compliance has been kept to a minimum. 
Business and Regulatory Environment 
MNCs operate in and typically seek to operate in many different countries, all with 
different taxation regimes. This presents both challenges and opportunities from a tax 
perspective as tax executives seek to take advantage of these differences. The range 
of challenges and opportunities are changing constantly, as is the business terrain 
within which MNCs are operating. The latter includes a changing economic context 
(global competition and internationalisation of markets), changing technologies 
(different ways of doing business), changing management styles and new 
organisational forms (which may require or give rise to new inter-organisational 
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networks, strategic alliances, outsourcing and so on). In response, James (2005) 
expects to see increased complexity in tax systems around the globe with continued 
tax competition between countries and little chance of complete tax systems 
alignment in the near future. 12 Such complexity, and continued differences in tax 
systems will, it could be argued, require a more complex and comprehensive response 
by MNCs which could result in taxation being positioned higher up the corporate 
agenda. According to James (2005), `there is likely to remain considerable scope for 
business strategies to take account of such differences' (p. 164). 
Focus has also recently been put on taxation in this post-Enron, WorldCom 
environment, in which Slemrod (2005) posits there is a `rethinking of the governance 
of public corporation, and a new set of laws' (p. 91), which includes taxation. 
Consequently, US disclosure requirements have been increased in the areas of public 
accounting and IRS requirements. One of the most significant changes in this context 
was the introduction of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which was referred to 
many times by the interviewees. SOX constitutes the US federal response to a number 
of major corporate and accounting scandals including those affecting Enron, Tyco 
International and WorldCom. 13 This changing regulatory environment brings with it 
12 Despite recent efforts towards tax harmonisation in the EU for example, James (2005) provides 
evidence to support the view that considerable differences still exists between countries in terms of tax 
rates and the structure and administration of tax systems. 
" SOX established new/enhanced standards for all US public company boards, management, and 
public accounting firms. It also established a new `quasi-public' agency, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), also referred to by many of the interviewees. This Board is 
charged with overseeing, regulating, inspecting, and disciplining accounting firms in their roles as 
auditors of public companies. Interviewees were particularly exercised about s. 404 of SOX which 
requires management and the external auditor to report on the adequacy of the company's internal 
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an era of calls for increasing accountability, resulting in an expected increased focus 
on areas like RM, and specifically tax RM (see Chapter Six). This study, which has a 
clear focus on management-type issues (tax strategy development, RM, PM etc. ), is 
certainly timely. Its findings unveil a significant level of consciousness among tax 
executives of this changing regulatory and corporate governance type environment, 
and indicates how such a consciousness is penetrating into the practice and process of 
tax planning. 
While a range of tax- related topics or areas of business are referred to throughout this 
thesis, two in particular warrant a specific mention at this stage as they represent 
areas which are under regular scrutiny by tax authorities throughout the world, and 
they both feature in this study as important areas in the context of RM (see section 
6.3). The first of these is transfer pricing, the `pricing of business transactions 
between associated persons' (Miller and Oats, 2006: p. 205), such as a parent and its 
subsidiary. Transfer prices can be manipulated to shift income from one tax 
jurisdiction (high tax) to another one (low tax). Not surprisingly, tax authorities try to 
prevent such manipulation and abuse of transfer prices. For the companies involved 
in this study, which have transactions with many related parties ('associated persons' 
in the above definition), transfer pricing is an extremely important consideration in a 
tax-planning context. The second related area to highlight concerns the existence and 
tax implications of a permanent establishment, `a fixed place of business through 
which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on' (Miller and Oats, 
control over financial reporting. The latter therefore, requires documenting and testing important 
manual and automated controls with respect to tax. 
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2006: p. 116)14. It includes, a branch, place of management, office and so forth. As 
noted by Miller and Oats, this concept is `crucial to the taxation of business profits' 
(p. 115) and is thereby of great interest to in-house tax executives. Generally a state 
has taxing rights once it is established that a permanent establishment exists in that 
state. This concept is important therefore in the context of setting transfer prices as 
referred to above. 15 
1.4 Overview of Research Design 
In order to pursue this study's overriding concern with understanding tax planning in 
practice four distinct research questions were posed. These questions were in turn, 
unpacked into a number of objectives attached to each question (see section 3.2). 
These questions and objectives were informed by the literature on tax planning 
(section 2.2), the conceptual framework (section 3.4) and the findings from 
exploratory interviews. 
After much consideration, an interpretive inductive methodological approach was 
adopted (section 3.3.1), as it is very well suited to obtaining the insights and 
understandings about tax planning in practice, which is the subject of this thesis. In 
line with this overall approach, the face-to-face interview method was the main 
research method employed. Following a detailed literature review and the 
14 Miller and Oats (2006) draw on the OECD Commentary on the Model Tax Convention for the 
meaning of 'permanent establishment'. 
15 While 'transfer pricing' and 'permanent establishment' will be referred to throughout this thesis a 
further focused discussion on them is beyond the scope of this study. 
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construction of a draft theoretical framework, an interview schedule was drawn up 
and used as a guide when carrying out the in-depth semi-structured interviews. I 
carried out these interviews with the heads of tax and/or senior tax managers within 
fifteen US MNCs in the information technology sector, all based in the Silicon Valley 
area of California. Section 3.5 sets out the rationale for focusing on these companies 
and individuals and section 3.6.2 describes the interview process. I also carried out 
secondary research, namely detailed examination of the companies' IOKs, their 
websites, recent company press releases, press comments, and internet-accessible 
executive biographies of the interviewees. 16 Material on recent legislation, considered 
to give context to some of the interview discussions was also reviewed, such as the 
Sarbanes Oxley 2002 Act 2002. 
The primary data collected, consisting of interview transcriptions, post-interview 
notes, and email correspondence received from a number of the interviewees, was 
analysed with the assistance of NVivo, a well-recognised piece of coding and 
computer-aided data analysis software (CAQDAS). Section 3.7 describes this process 
in detail. Following this detailed data analysis process, the theoretical framework was 
revisited and refined, resulting in the final framework as described in section 3.4. This 
framework represents the convergence of theoretical explanatory concepts from tax 
planning literature, new institutional sociology (NIS) and endogeneity of law and is 
presented in two stages. The first stage (see Figure 3.1), drawing on Dillard et al. 's 
(2004) framework, sets the scene by encapsulating the three levels of social systems 
16 Form 10K is the annual report that publicly quoted companies file with the U. S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission (SEC). It provides a comprehensive overview of the company's business. 
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within which corporate tax executives operate: the economic and political level, the 
organisational field level and the organisational level. Key actors operating at each 
level are identified and section 3.4.1.4 describes the dynamics of this framework. The 
second stage, as represented in Figure 3.2 incorporates the key theoretical constructs 
drawn from the tax planning literature (for example, income shifting (Scholes and 
Wolfson, 1992); communication and interpersonal skills (Wilson, 1995)); NIS (for 
example legitimacy (Scott, 2001; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991); institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b); decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1991); 
power and politics (Perrow, 1985; Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988)); and endogeneity of 
law (for example the reciprocal relationship between regulated and regulatee 
(Suchman and Edelman, 1996)). The data analysis and the theoretical framework 
ultimately formed the platform from which the structure and presentation of the 
findings chapters evolved (Chapters Four to Seven inclusive). 
1.5 Contribution of the Study 
This study makes a significant contribution to our knowledge of tax planning in 
practice. It identifies and fills gaps in the literature, responds to specific calls for this 
type of research in the literature, adopts an interpretive methodological approach to 
enhance our understanding of tax planning in practice, advances the development of 
theoretical constructs through the construction and application of a unique theoretical 
framework, recognises the social and political influences inherent in tax policy 
development and implementation, and highlights tax policy implications of the 
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findings, as set out in this section. These contributions serve to uncover the `black 
box' of taxation. 
This study fills a number of specific gaps in the tax planning literature by addressing 
a number of aspects of tax planning not previously addressed. For example, in 
relation to tax strategy, this study provides an understanding of how a strategic role 
for the tax function is defined, mapped out, implemented, managed and monitored on 
an ongoing basis in complex, ever-changing organisations. It provides valuable 
insights into the relationship that exists in practice between tax executives within 
MNCs and the organisational field (including lobbying and networking), within 
which it operates, and thereby uncovers the significant impact which members of the 
that organisational field (for example professional representative bodies) have on the 
practice and process of tax planning within these companies and visa vice versa. 
At an empirical level, this study makes a contribution to the tax planning literature (as 
reviewed in section 2.2) through the interviews conducted with the `elites' of tax 
planning in practice i. e. senior tax executives in US MNCs. Securing access to such 
individuals is exceptional and the insights gained as a result are equally exceptional. 
As described in section 3.3.1, the carefully-selected interpretive methodological 
approach adopted in this research provides a new and rich perspective on tax planning 
in practice, highlighting some shortcomings of positivistic approaches. 
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This study contributes to knowledge by directly responding to calls in the literature 
for this type of research. For example, as noted by Lamb (2005), `the organization 
and management of taxation remain research problems that have been little explored' 
(p. 70). Glenn Hubbard referred to `the paucity of information about the role of tax 
planning in multinationals' decisions' (Wilson, 1993: p. 232)17. Roberts and Bobek 
(2004) called for studies at the organisational level `to investigate the motivation and 
execution of managerial strategies that are undertaken to influence tax laws' (p. 587). 
Hopwood (1983) called for the examination of accounting, of which tax is an 
important element, in the context within which it operates, recognising the multiple 
arenas within which it operates and thereby taking account of its social and 
institutional nature (Hopwood and Miller, 1994). As noted by Hopwood (1983), `we 
have a very limited understanding of the forces that either influence accounting 
change or help to shape the different forms the accounting craft can take' (p. 289). 
While some of the studies referred to in the tax planning literature review did produce 
some interesting findings with respect to, for example, to the organisation of the tax 
function18, there was no conceptual framework employed for the purposes of 
constructing/conducting the studies and interpreting the findings. This study makes a 
significant theoretical contribution through developing a conceptual framework 
(section 3.4), which (i) provides a rich descriptive framework of the tax arena within 
which tax planning takes place, drawing particular attention to powerful actors in the 
11 Glenn Hubbard made this comment when recognising the importance of Wilson's (1993) research. 
Wilson's study was concerned with how taxes influence companies' decisions on capacity expansion 
(the location decision) and on the use of existing capacity (the sourcing decision). 
18 For example, Porter (1999a), Porter (1999b) and PWC (2001). 
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organisational field level of analysis, and (ii) uniquely combines relevant theoretical 
constructs from tax planning literatures (for example Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; 
Douglas et al., 1996), NIS (for example Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1991; Scott, 2001) and endogeneity of law (for example Suchman and 
Edelman, 1996; Edelman et al., 1999) literatures. The explanatory power of this 
framework is in evidence throughout this study as it serves to enhance our 
understanding of tax planning in practice - the overriding aim of this study. 
Applying this framework in a tax context, a specialist area of accounting, serves also 
to develop our understanding of the theoretical constructs themselves contained 
therein. Scott (2001) posits that institutional theory will `benefit greatly by continuing 
to cultivate connections with law and society scholars..., students of society and 
accounting... All of these communities bring theoretical insights and useful 
methodologies to our understanding of institutions and institutional change 
processes'. 19 It contributes to what Edelman and Suchman (1997) refer to as `the 
growing literature that discusses the endogeneity between law and organisations' 
(p. 479), which they posit is still at a very early stage and needs to be developed 
conceptually. This research is a response therefore to Covaleski et al. 's (2007b) call 
for further research probing `the institutional pressures by means of the very active 
agency of political actors who manipulate regulations to serve their own 
19 While three strands of institutional theory have emerged in the literature, namely old institutional 
economics, new institutional economics and new institutional sociology, a detailed discussion of these 
three strands is outside the scope of this study. This study is concerned only with the new institutional 
sociology perspective. See DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Moll et al. (2006) for a comparison of 
these three institutional isms. 
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interests... and effects of regulators who seek to curb this manipulation through pre- 
emptive and ex-post orchestration of regulations' (p. 38). 
Through Research Question Four, this study recognises the social and political 
influences inherent in tax policy development and implementation. Roberts and 
Bobek (2004) identify not recognising such influences as being `[a] significant result 
of the adoption of strict neoclassical assumptions in accounting policy research' 
(p. 565) and they go on to identify `a strong need for academic research that explores 
the corporate/state relationship' by addressing collective political influence and 
strategic political activities of corporations. Importantly, they also highlight that 
empirical research drawing on the Scholes and Wolfson (1992) paradigm (which 
takes a microeconomic approach), `fails to recognize the state as a negotiable 
contracting party and the structure of tax accounting laws as endogenous to a 
corporations' tax planning activities' (p. 566). (See section 2.2.4 for a review of the 
Scholes and Wolfson framework and section 2.3.4 for a review of literature on 
endogeneity of law). 
While the tax literature does provide a number of definitions of `tax planning' (see 
section 2.2.4), it does not address the extent to which the practice of tax planning is 
different to tax compliance, nor to what extent in practice they are intertwined in 
practice. As a by-product, this study explains the distinction/relationship between tax 
planning and compliance and the impact of this distinction/relationship on the 
practice and process of tax planning. 
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Finally, this study contributes by drawing attention to the tax policy implications of 
its findings, thereby informing the tax policy debate (Shevlin, 1999), through, inter 
alia, exploring the corporate/state relationship as referred to above and providing 
information which enhances a State's understanding of taxpayers' motivations and 
behaviour. 
These areas of contribution as identified here are reflected in the substance of the four 
research questions and associated research objectives as detailed in section 3.2. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter Two reviews the pertinent literature from three distinct strands of literature, 
namely, tax planning, NIS and endogeneity of law. These three strands of literature 
together inform the conceptual framework developed in this study. Chapter Three sets 
out the four research questions posed in this study, and their associated objectives. 
Critical areas of methodology are addressed here, including the overall 
methodological approach adopted in this study, the research methods employed, 
interviewee selection, the interview process and data analysis. The theoretical 
framework and its dynamics are also described in detail in this chapter also. Chapters 
Four to Seven inclusive present the findings of this study, making theoretical 
inferences, drawing on the theoretical framework from Chapter Three throughout. 
These chapters respond to the four research questions posed in this study, 
highlighting the predominant themes which arose in the detailed data analysis stage. 
Finally, Chapter Eight summarises the key findings and implications of this study, my 
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contribution to knowledge from this study, and makes some recommendations for 
further research arising from this study. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of a review of three strands of literature, namely tax planning, 
new institutional sociology (NIS), and endogeneity of law. Core aspects of these 
literatures are drawn upon to construct a conceptual framework for this study. This 
framework provides the theoretical lens through which the findings of this study are 
analysed and discussed in Chapters Four to Seven inclusive20 (see 3.4 for 
development of the conceptual framework). Section 2.2 reviews the tax planning 
literature and is structured on the basis of the key thematic areas of tax and strategy, 
organisation of the tax function, performance measurement (PM), the technical nature 
of tax planning and tax risk management (RM). Section 2.3 reviews the pertinent 
literature on NIS, and is extended to incorporate the role of power and powerful 
actors in an NIS context. This section also draws upon and reviews the core 
theoretical insights of the endogeneity of law literature. It concludes by addressing 
how research in the accounting and taxation domain has drawn on the NIS 
perspective. 
20 Investigating the practice and process of tax planning could also be carried out drawing on judgment 
and decision making literature. The latter was given some consideration but was not considered the 
most appropriate lens to be used in this research. As noted in section 8.4 however, addressing the 
findings of this study through such alternative theoretical perspectives provides future research 
opportunities. 
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2.2 Tax Planning 
This section presents a review of the pertinent literature on the nature of tax planning 
and the tax planning process. It clearly identifies a major `gap' in the tax planning 
literature, namely, a need to understand how organisations create, formulate and 
administer their tax plans. It identifies other `gaps' in the literature concerning, for 
example, the area of research methodology. While the literature reviewed is clearly 
interdisciplinary and comes from a diverse range of academic disciplines (for 
example, accounting, law, organisational theory), very distinctive themes emerged, 
which provided the impetus for the structure of the literature review presented here. 
Many aspects of this literature were drawn upon when constructing the interview 
schedule, and will be revisited in the course of analysing the findings. 
2.2.1 Tax and Strategy 
This section reviews the literature which is concerned with tax strategy and its 
alignment with overall business strategy. This includes addressing the importance of 
tax within organizations i. e. the embeddedness of tax. There is no overall consensus 
on how important tax actually is in organisations. For instance, Porter (1999a) 
reported that just over 50% of tax managers surveyed `believe their company's 
directors accord "considerable" or "very great" importance to minimising tax 
liabilities' (p. 36). There is some debate in the literature about the role of tax in 
business decisions, the extent to which tax personnel should be consulted when 
business decisions are being made and what types of business decisions merit a tax 
input. Wilson (1995) questions therefore whether an in-house tax professional is 
perceived as a `tax policeman', `service provider' or `business partner'. 
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The tax literature is not, however, short however of advocates of the strategic 
importance of tax. Valente (2002) posits the `strategic alignment of the taxation 
variable with the goals pursued by top management' as representing `the most 
forward-looking approach within the multinational entrepreneurial scenario'. He 
notes that globalisation has tax implications from both the perspective of states and 
enterprises. It presents the former with obstacles and challenges but the latter with 
new opportunities. He sees the strategic vision for taxation policy within 
multinational groups as taking place on a global scale and is `consequently 
implemented (on a corporate level) in a transnational spirit, to the primary benefit of 
the country in which the top holding resides'. According to Hines (1999), 
`[i]nternational tax rules and the tax laws of other countries have the potential to 
influence a wide range of corporate and individual behavior' (p. 308), and he 
continues `there is considerable evidence that tax considerations strongly influence 
the choices that firms make' (p. 313). 21 Picciotto (1995) posited: `No major deal by 
transnational corporations (TNCs) takes place without consideration of the tax 
implications and optimal tax arrangements' (p. 25). Yancey and Cravens (1998) 
alluded to the importance of a company's tax strategy complementing and thereby 
having a role to play in implementing a company's overall business strategy. Karayan 
and Swenson (2007) posit that `good decision makers generally seek to manage taxes 
on every major transaction' (p. 7) and that tax management should `work to enhance 
21 When structuring and financing investments, related parties' transactions and profit distribution. 
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the firm's strategy and should not cause the firm to engage in tax-minimising 
transactions' (p. 63). 
Notwithstanding the above, James (2005) highlights the `pervasive nature of taxation 
in commercial transactions' (p. 154), when making the case for incorporating taxation 
into business strategy and calls for consideration of economic, legal and accounting 
aspects of taxation when including taxation in the process of developing business 
strategy. He expresses some surprise therefore that `there are textbooks on business 
strategy that hardly mention taxation' (p. 154), Glaister and Hughes (2008) point out 
that `in general, models which set out the prescriptive approach to strategic 
management make no reference to tax implications of strategic decisions' (p. 34). The 
dearth of consideration of tax issues in the strategy and management literature 
contributes to the `black box' status of tax. Interestingly, James (2005) does not focus 
on the inclusion of tax in this context as a technical tax exercise but as a `process of 
incorporating tax considerations regarding present and likely future tax developments 
along with all the other relevant factors in strategic business decision making' 
(p. 164). Similarly, Holzman (1965) believes that most management decisions have 
tax consequences which should be addressed, and the management group must `know 
enough about taxation to solve the organizational, commercial and financial problems 
that have to be met' (p. 6). The latter emphasises the importance of effective 
communication and relationships skills, which are at the core of Wilson's (1995) 
efforts to find ways to have senior management and in-house tax personnel work 
together towards optimisation of after-tax profits. 
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Porter (1999a) refers to prior research in the investment/fund management area which 
concluded that shareholder value analysis is the single most useful technique for 
valuing and appraising a company. This research also found that a company's cash 
tax rate is one of the most important drivers of shareholder value. It follows therefore 
that `managing cash tax liabilities to gain maximum financial advantage should be a 
key corporate objective' (p. 32). This gives rise, she argues, to two divergent 
components i. e. tax compliance and planning. There are definitional issues 
concerning `compliance' and `planning' which have implications for organisation of 
the tax function in MNCs which would question the extent to which these could be 
considered `divergent' in practice (see sections 1.3 and 4.2). 
PWC (2001) found that internal marketing of the tax function to colleagues in other 
functions is an important task in the context of the tax function helping to implement 
an organisation's corporate strategy. These colleagues are like customers and should 
be supported through seminars, training and road shows. They refer to an increasing 
interest in the tax function at Board level arising from an awareness of `the 
contribution that effective tax planning can make to corporate strategy' (p. 3). KPMG 
(2005) set out to `stimulate further discussion at board level as well as below and help 
tax, its oversight and management, be responsive to industry preferred practice 
developments in an ever changing world' (p. 1). The latter, of course, is evidence of 
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tax practitioners trying to push tax on to the Boardroom agenda. 22 This research 
investigates further the factors which influence the perception of tax within MNCs 
and the resultant real impact of tax on the way business is done. 
PWC (2001) found that most tax directors' focus was still on the larger strategic plan 
but that they would like to increase dialogue with the business units. Tax directors 
said the people they need to influence mostly are the finance directors and CEOs. 
They must get Board approval on for things before getting them accepted at operating 
level (some said the former is sometimes easier). This study investigates the current 
level and drivers of interaction between tax and the Board. As noted by Glaister and 
Frecknall Hughes (2008), there are some unanswered questions including `how 
within the firm strategic decision-makers interface with tax decision-makers' (p. 34). 
The extent to which tax is embedded strategically in organisations could also be a 
function of the size of the organisation, with Rego (2003) positing that `large firms 
generally engage in more business activities and more financial transactions than 
small firms do, thereby providing more opportunities to avoid income taxes' (p. 812). 
The size of the companies that participated in this study was a factor to be considered 
when engaging in purposive sampling (see section 3.5). There is a counter argument 
however, as also acknowledged by Rego (2003) also whereby `proponents of the 
political cost hypothesis argue that larger firms are likely to pay more income taxes 
22 I acknowledge the vested business interests of tax advisors in this context. This is not only a US 
phenomenon, see KPMG (2005) Tax in the Boardroom: A Discussion Paper, and HMRC Tax in the 
Boardroom (http: //www. hmrc. gov. uk/lbo/tax-in-the-boardroom. htm). 
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than smaller firms do, as a result of increased visibility and government scrutiny and 
expropriation of resources' (p. 812)23. My study addresses various aspects of the 
external political tax environment including the process of engaging with it, and the 
potential costs/benefits of such engagement (Research Question Four). 
While there is some consensus in the literature that tax should be strategically 
important, and yet that it sometimes struggles to really matter greatly in practice, 
none of the research has gained a real understanding of how a strategic role for the tax 
function is defined, mapped out, implemented, managed and monitored on an 
ongoing basis in complex, ever-changing organisations. Also this literature fails to 
examine the formalisation (or not) of an overall tax strategy/mission within MNCs, 
and the factors which establish the importance of tax (tax embeddedness) within these 
organisations. This includes, for example, the role of key players such as the CFO, the 
extent to which tax is integral to the way business is done within MNCs, and the 
extent to which tax personnel understand and/or are enabled to understand the 
business within which they are operating. 
2.2.2 Organisation of the Tax Function 
An obvious question for all organisations, particularly large organisations, is how best 
to organise the tax function. The tax function comprises compliance and planning 
both of which are referred to in this context. Decisions concerning whether to have an 
in-house tax department, whether to outsource some or all of the tax function and the 
23 Zimmerman (1983) discusses the `political cost hypothesis' in detail. 
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extent to which external advisors should be consulted are among the key 
considerations addressed in the literature. 
PWC (2001) found that as complexity increases, tax directors must establish clear 
responsibility for direct and indirect tax compliance and support in overseas 
territories and ensure those reporting lines are briefed on tax issues. Responsibilities 
for overseas territories are expected to be of great relevance and importance to the 
companies involved in this study due to their presence in so many countries, all with 
different tax regimes and different tax risk exposures. 
An important aspect of organisation of the tax function concerns the decision around 
outsourcing. Levine and Lerner (1993) discuss the opportunities and challenges for 
the corporate tax executive arising from outsourcing the tax function or even 
considering outsourcing it. They see the climate of discussion on outsourcing as a 
wake-up call for the tax executives within companies and it should be seen as an 
opportunity for the tax section to highlight the value added by them and the many 
benefits they provide, which is at least in part, a function of good communications 
between the tax executives and management generally. They also refer to the 
importance of good communication and open dialogue between the tax executive and 
the auditor. According to Levine and Lerner (1993), the in-house tax executive must 
be able to combine technical competence with `an understanding of the corporation's 
goals... ongoing experience with the myriad personalities involved... knowledge of 
the company's practices... and appreciation of the corporate culture that enable the tax 
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executive to bring more to the table than the outside consultants'. The tax executive 
should also show CFOs and CEOs the advantages of evaluating operating units on an 
after-tax basis. The latter would obviously lead to operating managers becoming more 
interested in tax considerations, which would make them more open to involving the 
tax department. 
In the climate of outsourcing non-core business areas, Levine and Lerner (1993) 
advocate that the corporate tax executive should try to `transform the tax department 
from simply a service department into a strategic resource for management'. 
Essentially, tax executives should try to outsource the compliance-related work and 
spend more time on `generating tax planning ideas, reducing effective tax rates, and 
improving after-tax profitability of specific business units and the organization 
overall'. They call for the application of performance improvement methodologies for 
tax departments to achieve advantages. 
Dunbar and Phillips (2001) produced some interesting findings when testing for 
relationships between a number of organisational and environmental factors, and the 
organisation of the tax function in terms of it being outsourced or managed in-house. 
For example, they found that tax is not outsourced when top management perceives 
the interaction between tax professionals and operating managers to be important24; 
companies that generate proprietary technology25 do not tend to outsource the tax 
24 High importance was deemed in evidence where operating managers were assessed on an after-tax 
basis. 
25 Measured by investment in research and development. 
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function; larger firms tend to outsource less than small firms; evidence did not 
support the idea that companies with a wide range of activities are more likely to 
outsource the tax function; growth firms outsource more and where tax professionals 
are of a high status within the company they are less likely to outsource the tax 
function. 
Porter (1999a) presents the results of a 1996 Price Waterhouse survey of the in-house 
tax function of various UK companies. Overall, it was suggested that in-house tax 
executives could add more value by spending more time on tax planning and advisory 
work. They should `focus on tax planning (with a view to maximising tax benefits 
and minimising tax liabilities) and giving general tax advice within the organisation' 
(p. 50). Wilson (1995), whose research also addressed the matter of tax adding value, 
posits that tax professionals can add value by having and indeed always improving on 
three kinds of human capital: business knowledge, tax expertise and relationship 
skills. He also emphasises the necessity of organizational support by, for example, 
providing incentives, resources and opportunities for tax personnel. 
Clearly, companies use external advisors to various degrees and with various degrees 
of success. They are typically employed to help out with excess workloads and/or, 
generate, confirm, provide, comfort, reassure, or consult on tax planning ideas or 
proposed transactions, specialist knowledge (technically/territorially), and 
compliance. External tax advisors, important actors in the tax organisational field (see 
section 3.4), are typically placed in accountancy or legal firms. It is argued that 
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`lawyers have greater independence and can offer a more creative 
approach... Lawyers can also offer client confidentiality' (Picciotto, 1995: p. 26) 26 
According to PWC (2001), `most interviewees consider the Big Five advisers 
"essential" for management of international tax profiles because of their extensive 
international networks'. 7 In order to ensure consistent quality throughout the group, 
responsibility for appointing external advisors should be centralised. 
While the PWC studies provide some interesting findings on tax organisation issues 
there was no conceptual framework employed for the purposes of 
constructing/conducting the studies and interpreting the findings. Theoretical 
implications were not addressed. Also, the Dunbar and Phillips (2001) study 
produced some interesting findings but due to the quantitative nature of this research 
these findings are largely unexplained. It is necessary to go beyond these findings and 
seek to understand, for example, in what way does a tax professional's in-house status 
effect the out-sourcing decision? What strategic role can tax play when it is 
outsourced? Addressing these types of questions, as is done in this study, provides a 
deeper understanding of the organisation of an MNC's tax function. 
Finally, the tax literature does not address directly the extent to which the practice of 
tax planning is different to tax compliance as perceived by in-house tax personnel, 
26 Literature on the professions, for example Abbott (1988), was considered, but deemed not to provide 
an appropriate theoretical lens for the purposes of this study. 
27 The `Big Five' providers of accountancy and taxation services worldwide at the time, consisted of 
Price Waterhouse (now PricewaterhouseCoopers), Ernst and Young, Deloitte, KPMG and Arthur 
Anderson. Since the demise of Arthur Anderson, the other advisers are now referred to as the `Big 
Four'. Again, I recognise the vested business interest of PWC in this context. 
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nor to what extent in practice are compliance and planning (however defined) 
intertwined. This study obtains the participants' view of the distinction/relationship 
between tax planning and compliance and the impact of this distinction/relationship 
on the practice and process of tax planning, which ultimately impacts on the 
organisation of the tax function in MNCs (see sections 1.3 and 4.2). 
2.2.3 Performance Measurement28 
Measuring performance of tax professionals in organisations (as in other disciplines) 
can be contentious, problematic and varied. Factors often looked at include the 
effective tax rate (ETR)29, the cash rate and the accounts rate. However, PWC (2001) 
found very little uniformity on the way tax directors are appraised, and that tax 
directors were frustrated with this lack of `specific and achievable targets'. 
In terms of who evaluates the tax function, which incorporates the in-house tax 
executives, collectively referred to here as `tax', Douglas and Ellingsworth (1996) 
suggests CFOs are the principal evaluators, presumably explained by the likelihood 
that tax typically sits in the finance division. PWC (2001) say `the tax function is 
perhaps the hardest function to evaluate within an organisation' (p. 25). They suggest 
using some combination of the following measures: minimisation of penalties; 
28 A literature review on the use of financial and non-financial performance measures, and performance 
management in the non-tax related accounting literature was beyond the scope of this study (for 
example, Otley (1997); Inner and Larcker (2003); Otley (2003); Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004)). 
29The working definition for ETR in this study is: provision for income taxes/income before tax 
provision. This provision is a combination of the tax liability (which includes reserves) and deferred 
taxes as per the accounts. This definition of ETR is in accordance with one of the definitions put 
forward by Scholes and Wolfson (1992: p. 148) which they posit is popular for financial reporting 
purposes. According to Rego (2003), `the usual definition of ETRs is income taxes currently payable 
divided by pre-tax accounting income' (p. 811). My calculation of ETRs included in Appendix 6 is 
based on this definition. 
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reduction of interest on overdue tax; project team feedback; structural savings 
identified; number of initiatives adopted by the group; successful peer review; 
negotiated settlements with Revenue Authorities;, potential exposure versus agreed 
amount. Porter (1999a) referred to similar performance evaluation techniques. 
Douglas et al., (1996) referred to `traditional' performance measures being in place 
such as tax audit results and meeting compliance deadlines, but added that broader- 
based measures such as providing superior customer service and `increasing value to 
the business enterprise... appear to be the real world measures by which the 
performance of the tax department and its executives are judged'. 
In relation to the ETR, it is noteworthy that many researchers have used it to attempt 
to measure the effectiveness of tax planning such as Zimmerman, 1983; Mills et at., 
1998; Rego, 2003. According to Rego (2003), 'ETRs have been an important measure 
of corporate tax burden for policymakers and academic researchers for several 
decades' (p. 809). It should be handled with great caution however in this context 
because, as pointed out by Phillips (2003), `[a] lower ETR, however, can only proxy 
for tax savings and does not always imply that after-tax income and/or cash flows 
have been maximized' (p. 848). In Slemrod's (2005) discussion of the pros and cons 
of increasing disclosure of some tax return information, he suggests such disclosure 
might well `exacerbate the race to the bottom of ETRs' (p. 95). More interestingly 
however, he poses the question as to where shareholders think lower ETRs come 
from. While in part, it may be because some corporations have smarter tax personnel, 
he adds `savvy investors realize... that lower ETRs result from a more aggressive 
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stance that pushes the limits of what is legal' (p. 95). The latter has clear implications 
in terms of PM, and the question beckons as to whether corporations who reward the 
lowering of the ETR are simultaneously advocating or encouraging an aggressive tax 
approach which may not always be in the best interest of other stakeholders, 
including shareholders. A real sense of the extent to which the ETR exercises the 
minds of senior tax personnel within these MNCs is provided in this study (section 
5.3). Interestingly, Scholes and Wolfson (1992) believe that ETRs lack real economic 
meaning. 30 
As posited by Rego (2003), 'ETRs are an important measure of performance to a 
diverse set of stakeholders' (p. 809). Such other stakeholders include financial 
analysts, identified as important actors in the tax organisational field (section 3.4). 
Rego (2003) asserts `the widespread interest in ETRs suggests that ETRs have 
valuation implications' (p. 809). In relation to the forecasting of ETRs, for example, 
Bauman and Shaw (2005) found that `although interim ETRs are useful in predicting 
future earnings, both financial analysts and stock market investors fail to fully 
impound the earnings implications of interim effective tax rate changes in their 
decisions' (p. 57). Underlying this type of research is the assumption that ETRs do 
matter because financial analysts do to some extent monitor them and question Chief 
Financial Officers (CFOs) about them. It would be reasonable to expect therefore 
some cognisance being given in practice to the ETR in terms of performance 
30 This is largely because the two ETR definitions put forward by these authors do not take account of 
implicit taxes, which they go on to acknowledge are difficult to measure in any event and are therefore 
typically excluded from studies on corporate tax burdens. 
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measurement, not least because it is a measure easily comparable (by the analysts and 
others) with other companies. This research investigates the perceived importance of 
the ETR as a performance measure among tax personnel and of what it indicates to 
analysts (if anything) about the company's performance. As outlined by Bauman and 
Shaw (2005), under APB No. 2831 these companies estimate the annual ETR when 
making their interim (quarterly) income tax provision, and this estimate is audited 
which thus automatically merits it further attention. This is then public information, 
and it would be reasonable to expect that meeting this predicted ETR in itself may in 
itself well become an objective which translates into a measure of performance. 
Significant movements away from the predicted ETR may then need to be explained 
to the CFO/by the CFO and ultimately to the financial analysts. The use of any 
measure like this, where potential impacts on share valuation could be realised, might 
suggest some earnings-management-type activity might be engaged in, in order to 
meet the forecast (in order to prevent the potential negative market response). 32 As 
suggested by Bauman and Shaw (2005) `firms might use APB No. 28's flexibility to 
manage reported earnings to meet earnings thresholds' (p. 58). While prior research 
has been carried out concerning ETRs in the context of earnings management and 
compensation-based incentives (for example, Bauman and Shaw, 2005; Dhaliwal, 
31 APB Opinion No. 28, Interim Financial Reporting. The Accounting Principles Board (APB) is the 
former authoritative body of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). It issued 
pronouncements on accounting principles until 1973. The APB was replaced by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
32 Addressing the earnings management literature in this context is beyond the scope of this research, 
but I was interested to see how the interviewees perceive the importance of ETR in terms of 
performance measurement (such perceptions one might expect to feed into how tax personnel connect 
with/engage with the ETR) and its interpretation by financial analysts, which ultimately could impact 
on share valuation. 
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Gleason and Mills, 2004; 33 Phillips, 2003), the literature lacks any qualitative 
interpretive approach to this topic as in the way that is adopted in this study. 
When measuring performance one benchmark often used is often that of the 
competitors. This is particularly applicable with respect to ETRs. An agreed 
definition of ETR, which exists based on this study (see footnote 29 and section 5.3), 
renders such benchmarking possible. Increasing public disclosure requirements in 
terms of items like tax liability and taxable income might, according to Slemrod 
(2005), `facilitate incentive contracts for tax managers by making it easier to 
benchmark their performance against the performance of Tax departments in the 
same sector' (p. 95). In my study, Research Question Three investigates matters such 
as the extent to which benchmarking among competitors does actually take place. 
Does it matter? What aspect of tax lends itself to benchmarking? How difficult or 
easy is the benchmarking process? The US corporate tax rate provides another 
possible benchmark for assessing a company's ETR. Karayan and Swenson (2007) 
support the idea that US MNCs do actively manage their taxes by comparing the 
relatively low effective tax rates of a number of MNCs with the standard US 
corporate tax rate of 35%. This study enhances our understanding of the practice and 
process of such active management. 
33 Interestingly, they believe that tax is a suitable context for studying earnings management because it 
is 'one of the last accounts closed before earnings are announced because other income related changes 
affect the tax accounts' (p. 435). 
39 
Literature Review 
A contentious area within the PM of tax context concerns assessing the performance 
of non-tax staff on a post-tax or pre-tax basis. Arguably, if a post-tax basis is used, 
tax may well be given more attention by non-tax personnel which, ultimately, might 
result in them incorporating tax implications into their business decisions. The latter 
approach however may, however, be contested by `tax experts' who posit the view 
that consideration of the tax implications and subsequent management thereof should 
be left to the experts in the field. Phillips (2003) reasonably suggests that using the 
ETR as a measure should motivate `the manager's increased cooperation with tax 
professionals to help identify, develop, and execute tax-planning strategies' (p. 849). 34 
Wilson (1993) refers to the problem for corporate managers of trying to `ensure after- 
tax profit maximization when sourcing managers are evaluated pretax? ' (p. 226). 
Phillips (2003) does however acknowledge however one potential shortcoming in his 
study in its not taking into account costs associated with using after-tax performance 
measures. 35 Dunbar and Phillips (2001) did find companies that assessed their 
operating managers on an after-tax basis (as referred to above). Subsequently, Phillips 
(2003) used the ETR as an empirical surrogate for tax-planning effectiveness, when 
investigating if compensating business unit managers and chief executive officers 
(CEOs) on the basis of after-tax accounting based performance measures leads to 
lower ETRs. He found that compensating business unit managers only on an after-tax 
basis leads to lower ETRs. Phillips (2003) refers collectively to a number of studies in 
this area which found that `multinational status, number of operating segments, firm 
34 Examples of such cooperation would include early consultation with the tax department about plant 
location decisions or new employees coming on board. 
35 These costs would include additional wages, administration costs and possibly increased scrutiny 
from the tax authority. 
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size, and capital intensity are positively associated with after-tax CEO compensation' 
(p. 850). Companies presenting with these attributes would arguably be best 
positioned to engage in and exploit tax planning opportunities. KPMG (2005), 
recognizing that pre-tax PM still predominates, make the logical statement that 
`generally speaking, managers are not motivated by their assessment and reward 
systems to take tax into account in their day-to-day decision-making' (p. 4). In 
Wilson's (1993) study only two of the nine companies involved used after-tax 
evaluation systems. Again, however, most prior studies take a quantitative approach, 
and there are many potential measurement issues associated with the various 
variables/proxies used in such studies, many of which are acknowledged by the 
authors themselves. 36 
2.2.4 Technical Nature of Tax Planning 
There are many references in the literature to `tax planning', `effective tax planning' 
and `international tax planning'. However, such terms are often not explicitly defined. 
For the purposes of this study, it is useful, and indeed necessary, to provide a simple 
definition of what is meant by the term `tax plan'. It is defined as `the tax 
aspects/structure of any business activity or plan'. 37 This simple definition refers 
essentially to the organisation of a business activity/transaction from a tax 
perspective. It thereby considers the tax implications of any business 
36 Wilson (1995) did however, as part of a working paper carry out a number of interviews which 
included discussion on this point. 
37 After conducting some exploratory interviews I felt this short definition was appropriate and 
necessarily broad to capture the many and varied transactions/activities that could be legitimately 
categorised as 'tax planning', as well as incorporating the various aspects of tax planning reflected in 
this section of the literature review. Interviewees agreed with this definition. 
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activity/transaction. As mentioned earlier, the literature does not address directly the 
question of differentiating tax planning from compliance. This differentiation, and its 
implication for the practice and process of tax planning, is addressed in sections 1.3 
and 4.2. In this section of the literature review no further reference will be made 
explicitly to compliance. 
A number of distinct perspectives on tax planning can be drawn from the literature, 
although there are clear points of overlap with respect to certain principles. Scholes 
and Wolfson (1992) provide a framework for understanding how taxes affect decision 
making, asset prices, equilibrium returns and the financial and operational structure of 
firms. 38 This facilitates examining an examination of the impact of taxes on business 
activities generally. According to Macnaughton and Mawani (2005), it `seeks to 
explain the role and influence of taxes in organizations in a positive and predictive 
approach' (p. 168). They point out that research resulting from this framework has 
become labelled as the `microeconomic approach to tax planning' (p. 168). Such 
research typically uses the tools of modem finance and economics, and is chiefly 
concerned with the implications of tax rules for individual and firm behaviour. 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) posit that effective tax planning requires the 
consideration of all parties, all taxes (both implicit and explicit), and all non-tax costs 
in connection with any business transaction. As noted by Wilson (1993), who drew 
on the Scholes and Wolfson framework, `tax planners must sometimes sacrifice tax 
78 This 1992 edition comprises the pioneering work of Scholes and Wolfson on this framework, and is 
therefore referenced throughout this thesis. Two subsequent editions have since issued in 2002 and 
2005, to which the authors Erickson, Maydew and Shevlin have been added. There are no significant 
amendments made to the framework in these subsequent editions. 
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benefits because of nontax considerations ... tax planning is subordinate (as a 
managerial objective) to maximizing firm value' (p. 196). He specifically identifies 
some non-tax considerations or `frictions' in a company-location decision context as 
including `technology constraints, transportation costs, company culture, the need to 
be close to customers, and the need to concentrate manufacturing in a few world-scale 
plants to compete on costs' (p. 198). Other non-tax costs for consideration generally 
include financial reporting costs, transaction costs and agency costs. 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) are primarily concerned with tax planning activities 
from the perspective of tax rules, so it is not surprising that Shevlin (1999) sees tax 
planning research as examining `how firms and individuals respond to the tax 
rules... How do the tax rules influence how businesses and individuals conduct their 
lives? ' (p. 430) This perspective, which works largely on the basis that law is 
determinate, (see later in this section where this notion is challenged), has resulted in 
the pursuit of a quantitative approach to tax planning research which fails to take into 
account many other influencing factors on a company's tax planning activities apart 
from the tax rules themselves. In addition, as noted by Roberts and Bobek (2004), the 
Scholes and Wolfson paradigm `fails to recognize the state as a negotiable contracting 
party and the structure of tax accounting laws as endogenous to a corporation's tax 
planning activities'(p. 566). This endogeneity of law construct constitutes an 
important part of the extended NIS theoretical perspective put forward in this study 
(see sections 2.3.3,2.3.4 and 3.4.2). 
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Yancey and Cravens (1998) are equally concerned with all taxes and non-tax costs. 
`An effective tax policy must integrate all relevant taxes and consider the effect to the 
overall corporate entity in conjunction with non-tax constraints' (p. 252). James 
(2005) refers to conflicts which may arise between tax and financial reporting, a non- 
tax cost. Karayan and Swenson (2007) allude to lobbying costs as a non-tax 
transaction cost to be considered. This study investigates the nature of non-tax costs 
that tax executives have to deal with in practice. 
Scholes and Wolfson's (1992) perspective on the tax authority in this context is an 
interesting one, describing it as an `uninvited party to all contracts' and an 
`investment partner'. According to Karayan and Swenson (2007) managers should 
aim to minimise that particular partner's (the tax authority's) share of the firm's 
value-added. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) and James (2005) identify the need for 
dynamic tax planning which includes reversibility and adaptability in responding to 
subsequent changes in tax rates, laws and many other developments. Hoffman (1961) 
refers to the existence of loopholes actually making tax planning more effective, 
while McBarnet (2001b) refers to the law being treated as `recipes for avoidance'. 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) posit that changes in all tax regimes (US and non-US) 
involve turning two kinds of `dials', namely, levels of tax rates and relative tax rates 
(across tax paying units, tax periods and across economic activities). As the `dials' 
move (i. e. as the tax rules change) their framework could facilitate gaining an 
understanding of how businesses reorganise their business activities in response to the 
dials turning. 
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Scholes and Wolfson (1992) identify three types of tax planning which engage tax 
planners: converting income from one type to another, 39 shifting income from one 
pocket to another, 40 and shifting income from one time period to another. 41 Samson 
(1998) also referred to these as three basic tax planning strategies, which he 
endeavoured to have his students grasp. 2 Fallan, Hammervold and Gronhaug (1995), 
in their research on tax planning in the context of innovations literature, also refer to 
these three tax planning strategies. Taxpayers who know about these `innovations' 
and their impact on the tax burden will adopt them and subsequently make money. 
Green (1999) sees the identification and evaluation of tax planning opportunities as 
`an important part of risk management' (p. 146)43 Where any of the above activities 
do not exhibit a `valid business purpose' other than tax avoidance, the tax authority 
may well recharacterise the activity and such a recharacterisation will result in a less 
44 favourable tax treatment 
Hoffman (1961) looks at tax planning from the tax practitioner's perspective, and 
identifies seven cardinal principles that are `inherent in every tax planning process' 
(p. 274). These are: flexibility, personalisation, a professional product, coordination, 
39 For example, converting income to capital gains which carries a more favourable tax treatment. 
40 For example, a high tax bracket taxpayer having income earned through a tax-exempt pension fund. 
41 For example, delaying income recognition until a future lower tax rate period. 
42 Samson (1998) applied historical tax rates in eleven different scenarios to help his students grasp 
these three tax planning strategies. 
43 See section 2.2.5 for further discussion of tax risk management. 
44 See section 1.3 on distinction between tax avoidance and evasion. 
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resolution of conflicting interests, orientation as to time and complete honesty. 45 
While clearly an advocate of a formalised approach to tax planning, he reminds us 
that effective tax planning `can never be the sole objective of the taxpayer' (p. 276). 
Karayan and Swenson (2007) are advocates of a transactions approach to tax 
management, utilising the SAVANT framework which considers strategy, 
anticipation, value-adding, negotiation and transforming' aspects of any transaction 
being considered (p. 63) 46 
In contrast, Yancey and Cravens (1998) constructed a tax planning framework for 
MNCs concerning specific areas of jurisdiction, time periods, choice of entity, 
contractual forms, and corporate activities, 47 all of which require serious attention 
from a tax perspective in order to minimise worldwide taxes. 8 Like Scholes and 
Wolfson (1992), this framework assumes MNCs endeavour to minimise their tax 
exposure subject to non-tax constraints. Interestingly, Yancey and Cravens (1998) are 
of the view that MNCs should, when engaging in tax planning, `evaluate tax policy 
goals of foreign governments and method of collection for each firm where the firm 
maintains operations'(p. 270). The role of bilateral tax treaties need to be considered 
'S While his views in this article pertain largely to personal taxes they are equally applicable to a wider 
business tax planning context. There is a significant overlap between these principles and the Scholes 
and Wolfson (1992) framework, signifying to some extent how little things have changed over time 
concerning the principles of effective tax planning. 
46 Many aspects of this model overlap with the Scholes and Wolfson framework. For example, 
negotiation incorporates negotiating with other parties to the transaction and perhaps with tax 
authorities. 
" Corporate activities would incorporate the provision of services both within and outside the MNC 
group. 
48 The Yancey and Cravens framework was applied to a hypothetical company and was not tested 
therefore empirically on a database of companies (which is in contrast to studies based on the Scholes 
and Wolfson framework). 
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here also, as does the tax administrative process in each country. Karayan and 
Swenson (2007) similarly refer to the importance of anticipating tax changes before 
they become official. The latter suggests the need for MNCs to monitor closely - 
and indeed take into account in their tax planning - how tax policy in various 
countries is formulated and implemented. 
Another perspective on tax planning in the literature is a purely legalistic one. In this 
context tax planning is frequently equated with tax avoidance (see also section 1.3). 
The latter is largely concerned with the idea that tax planning amounts to exploiting 
opportunities presented through inadequate legislation. Tax avoidance is not, 
however, illegal. Slemrod (2005) calls attention to studies that document a gap 
between book-reported income and taxable income of corporations, which is not fully 
explained by accounting differences. The latter, he suggests `has prompted some 
observers to conclude there is growing tax avoidance' (p. 93). McBarnet (2001b) is of 
the view that such `creative compliance' can in practice `frustrate tax policy', and is 
`pervasive among leading lights in the social and corporate world' (McBarnet, 2001a: 
p. 5). She sees tax avoidance as a `creative' way of complying with the strict letter of 
the law but often `undermining the policy behind the words' (2001b, p. 2) i. e. it is 
outside the spirit of the law. Porter (1999a) defines positive tax planning as `the 
deliberate use of techniques which may contravene the spirit but not the letter of the 
law, with a view to reducing the company's tax liabilities' and distinguishes it from 
`good housekeeping' (p. 47). According to McCahery and Picciotto (1995), such legal 
creativity `raises constant ethical, political and economic (as well as legal) issues, as 
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it probes the limits of existing regulatory patterns' (p. 259) 49 McBarnet (2001 b) posits 
that creative compliance is a `general law issue' and accordingly she sees the chance 
to learn from similar creative compliance issues in other disciplines, particularly 
accounting. McBarnet and Whelan (1992) earlier addressed the area of accounting 
and the law. The question they posed was `Could the might of the law lead to more 
effective control of accounting? ' (p. 101). With regard to ineffectiveness of law in 
various areas they refer to two factors which have dominated socio-legal research i. e. 
the failure of the lawmakers and the failure of law enforcers. These authors introduce 
a third factor, `the role of the regulated in actively resisting it' (p. 102). (See section 
2.3.4 for some discussion of the overlap between this literature and the endogeneity 
of law perspective. ). They conclude that `there are fundamental limits in the nature of 
the law itself (p. 102), and acknowledge that even when law is changed to close some 
`loophole' another way of working around it is found. They question therefore 
whether the law can in fact `control creativity'. Indeed, `it is the indeterminacy of the 
abstract rules that leaves the space for creativity, which enables the reshaping of the 
regulatory regime' (McCahery and Picciotto, 1995: p. 266). Burton (2007) questions 
any presumption that law is determinate in the face of considerable uncertainty in the 
application of tax rules. 
McBarnet (2001a) identifies two factors which contribute to creative compliance. 
(i) Drafting law is fallible'. It is difficult to get right all the time and the nature of 
law is that it is often open to interpretation. 
49 See this article for a detailed addressing of philosophical concerns arising around the question of 
'compliance' with rules and `creativity' in relation to those rules. 
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(ii) Some people see the law as `material to be worked on to one's own or one's 
client's interests' (p. 3). There is this type of attitude to the law that lends itself to 
creative compliance activities. This assumes essentially a disregard for the policy 
behind the legislation, similar to Scholes and Wolfson (1992). 
McBarnet (2001 a) sees creative compliance actively seeking out opportunities under 
three headings: 
" Gaps in the legislation i. e. the `where does it say I can't do that? ' argument'; 
" The ex-files of law i. e. restructuring practices to fit within express exemptions, 
exclusions and exceptions; 
" Rules i. e. adopting legal forms to fit inside or outside the literal interpretation or 
ambit of the prescribed rules. 
McBarnet (2001a) mentions that creative compliance is legal/illegal depending on the 
outcome in court, but if found to be illegal in this context it may still not be branded a 
tax fraud. McBarnet (2001b) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of a shift 
away from strict tax rules and regulations to principles, considering the substance of 
practice as well as its legal form, introducing `super-principles' such as the general 
anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and taking a conceptual approach to the construction of 
definitions 50 Such general anti-avoidance provisions should prevent taxpayers 
`arranging their affairs "artificially" to avoid tax' (James, 2005: p. 158). However, 
McBarnet (2001b) still maintains such principles can be treated as `material to work 
50 See 2.2.5 for further reference to GAAR. 
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on' and presents opportunities under the three headings referred to above. 
Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat worryingly, Picciotto (1995) posits: 
Regulation based on bargaining within the framework of broad discretionary 
rules can be functional if there is sufficient understanding and acceptance of 
parameters between the players, that is, if there is a relatively small universe 
of `repeat players', perhaps socially homogenous or operating within a shared 
professional ideology. (p. 36) 
He goes on to state that dysfunctionality may appear with the arrival of `newcomers' 
into the arena (for example new tax executives) or when some tax rules become the 
subject of public debate. This study addresses the existence and impact of 
homogeneity with respect to tax planning in practice, through the NIS lens, and is 
referred to throughout the findings in Chapters Four to Seven inclusive. 
This research provides some insight into a possible attitude to tax laws as described 
by McBarnet (2001 a) being held by senior in-house tax personnel within MNCs, and 
by tax advisors. Do they consciously approach tax planning with a view to 
specifically availing themselves of opportunities presented under the headings of 
gaps, ex-files of law or rules? This research seeks to obtain an insight into the attitude 
of some such individuals to tax laws, and how this attitude impacts on the practice 
and process of tax planning in their respective organisations. 
Another perspective on tax planning entails examining it through the lens of the 
innovations literature, as advocated by Fallan et al. (1995). They describe research on 
`innovativeness' as identifying characteristics which enable the prediction of who will 
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see the advantages and will adopt the innovation such i. e. tax planning. 51 There are 
different adoption rates of innovations and it varies between adopters in their ability 
and willingness to adopt. 52 The objective of their study was to `predict the adoption of 
tax-planning instruments in business organizations' (p. 187). Interestingly, their 
findings, inter alia, supported the hypotheses that the degree of administrative 
specialisation positively influences the use of external advisors in the tax-planning 
process, and that the use of the external networks of tax advisors in the planning 
process is positively related to the adoption of tax planning instruments. Evidence did 
not support the hypothesis that the higher the degree of professionalism of the 
responsible tax planner in the firm, the more use will be made of the external network 
of tax advisors in the planning process. 53 These three findings were explored further 
in my study when discussing the relationship in-house tax personnel have with their 
external advisors. It would be of particular interest to tax authorities to be better able 
to better predict which companies, based on their profile, are more likely to adopt tax 
planning instruments, and perhaps invest more generally in sophisticated tax planning 
activities. The latter may, for example, better position the Revenue Authorities to 
effectively and efficiently select companies for tax audit, which is clearly an 
important policy implication 54 
51 In their study `tax planning' translates into the choice of the optimal tax instruments within legal 
rules and constraints. 
52 See section 3.4.1.3 for further reference to innovators and adopters (drawing more from the NIS 
literature) in the context of describing the organisational level of this study's conceptual framework. 
 `Administrative specialisation' was captured by age and size of firm, and `degree of professionalism' 
was captured by level of tax-relevant education, reading of tax-relevant periodicals and participation in 
courses on tax planning. 
sa I understand in the UK, that the Revenue Authorities are adopting a risk scoring-based approach to 
deciding which MNCs they need to look at more closely. 
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My study provides and interprets the views of in-house tax executives on the 
existence, or otherwise, of leaders and adopters among MNCs, with respect to the 
practice and process of tax planning (see Research Question Four and Chapter 
Seven). 
Part of some companies' approach to tax planning, is the lobbying of tax legislators 
with a view to having specific tax laws introduced or amended to facilitate specific 
tax planning activities. Karayan and Swenson (2007) refer to companies negotiating 
at two levels in US. They can lobby Congress and can seek advance rulings from the 
IRS. They do highlight however that both `require large outlays of time and money, 
which may explain why they are typically used only for significant transactions and 
by large firms' (p. 84). Related to this, Roberts and Bobek (2004) posit that `studies of 
tax policy and firm tax strategy should explicitly incorporate societal-level interests 
and recognize that inequalities in resources lead to political inequalities as well' 
(p. 588). 
Roberts and Bobek (2004) recognise the state as a `negotiable contracting party', 
illustrating the endogenous aspect within tax law making, and thereby demonstrate 
that companies `engage in political activities in order to influence the structure of tax 
accounting laws under which their corporations must operate' (p. 567). 55 This study is 
ss They draw on literature on pluralist and Marxist theories. A more fruitful lens through which this 
aspect will is addressed in this study is MS and endogeneity of law literature (see sections 2.3 and 
3.4). 
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clearly seeking to understand the nature and impact of such political activity 
56 (Research Question Four) 
There have been many pieces of academic research conducted primarily by North 
Americans using the Scholes and Wolfson (1992) framework. Such research has 
focused on specific aspects of business, such as choice of organisational forms for 
conducting business and organisational design, taxpayers' choice of savings vehicles, 
the existence of tax clienteles and making trade-offs between tax and non-tax costs 57 
The empirical research carried out to date on technical tax planning techniques and 
approaches is highly quantitative. Shackleford and Shevlin (2001), who are advocates 
of the Scholes and Wolfson (1992) framework, view most of this research as 
`documentation' and maintain the move into explanation, understanding and 
prediction is critical, but slow. Maydew (2001) maintains certain areas of tax in need 
of research presents an opportunity to engage in qualitative research. The qualitative 
research being conducted in this study research serves to fill this gap in the literature 
as it provides a new perspective on tax planning, producing a rich understanding of 
the practice and process of tax planning in US MNCs. 
2.2.5 Tax Risk Management 
Any in-house tax department (and ultimately any organisation) is exposed to various 
risks which need to be managed. Arguably, tax plans should be viewed as part of an 
organisation's overall RM strategy. Good practice suggests the need to manage such 
56 Consideration of this aspect of tax planning through the lens of the lobbying literature was 
considered to be outside the scope of this research. 
57 For example, Harris (1993), Klassen, Lang et al. (1993), Maydew (1997). 
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risks in a structured and formalised way. PWC (2001) found that, in the light of 
changes in corporate governance (Cadbury and Turnbull), 58 the tax director should 
develop a tax risk policy to ensure adequate financial controls can be demonstrated. 
Interestingly, KPMG (2005) notes the Australian Tax Commissioner's public 
statement referring to tax as `a corporate governance issue.. . boards should make 
conscious decisions about where their companies should position themselves on the 
tax risk spectrum and ensure the necessary controls are in place to maintain that 
position' (p. 17). 59 
PWC (2001) identified three types of tax risks that need to be managed and controlled 
namely, operational, planning and compliance. The need for RM in a tax-planning 
context often arises from the existence of uncertain and inadequate tax legislation (see 
section 1.3. on the uncertainty aspect of some tax laws). RM strategies often reflect 
how organisations and, more specifically, how in-house tax professionals deal with 
such uncertainty. As evidenced by the earlier discussion on the legalistic approach to 
tax planning (see section 2.2.4) a tax professional's `attitude' to tax legislation and 
indeed to law in general is important in this context. Some tax professionals are likely 
to be risk averse and will therefore steer away from what might be termed 
`aggressive' tax plans. Those who are not risk averse, and are happy to work 
exclusively within the letter of the law, are more likely to engage in more 
S8 The Cadbury and Turnbull reports were part of a series of corporate governance guidelines published 
in the UK in the 1990s. 
59 See Ernst and Young (2006) for results of their survey on tax risk. 
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`aggressive' tax planning6° In terms of understanding what determines the level of 
tax aggressiveness in a firm, Shackleford and Shevlin (2001) suggest an interesting 
question: `Are growth firms, decentralized firms, and firms led by non-financial 
CEOs less aggressive? ' (p. 378). Maydew (2001) similarly calls for further research 
being `needed to explain why some firms appear to be more aggressive tax planners 
than other firms' (p. 397). While these authors are most likely interested in 
quantifying aggressiveness, my research obtains a strong sense of the influence of 
certain individuals (whether it is the CEO, CFO or VP Tax) on a company's position 
on the tax aggressiveness spectrum. 
A tax professional's RM strategy, however, is unlikely to be determined exclusively 
by one's `attitude' to the law. With regard to how tax professionals manage tax- 
planning risks, according to PWC (2001) what the competitors are doing is a 
significant influence on acceptable risk. 61 From a tax practitioner perspective 
Hoffman (1961) advocates that a tax practitioner must evaluate the situation carefully 
before advising a client to take advantage of a loophole in the legislation. He/she 
needs to give a `guarded opinion' informing the client of the contingencies involved. 
His advice can be reached at by, inter alia, seeking advice of fellow practitioners, 
reviewing tax experts' opinions as published in professional journals, assessing the 
attitude of the Revenue and taking account of how long the loophole has existed 
6o Tax professionals' `attitude' to the law and explaining/understanding the extent to which they 
engage in `aggressive' tax planning could also be examined through the lens of literature on 'tax 
aggressiveness', for example, Schisler (1994) and Spilker, Worsham et al. (1999). However, this 
literature which empirically has tended to focus on tax advisors was not considered appropriate for this 
study. 
61 Institutional isomorphism - see section 2.3.2.2. 
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(generally the longer the better). Presumably in-house tax professionals often engage 
tax advisors as a risk management strategy in the knowledge that the advisors are 
indeed taking an approach similar to that suggested by Hoffman (1961) when giving 
tax opinions. 
A significant challenge for in-house tax professionals is how to respond to possibly 
increasingly uncertain tax legislation. This arises due to some finance ministries 
around the world choosing to deal with creative tax planning by using some `big 
power' strategies as referred to earlier (see section 2.2.4). While there is some debate 
on how effective such strategies are in dealing with `unintended' tax planning 
opportunities, they have become a reality for many organisations to deal with. Porter 
(1999b) reports mixed reaction to the possible introduction of a general anti- 
avoidance rule (GAAR) 62 Some managers did not see this rule necessitating any 
change in the workings or strategy of the in-house tax department. A number of these 
managers considered themselves to be already cautious in their approach to 
borderline tax schemes. However, others did see themselves becoming more cautious 
when GAAR was in place. GAAR could be perceived as bringing greater uncertainty 
into the tax manager's arena, which would not be desirable from their perspective. 
However, by contrast, McBarnet (2001a) draws a comparison with the accounting 
function in the context of how uncertain legislation can sometimes be effective from a 
tax policy perspective. She refers to the cross-eyed javelin thrower in the context of 
62 The US counterpart to GAAR is the business-purpose doctrine (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992: p. 26) 
which requires the proof of a business transaction's validity through practice as well as legal form (see 
also section 2.2.4). Its primary purpose is to prevent the abuse or misuse of tax laws. 
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the new principle- based regime of the ASB, where its chairman David Tweedie said 
`we're like a cross-eyed javelin thrower competing at the Olympic Games: we may 
not win but we'll keep the crowd on the edge of its seats' (p. 12). 
Research conducted by Spilker et al. (1999) produces findings which are `consistent 
with recent strategic attempts by the IRS to frustrate tax professionals' ability to tax 
plan by proposing that tax rule ambiguity be increased in certain areas of the tax law' 
(p. 76). Spilker et al. (1999) conducted experimental research involving tax 
professionals. Results showed that tax professionals interpret ambiguity aggressively 
in compliance contexts (considering issues after the relevant transactions have 
occurred), but relatively conservatively in planning and decision contexts (where 
advising on structuring transactions to be ultimately reflected ultimately in the tax 
return with an aim to improve their tax situation). 63 
The above literature on tax RM provides a very limited insight into the management 
of tax risks in MNCs. This research begins to fill this gap, as it focuses on identifying 
the main types of risk facing MNCs; understanding the tax risk profile of these 
companies; understanding what tax RM policies these companies have in place and 
what are the drivers of these policies are; understanding how a company's tax RM 
policy impacts on/influences the practice and process of tax planning; what tax RM 
processes and procedures are in place; and examining how the tax RM policy 
interacts with an MNC's overall RM policy (Research Question Three). 
63 For a recent UK study of tax risk and attitudes to avoidance see Freedman, Loomer & Vella (2007). 
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2.3 Institutional Theory 
2.3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in section 2.1, the conceptual framework being utilised in this research 
for interpretation and analysis of findings draws on three strands of literature: tax 
planning, NIS and endogeneity of law. This section focuses on NIS and endogeneity 
of law. Section 2.3.2 describes the core concepts within NIS, drawing primarily on 
seminal literature primarily, although not exclusively within the 
sociological/organisational theory domain. Section 2.3.3 sets out an extended NIS 
perspective which deals primarily with what is by now a recognised shortcoming of 
earlier NIS-based research i. e. the role of power and politics. Section 2.3.4 reviews 
the pertinent literature on the endogeneity of law construct representing a theoretical 
extension of NIS and a form of theoretical triangulation being applied in this research. 
This is followed in section 2.3.5 by a brief review of literature in the 
accounting/taxation domain, which has drawn on the theoretical underpinnings of 
NIS. 
NIS provides an appropriate theoretical lens through which the many findings of this 
research concerning the organisation of tax within MNCs, performance measurement 
of tax (planning), tax RM, and the relationship between tax and the external 
environment, can be explained and understood. Importantly, as can be seen from this 
review, drawing on NIS responds to calls in the accounting literature for examining 
accounting, - of which tax is an important element, - not as a technical practice, 
but in the context within which it operates (Hopwood, 1983), recognising the multiple 
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arenas of operation within which it operates and thereby taking account of its social 
and institutional nature (Hopwood and Miller, 1994). A number of other 
organisational and sociological perspectives frequently drawn on in accounting 
research and labelled as `open system theories' (Llewelyn, 2003) were also 
considered: contingency theory, resource dependency theory and the sdciology of the 
professions. None of the alternatives were considered to provide a theoretical lens as 
rich or comprehensive as NIS for explaining and understanding the practice and 
process of tax planning in MNCs. 64 
2.3.2 New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
Recently, institutional theory has become a rather dominant theoretical perspective 
applied in the organisational theory domain and in research on accounting in practice. 
This new institutionalism has, as described by DiMaggio and Powell (1991a), `a 
distinctly sociological flavor' (p. 11). A significant body of scholarship in the 
sociology/organisational theory domain has contributed to the theoretical debate on 
institutional theory (see Powell and DiMaggio (1991) for important contributions by 
Powell, DiMaggio, Meyer and Rowan, Scott, and Zucker). 65 The move towards NIS, 
classified as an interpretive perspective (Covaleski, Dirsmith et al., 1996), or a 
normative cultural perspective that `stresses the impact of cultural rules, models, and 
mythologies on organizational structures and practices' (Edelman and Suchman, 
1997: p. 493), represents a changing emphasis in perspective from efficiency 
64 There is some overlap between NIS and Legitimacy Theory as noted by Deegan (2006). See Deegan 
(2006) for a detailed discussion on Legitimacy Theory. 
6s A number of contributions to this book were originally published elsewhere (such as the American 
Journal of Sociology) in the late 1970s/early 1980s. They were republished here (amended in some 
cases) in this 1991 publication. All references in this thesis are to the 1991 publication. 
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(concerning technical environments) to legitimacy (concerning institutional 
environments). NIS reflects the `dramatic transformation in the way in which social 
scientists have come to think about human motivation and behavior' (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991a: p. 15). A key objective of the contributors to the NIS perspective is to 
`develop robust explanations of the ways in which institutions incorporate historical 
experiences into their rules and organizing logics' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a: 
p. 33). According to Covaleski et al. (1986) `perhaps the single most important 
contribution of institutional theorists to the study of organizations is their 
reconceptualization of the environments of organizations' (p. 12). 
There is no agreed definition of institutions in the literature. Scott (2001) provides a 
rather comprehensive, `omnibus conception' of institutions as follows: 
Institutions are social structures... composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, 
and regulative elements, that together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life. Institutions are transmitted by 
various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational systems, 
routines, and artifacts... operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction. (p. 48) 
Institutions therefore, he explains, exhibit resistance to change and tend to be 
transmitted over time, to be maintained and reproduced (Zucker, 1991). An 
institutional perspective must also `encompass associated behavior and material 
resources... rules norms and meanings arise in interaction, and they are preserved and 
modified by human behavior' (Scott, 2001: p. 49). 
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A more general definition is provided by Berger and Luckmann (1966). 
`Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized 
actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution' 
(p. 72). Meyer and Rowan (1991) describe institutionalisation as involving `the 
process by which social processes, obligations or actualities come to take on a rule 
like status in social thought and action' (p. 42). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991a) explain that NIS concentrates on `organizational 
structures and processes that are industry wide, national or international' (p. 9). It 
emphasises how organisations are so homogenous and states that `taken-for-granted 
scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made' (p. 15). 66 
Subsequently, however Powell (1991), in attempting to refine and sharpen some 
earlier arguments with DiMaggio, recognised that `we need an enhanced 
understanding of both the sources of heterogeneity in institutional environments and 
the processes that generate institutional change' (p. 183). Powell (1991) outlined key 
sources of heterogeneity, which explains in part why, despite similarities in the 
external environment facing MNCs, and many isomorphic forces potentially at play, 
the practice and process of tax planning among MNCs differ. These include: different 
resource environments, differences in industry structure and how organisations relate 
to the state, partial or fragmented governance, professional and occupational 
66 According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991 a: p. 9) MS in organisational analysis `takes as a starting 
point the striking homogeneity of practices and arrangements found in the labor market, in schools, 
states, and corporations'. 
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diversity. Importantly, as recognised by Powell (1991), `not all forms of social 
change can be explained from an institutional point of view' (p. 200). 
Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman (2004), advocates of the NIS perspective state that 
institutional theory is: 
Primarily concerned with an organization's interaction with the institutional 
environment, the effects of social expectations on the organization, and the 
incorporation of these expectations as reflected in organizational practices and 
characteristics. (p. 508) 
They believe it is `a way of thinking about formal organization structures and the 
nature of the historically grounded social processes through which these structures 
develop' (p. 508). 67 According to Hussain and Hoque (2002), NIS `adopts a broader, 
multi-dimensional approach for focusing on issues of external (macro) and internal 
(micro) organizational contexts' (p. 164). They also posit that this perspective `has 
contributed significantly to the understanding of the relationship between 
organizational structures and the wider social environment in which organizations are 
situated' (p. 164). 
Hopwood (1983), whilst not using the term NIS, referred to organisational influences 
on accounting (which incorporates taxation) being `seen to be specific manifestations 
of social influences, pressures and tensions' (p. 301). He referred to the role of the 
state, the media and professional institutions of the accounting craft (or taxation craft 
in this study) `in establishing a view of both the prevailing technical state of the 
67 See sections 3.4 for more in-depth references to Dillard et al. (2004). 
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accounting art and those managerial practices which were regarded as legitimate and 
in order' (p. 301). 
While some NIS-based research focuses on how institutions undergo change over 
time, an equally valid pursuit, which is being pursued in this study, is to establish 
what `institutions' are in action in the tax planning world today, and to gain the 
perspective of arguably powerful actors in the tax arena, (in terms of creating, and 
maintaining and changing institutions), as to how these institutions are then 
maintained. Insight is gained also on how institutions in taxation change over time, as 
many of the interviewees have been part of the tax world for many years. Importantly 
for this study, Powell's (1991) call for an `expanded institutionalism requires that the 
focus of empirical research should not be confined to the public and nonprofit sectors, 
and that more attention be directed to such core sectors of the economy as 
manufacturing and finance' (p. 189). Equally important, he refers to accounting 
practices (which clearly incorporates taxation) as strongly shaping institutional 
expectations and pressures. Also he states, `as firms grow in size and become 
involved in industry activities as well as dense networks of exchange, the 
institutionalized expectations of other firms, consumers, and the government exert 
greater influence on their behavior' (p. 188). Powell's arguments position NIS with 
significant explanatory power for understanding the practice and process of tax 
planning within large MNCs in SV. 
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Three common themes, namely legitimacy, isomorphism and decoupling, permeate 
throughout NIS-based research, and they provide appropriate theoretical constructs 
through which to examine the institutions of tax planning. The literature pertaining to 
these three themes is reviewed below. Following this, the different levels of analysis 
at which NIS-based research has been carried out are addressed. 
2.3.2.1 Legitimacy 
The first theme concerns legitimacy-seeking behaviour which refers to what is 
considered `appropriate behavior' by constituents in the environment with which 
organisations must interact (for example shareholders, general public, professional 
organisations and regulators). Legitimacy is a core concept within NIS. This concept 
is rooted in the idea that organisations need to be socially acceptable and credible in 
order to survive in their social environment (Scott, 2001). Suchman (1995) defines 
legitimacy as `a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions' (p. 574). 
According to Scott (2001), legitimacy is `a symbolic value to be displayed in a 
manner such that it is visible to outsiders' (p. 59). The use of language is very 
important here as terms such as `symbol', `value' and `display' arguably suggest how 
an organisation (with respect to tax in this study) or indeed an individual (an in-house 
tax executive in this case) is perceived by various constituents within its/his/her 
extant environment. This is, (a) very important for survival, and, (b) does not 
necessarily reflect, the reality. Carruthers (1995) refers to the effective survival 
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strategy of `achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the world, state, powerful professions, 
or society at large' (p. 317). Managing how an organisation or an individual is 
perceived with respect to tax, by the complex set of external constituents present in 
the tax arena, (tax regulators; professional representative organisations; industry 
representative groups; peer organisations and individuals; external auditors: the 
general public)68, with many and sometimes conflicting views or `competing 
sovereigns' (Scott, 2001: p. 60) on what constitutes legitimate behaviour, is truly a 
challenging task. How this is accomplished, along with its importance and 
implications for practice and policy, merits investigation. 
Dillard et al. (2004) refer to the economic and political context of market capitalism, 
which delivers the primary legitimising characteristic of economic efficiency. 
Importantly, Scott (2001) recognised the restricted conception posited by NIS 
theorists in the earlier days, himself included (Scott and Meyer, 1991), which viewed 
institutional processes as opposing efficiency concerns, whereas subsequent research 
sees institutional processes as `shaping and interacting with interest-based efforts. 
Institutional structures do not frustrate but frame rational decision making' (p. 135). 
Hopper and Major (2007) found that `social and economic pressures were 
inseparable' (p. 61). Likewise, Powell (1991) maintained `institutional and 
competitive processes are not necessarily oppositional' (p. 183). Covaleski et al. 
(1996) describe the general theme of the institutional perspective as thus: `an 
organization's survival requires it to conform to social norms of acceptable behavior 
68 Scott (2001) specifically refers to how professional and trade associations and agents of the state are 
often critical for organisations in this context, all of which are a part of the external tax environment. 
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as much as to achieve levels of production efficiency'. Hopper and Major (2007) 
summarised this issue well: 
Leading NIS researchers now recognize that institutional and economic 
pressures are not mutually exclusive or oppositional, can confront 
organizations simultaneously, and prevail on both public and private 
organizations. (p. 63). 
This progression is extremely important in the context of this study, which deals with 
MNCs, for whom arguably economic efficiency, however measured, is central to their 
very survival. Covaleski et al. (1996) also refer to formal organisational structures 
and how structures that adhere to the norms and behaviour expectations in the extant 
environment effectively prevents the organisation from being questioned about its 
conduct. The need to establish procedural legitimacy may be greater among 
organisations whose processes have a high degree of arbitrariness, which makes them 
more vulnerable to attacks on their work arrangements and procedures (Scott, 1987). 
Interpretation of tax laws sometimes require judgement, which brings with it some 
degree of arbitrariness, and ultimately may result in organisations being under the 
scrutiny of the tax legislators, who may well be keen to observe, at minimum, rational 
procedures that are in place in support of whatever judgement is applied. The 
procedures themselves, providing a form of scientific rationality, are seen as primary 
legitimating characteristics which establish appropriateness and rationality: 
Organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined 
by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work and 
institutionalized in society. Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy 
and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the 
acquired practices and procedures. (Meyer and Rowan, 1991: p. 41) 
Notwithstanding the recognition of economic efficiency within the realm of NIS, `the 
point is not to discern whether institutions are efficient, but to develop robust 
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explanations of the ways in which institutions incorporate historical experiences into 
their rules and organizing logics' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991 a: p. 33). 
2.3.2.2 Institutional isomorphism 
Inextricably linked with legitimacy is the second theme within the NIS literature, 
namely institutional isomorphism, which constitutes the adaptation of institutional 
practice by an organisation, which ultimately `promotes the success and survival of 
organizations' (Meyer and Rowan, 1991: p. 49). 69 Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) 
describe the effort within isomorphism as being `directed at building both an agreed- 
upon knowledge base and rational-appearing tools of practice' (p. 563). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991b) contend that institutional isomorphism `is a useful tool for 
understanding the politics and ceremony that pervade much modern organizational 
life' (p. 66). They identify three classifications of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and 
normative. Scott's (2001) typology refers instead to three `pillars of institutions' 
which provide bases of legitimacy: regulative systems, normative systems and 
cultural-cognitive systems. Scott's three pillars clearly equate with DiMaggio and 
Powell's classifications of isomorphism. I will hereafter primarily refer to DiMaggio 
and Powell's classification, on the understanding that they encapsulate Scott's ideas 
in this context, as was recognised by Scott (2001) himself. There is also some degree 
of overlap with the three processes referred to by Meyer and Rowan (1991) that 
generate rationalised myths of organisational structure: the elaboration of complex 
69 DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) also recognise competitive isomorphism but contend it does not 
present a fully adequate picture of the modem world of organisations', so they focus on institutional 
isomorphism as does this study. 
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relational networks, the degree of collective organisation of the environment and 
leadership efforts of local organisations. 
While distinguishing between different types of isomorphism may be useful, such a 
distinction may not always be easily made and indeed these three forces of 
isomorphism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, Edelman and 
Suchman (1997) state that `the literature increasingly suggests that multiple 
isomorphic pressures may operate together in any particular historical instance' 
(p. 497) 70 Each classification does offer potential in terms of understanding the 
external forces at play influencing the legitimising behaviour of some MNCs with 
respect to tax planning. A reasonable working assumption is that tax planning needs 
to be legal, and therefore it should be expected that a prominent source of coercive 
isomorphism comes from tax legislation, which contains many rules, and sanctions. 
Companies that engage in legal tax planning only gain legitimacy through their tax 
plans being `legally sanctioned' (Scott , 2001: p. 52). 
However, as noted earlier, the 
meaning and application of tax rules is not always easy, clear or certain (see sections 
1.3 and 2.2.4). Here, an NIS perspective makes for an informative lens through which 
to understand how executives engaged in tax planning manage ambiguity in tax 
laws7' Due to the ambiguity of some tax laws, their existence alone does not 
constitute per se a source of organisational isomorphism and one may have to 
`explore the complex ways in which organizations may mediate the impact of legal 
70 Further analysis of the three classifications here however will focus on how they differ from each 
another. Scott (2001) emphasised also that his typology was not intended to rule out 'inter-pillar 
communication'. 
71 See Hasseldine (2005) for a discussion of behavioural studies of tax practice, some of which address 
judgement and decision making in situations where the tax treatment is ambiguous. 
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mandates and may construct the meaning of legal compliance' (Suchman and 
Edelman, 1996: p. 941). Suchman and Edelman posit that institutional theory 
`obscures the extent to which law is, in reality, obscure, fragmented and highly 
ambiguous' (p. 929). As noted by Scott (2001), `many laws are sufficiently 
controversial or ambiguous that they do not provide clear prescriptions for conduct' 
(p. 54). See section 2.3.4 on endogeneity of law which addresses the different 
responses of the regulated to `uncertain' tax rules, which suggests the government 
(through its tax laws in this context) may not be in such a dominant position as NIS 
theorists might have placed it originally. The latter clearly questions Fligstein's 
(1991) conclusion that `the state can actually set the rules of the game for any given 
organizational field... It can, therefore alter the environment more profoundly and 
systematically than other organizations' (p. 314). 
Normative isomorphism however, is concerned with specifying how things should be 
done and `stems primarily from professionalization' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b: 
p. 70). It is thereby concerned with pursuing legitimate means to, for example, 
minimise taxes. They refer to the important mechanisms of `filtering of personnel', 72 
`occupational socialization', 73 and relatedly in the same context identify two 
important sources of normative isomorphism relating to professional ization, which 
apply particularly apply in the tax domain: 
One is the resting of formal education and of legitimation in a cognitive base 
72 Occurs through hiring individuals from firms in the same industry, through the recruitment of fast- 
track staff from a narrow range of training institutions etc. 
73 Takes place in trade association workshops, employer-professional-school networks, trade 
magazines and so forth. 
69 
Literature Review 
produced by university specialists; the second is the growth and elaboration of 
professional networks that span organizations and across which new models 
diffuse rapidly. (p. 71) 
This classification is concerned with professional ethics and unveils for example the 
`rules specifying how the game is to be played, conceptions of fair business 
practices... how the specified actors are supposed to behave' (Scott, 2001: p. 55). 
Again there is an interesting use of language here in the terms `game', `actors' and 
`fair business practices'. The idea of `best practice' permeates through the professions 
generally. In a tax context, this represents (at times) the focus moving away 
somewhat from the importance of the strict interpretation of tax rules to working 
within the spirit of the law (see section 2.2.4 for further discussion on this). 
Normative isomorphism assumes the provision of guidance on moral governance to 
achieve the legitimacy objective. Providers of such moral governance in the tax 
domain include professional tax representative groups and influential peers in the 
business (i. e. tax executives working in other MNCs). Normative forces of 
isomorphism, while clearly at times clearly constraining certain approaches to tax 
planning or means of dealing with Revenue Authorities, they may also, as noted by 
Scott (2001) `empower and enable social action', another interesting dimension in the 
tax context. 
The mimetic sources of isomorphism differ from the other two as they revolve around 
`the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames 
through which meaning is made' (Scott, 2001: p. 57), and are less tangible perhaps 
than the other two. Carruthers (1995) posits that `[O]rganizational fads and fashion 
seem likely to spread through mimetic isomorphism'. Mimetic isomorphism 
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recognises the influence of external cultural frameworks and is particularly present in 
uncertain environments (such as uncertainty in interpretation of tax laws). `It is a 
response to uncertainty' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b: p. 69). This modelling `may 
be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through employee transfer turnover, or 
explicitly by organizations such as consulting firms or industry trade associations' 
(p. 69). My study unveils the various sources of mimetic isomorphism that exist in 
relation to the practice and process of tax planning (for example networking and tax 
professional institutes etc. ), resulting in a very particular `social reality' (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966) for tax executives (see Chapter Seven). 
Of potential significance in the context of interpreting ambiguous tax laws, Carruthers 
(1995) states: `There is reassurance if not actual safety in numbers, and in the absence 
of a compelling reason to strike out on their own, organizations do what others are 
doing' (p. 317). The latter may lead to tax executives engaging in the practice and 
process of tax planning in a similar manner making them a homogenous group 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a). However, as my study demonstrates, the practice and 
process of tax planning is not always the same in all MNCs in SV. This study gains 
an understanding of why certain tax plans, processes and structures are copied and 
adopted by some organisations and not by others. Specifically, in relation to new 
ideas and tax plans the concept of `diffusion of innovation' comes into play and the 
perhaps the concept `that organizations imitate others whom they perceive to be 
74 successful or prestigious' (Scott, 2001: p. 162). Equally, is it the case that `diffusion 
74 See section 3.4.1.3 for more on the existence of leaders, adopters and late adopters. 
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occurs only if new ideas are compellingly presented as more appropriate than existing 
practices' (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002: p. 60). Another challenging role 
for the in-house tax executive is as `mediator', marrying the `social reality' of the 
corporation with the `social reality' of the wider tax world within which and with 
which he/she engages constantly at some level. 
2.3.2.3 Decoupling 
The third theme within the NIS literature is decoupling `which is treated as a hallmark 
of institutional conformity' (Scott, 2001: p. 173). It refers to the situation in which the 
formal organisational structure or practice is separate and distinct from actual 
organisational practice i. e. the practice is not integrated into the organisation's 
managerial and operational processes. The decoupling process `relies on both societal 
and organizational actors functioning in an atmosphere of confidence and good faith 
and not taking the institutionalized structures too seriously' (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1988: p. 563). 
According to Meyer and Rowan (1991), such formal structures constitute `powerful 
myths' which are often in conflict with efficiency criteria. There may be therefore a 
formal and an informal structure with `the former reflecting officially sanctioned 
offices and ways of conducting business, the latter, actual patterns of behavior and 
work routines. An uneasy tension exists between these structures' (Scott, 2001: 
p. 153). Scott goes on to point out that such formal structures are `ceremonial' and 
while they `signal conformity', some organisations buffer internal units, allowing 
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them to operate independently of these pressures. As posited by Meyer and Rowan 
(1991): 
To maintain ceremonial conformity, organizations that reflect institutional 
rules tend to buffer their formal structures from the uncertainties of technical 
activities by becoming loosely coupled building gaps between their formal 
structures and actual work activities. (p. 41) 
Importantly in a tax context, Edelman and Suchman (1997) noted that `regardless of 
the underlying motivation, the decoupling of ceremony from substance arguably 
undercuts and marginalizes the role of law in organizational life' (p. 496). Within an 
industry (such as the information technology sector which is the focus of this study), 
this concept of decoupling explains why MNCs may be similar in terms of formal 
practices and procedures around aspects of tax planning, but display diversity around 
the actual practice (see section 4.6.2 for example in relation to tax strategy 
statements). 
As noted by Covaleski et al. (1996), Zucker (1991) argued that `the rationalization in 
formal control systems is an important part of a network of political and power 
relations which are built into the fabric of social life, a process of transforming the 
moral into the merely factual' (p. 11). There is some obvious overlap between the 
theoretical constructs of decoupling and legitimacy-seeking behaviour. There has 
been without doubt a significant increase in tax compliance and audit procedures, as 
evidenced by the findings of this research. The interesting question to be addressed, 
however, is whether the tax executives perceive such procedures and processes to be 
an integral and formative part of tax planning in practice. Are these formal structures 
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and processes, which admittedly might secure organisational legitimacy, reflecting 
the practical activity of the organisation? Meyer and Rowan (1991) posit that they 
may not, as the practical demands for efficiency may conflict with the need to be seen 
to conform to society's expectations. How, for example, has this increased 
compliance-type environment really impacted on tax executives' (and companies') 
attitude to, and appetite for, the practice of tax planning? Are the additional 
compliance procedures more about maintaining appearances of legitimacy? 
According to Scott (2001), `it is a truism of modem organization studies that 
organizations are highly differentiated, loosely coupled systems in part because they 
must relate to many and different environments' (p. 157). Importantly for this study, 
Meyer and Rowan (1991) identify the professions (which include tax professionals) 
as an example whereby elements of their formal structure `are highly institutionalised 
and function as myths' (p. 44) 75 Such professionalisation `binds both supervisors and 
subordinates to act in good faith' (p. 58). 
While Carruthers (1995) cautions against over-emphasising the degree of decoupling, 
his description is rich, especially when considered in a tax-planning context: 
Formal plans, decision-trees, econometric forecasts, specification of 
contingencies and alternatives, quantitative estimates, and the ample use of 
accounting information all help to enhance the post hoc legitimacy of a 
decision. New institutionalists claim that these rationalized features usually do 
not determine how the decision was made, for they concern how the decision 
gets presented to the outside world after the fact. (p. 322) 
75 Meyer and Rowan continue: `these are occupations controlled not only by direct inspection of work 
outcomes but also by social rules of licensing, certifying, and schooling' (p. 44). 
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He does go on to warn that some audiences (the IRS perhaps) are mindful of 
decoupling, `especially if it becomes too extreme' (p. 323). 
The next section addresses the different `levels of analysis' at which NIS-based 
research has been carried out, focusing in particular on the importance of identifying 
and understanding the potential impact which the members of the `organisational 
field' can have on the practice and process of tax planning. 
2.3.2.4 Levels of Analysis 
NIS-based research has been carried out at different levels of analysis. While there is 
not a consensus on exactly how many levels of analysis exists, the three levels of 
social systems put forward by Dillard et al. (2004) are capable of encapsulating the 
many and varied actors involved in the tax arena. An understanding of the level, 
means and extent of interactions between actors at all levels provides an insightful 
perspective on, inter alia, the construction of the `social reality' within which these 
actors operate. The three levels of social systems of (i) economic and political, (ii) 
organizational field, and (iii) organizational level, map well onto other typologies 
used in NIS. 76 Dillard et al. 's framework facilitates an understanding of both the 
context and processes associated with creating, adopting and discarding institutional 
practices. 77 In my study it is a particularly useful tool for presenting a picture of the 
various actors involved in the tax arena, and for explaining and understanding the 
76 Scott (2001) for example identifies six levels: world system, society, organisational field, 
organisational populations, organisation, and organisational subsystem. 
77 However, as noted by Scott (2001: p. 126) 'to attend too rigidly to the distinction between levels of 
analysis is to ignore the ways in which social phenomena operate as nested, interdependent systems, 
one level affecting the others'. 
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political nature of institutional change in the tax world. It helps understand the 
complex external environment within which in-house tax executives operate. 78 
Establishing who the constituents are at each level in itself (an objective within 
Research Question Four) is in itself an important first step and as DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991b) pointed out in relation to the structure of the organisational field, `it 
must be defined on the basis of empirical investigation' (p. 65). 79 While these levels of 
analysis will be revisited in detail in section 3.4, the most important and influential 
level in the context of understanding the tax arena is the organisational field. This 
merits some further explanation at this stage as `the concept of organizational field is 
central to institutional theory' (Greenwood, Suddaby et al., 2002). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991b) who posit that the virtue of the organisational field unit of analysis 
lies in its directing attention `to the totality of relevant actors' (p. 65), define the 
organizational field as: 
those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products. 
(p. 64) 
Scott's (2001: p. 84) description of the field helps understand how actors contained 
therein could indeed create their own `social reality' over time: 
The notion of field connotes the existence of a community of organizations 
that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact 
more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the 
78 As mentioned earlier the perspective being gained on the process of institutional change in this study 
is being obtained through obtaining some historical perspectives on change by talking to some 
individuals in the `game' for a long time. It does not focus on one particular change per se, although 
some interviewees did speak specifically of the recent Homeland Investment Act (part of the American 
Jobs Creation Act 2004) and how and why that came to being. 
" Scott and Meyer's (1991) definition of `societal sector' is similar to DiMaggio and Powell's 
definition of `organisational field'. 
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field. '80 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) refer to four parts of the process of institutional 
definition, which has significance in the tax domain: 
An increase in the extent of interactions among organizations in the field; the 
emergence of sharply defined interorganisational structures of domination and 
patterns of coalition; an increase in the information load with which 
organizations in a field must contend; and the development of a mutual 
awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved 
in a common enterprise. (p. 65) 
Upon examination of the above passage, Barley and Tolbert (1997) posited that `in 
their early work, institutionalists explicitly postulated that institutions exhibit an 
inherent duality: they both arise from and constrain social action' (p. 95). 
This provides a rich description of how a group of tax experts, working in MNCs of 
various sizes, dealing with complex ever-changing tax rules on a global basis, 
working in the same industry, in the same geographical area, dealing with the same 
regulators, meeting each other through many fora, are ideally positioned to 
`construct' a tax community. The latter has important implications for the practice 
and process of tax planning in MNCs. 
NIS theorists identify types of institutional influences that potentially have strong 
effects at all levels of analysis which that are particularly pertinent in the tax arena, 
namely the nation-state, the professions, international organisations and associations, 
and cultural frameworks (Scott, 2001; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991 b). The latter maps 
80 This quotation is reproduced here from one of Scott's earlier publications (1994). 
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well onto the recursivity aspect of Dillard et al. 's (2004) framework, which is also an 
important aspect of my study's conceptual framework (see section 3.4) Notably, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) see the state and the professions as having become 
`the great rationalizers of the second half of the twentieth century' (p. 64), and are 
therefore held responsible for bureaucratisation and other forms of homogenisation 
emerging. The importance of recognising the existence and impact of the 
organisational field is of particular relevance in the sometimes uncertain terrain of tax 
laws and the interpretation thereof. DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) state: 
Highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which individual 
efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the 
aggregate, to homogeneity in structures, culture and output. (p. 64) 
While the latter essentially reflects how institutional isomorphism leads at times to 
homogeneity, it does not explain institutional change or entrepreneurship. It is 
important therefore to note the role of individual agency also. Scott (2001) 
emphasises the varied and complex interrelations that exist between professional and 
political actors, an aspect which is being explored in this study. With particular 
relevance to the tax domain, he goes on to state: 
In some instances, the professional associations and practitioners have been so 
effective in staking out and defending their jurisdictional claims against 
competitors that they have been invited to assist the state in exercising control 
over all providers of designated services. (p. 129) 
The latter is expanded on further in the next section. 
2.3.3 NIS Extended 
This section addresses some recommended extensions of NIS being addressed and 
employed in this study. Section 23.2.1 described, inter alia, how institutionalists have 
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moved on to accept and incorporate the co-existence of legitimacy and efficiency 
concerns in their research. This section addresses an extremely important and relevant 
extension (in the context of the tax arena) of NIS which considers the role of certain 
actors and organisations, the `power' they have in terms of maintaining and creating 
institutions in the tax planning domain, the source of such power and the ways in 
which they use this power, along with the associated implications. As noted by 
Covaleski et al. (2007a) `institutionalization as a process may be profoundly political 
and reflects the relative power of organized interests' (p. 8). 
There have been a number of calls for addressing power within the NIS perspective. 
Perrow (1985) was concerned that power and group interest has lost out to `cultural 
myths and symbols' within institutional theory (p. 154). Covaleski and Dirsmith 
(1988) refer to the institutionalist perspective's assumption of passivity and lacking 
`consideration of the active agency by which various social actors may construct, 
change, and enforce' societal expectations and being `inattentive to power and self- 
interest in terms of both societal and organizational actors' (pp. 562-3). Dillard et al. 
(2004) refer to the `neglect of power, special interest and the political nature of 
organizations' (p. 522) as a limitation of prior institutional theory research and 
importantly posit '[a] significant element of institutionalization is an ongoing product 
of the political efforts of actors to accomplish their ends' (p. 510). Carruthers (1995) 
also refers to this call among institutionalists for `greater attention to issues of 
politics, power and conflict.. . and to focus on myth and ceremony 
is to overlook 
power and control' (p. 324-5). Hopper and Major (2007) refer to the importance of 
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`power struggles and conflicts' in their study of why a Portuguese 
telecommunications company adopted activity based costing. Examining the extent to 
which in-house tax executives are powerful both within and outside of their 
organization is addressed in this research. Such actors may be able (individually or 
collectively such as via a professional institute) to use their power to impact on the 
social world by getting the rules of the game changed, impacting on accepted practice 
and resource distribution, thereby creating and maintaining institutions. 
Scott (2001) notes this important progression by institutional theorists towards giving 
`more attention to the ways in which both individuals and organizations innovate, act 
strategically, and contribute to institutional change' (p. 75). He posits that there has 
been an increase in attention given to 'the play of power and the role of agency in 
institutional analysis' (Scott, 2001: p. 193). Powell (1991) recognises 'the exercise of 
power' as an avenue of institutional reproduction: 'Elites may be both the architects 
and products of the rules and expectations they have helped devise' (p. 191). Such 
elites tend to be 'knowledge experts' (tax) and/or skilful negotiators. Covaleski et 
al. 's (2005) study posited the reinforcement of the notion that, after negotiations, 'the 
form the resulting institution takes depends on the relative power of the actors who 
support, oppose, or otherwise strive to influence it. '81 
It Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988), Barley and Tolbert (1997), Covaleski, Dirsmith and Weiss (2007a), 
Covaleski et al. (2007b), DiNfaggio and Powell (1991a), Dillard et al. (2004) and Covaleski et al. 
(2005), go some way to address 'power' as does this research. 
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Moll, Bums and Major (2006) refer to calls for NIS to integrate more with `micro' 
explanations and acknowledge `the interactive nature of institutional processes, 
incorporating the intra-organisational processes and the interests and generative 
capacity of actors into the perspective' (p. 188). My study addresses both internal and 
external sources of power that impact on the process and practice of tax planning and 
assesses the extent to which in-house tax personnel exercise power both within and 
outside of their organisations. As noted by Wickramasinghe (2006), `given the 
centrality of power in any social relation, power is a central concept in any social and 
organization theory' (p354). Just as he posits that power is fundamental to 
accounting, it is fundamental to tax management. While this study does not employ 
any framework of power as such, it is does recognise it as a factor to be explained and 
understood in terms of its impact on the practice and process of tax planning. It is 
important therefore briefly to briefly address its meaning. Wickramasinghe (2006) 
refers to a number of sources on the definition of power, which reflect the idea that 
power is `one's ability to carry out his/her own will in a social relationship, despite 
resistance' (p. 340). 
Of relevance in a tax context, he continues `some people exercise power in uncertain 
situations through their distinctive knowledge, skills and expertise' (p. 341). 
Importantly, `Power creates, and relates to, politics and resistance within and without 
organizations. When power mobilizes through relations, and between people, politics 
is inevitable. ' (p. 341) As noted by Scott (2001), some theorists in the institutional 
theory domain have begun to widen their theoretical frames, which incorporate multi- 
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levels and recursive models. In the context of such a highly regulated domain as tax, 
extending NIS in a way which embraces the work of legal scholars (Edelman and 
Suchman, 1997) brings some valuable additional insights into the ways in which US 
MNCs relate to institutional environments with respect to tax. Extending NIS in this 
way responds to any shortfalls considered to exist within the NIS framework (as 
described thus far) by legal scholars: 
Who complain that institutionalists too often embrace a legal formalism 
stressing the external, objective, rational nature of law. Rather, as Suchman 
and Edelman (1996); see also Edelman and Suchman 1997) propose, laws and 
regulations are socially interpreted and find their force and meaning in 
interactions between regulators and the regulated. (Scott, 2001: p. 169). 
This extension recognises the `endogenous process' of tax law-making which is 
further addressed below. This particular theoretical perspective is insightful in terms 
of understanding the nature and purpose of the relationship between MNCs (via their 
senior tax executives and representative groups) and their external environment, 
encapsulating the notion of power and powerful actors/organisations. Its contribution 
therefore is primarily in the context of addressing Research Question Four (section 
3.2 and Chapter Seven). 
2.3.4 Endogeneity of Lawa2 
This study explores the `endogenous process' that takes place in bringing certain tax 
laws and the application thereof to fruition. This ultimately results, quite often, in 
both sides being satisfied i. e. the regulated and the regulator. It does not therefore 
$2 See Hopper and Major (2007) for an alternative extension of NIS, incorporating economic, labour 
process and actor network theories. 
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take the traditionally-taken view of NIS theorists who interpret `governmental 
regulations as an exogenous force shaping the behavior of those regulated' (Dirsmith, 
Huddart and Jagolinzer, (2007). The endogeneity of law perspective pays attention to 
active agency and the play of power and politics in the context of understanding the 
social construction of meaning of tax laws. 
According to Edelman, Uggen and Erlanger (1999), law is rendered `endogenous' 
whereby `organizations are both responding to and constructing the law that regulates 
them ... the content and meaning of law is determined within the social 
field that it is 
designed to regulate. ' (p. 407) They examined the construction of the meaning of 
compliance with European employment opportunity law through consideration of the 
interactions between organisations, the professions and the courts and they posit that 
their arguments in this context should be applicable to other areas (such as tax law). 83 
" Such interactions, according to Edelman et al. (1999), result in the development of 
a particular `ideology of rationality over time. '8S This endogeneity of law perspective 
therefore challenges particularly the effectiveness of the state/government as a source 
of coercive isomorphism. (See section 2.3.2.2 on isomorphism). This may arise 
largely due to the sometimes ambiguous and uncertain nature of the meaning of tax 
laws. Edelman et al. (1999) thereby extend the NIS perspective by seeking to `specify 
how the diffusion of institutional structures affects their market rationality' (p. 408). 
" See section 8.4 for further study recommendation in the tax arena along the lines of Edelman et al. 's 
study. 
N Similarly, in section 2.2.4,1 referred to McBarnet (2001b) regarding creative compliance (with tax 
laws) as a general law and related her discussion to the accounting discipline. 
u They reviewed data from the professional personnel literature, the courts and a national sample of 
organisations. 
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There is a strong connection here with some of the writings by McBarnet and 
Whelan, as reviewed in section 2.2.4. In particular, when McBarnet and Whelan 
(1992) refer to the role of the regulated in actively resisting law as having explanatory 
power in terms of understanding the ineffectiveness of law (on-the-books). Such 
resistance amounts in part to the playing out of the game, and the social construction 
of the meaning of law, within this cndogeneity of law framework. 86 
Suchman and Edelman (1996) posit that the interplay between organisations and their 
legal environment (tax legislators/legislation in this case) results in a relationship that 
is a `highly endogenous and reciprocal one' (p. 938), which suggests that corporate 
interests play a role in tax policy development. " They call on institutionalists to 
`consider how organizations mediate, not just respond to, law' (p. 933) and emphasise 
the political process that precedes law-making. aa 
As taxation is an area of law, regulating organisations, it is therefore 
especially open to social construction because corporate lobby is usually 
successful in softening regulation that infringes on corporate interests, thus 
producing broad, vague mandates. (Edelman et al., 1999, p. 407) 
The focus of this study is not to describe the `endogenous process' associated with 
any one piece of specific tax legislation, but rather to examine the existence at all of 
this process generally within the tax domain, and to obtain the tax executives' 
perspective on the workings of the process and the extent to which they believe they 
' See section 3.4.1 also which draws attention to a further conceptual link with Dillard et al. 's 
`dynamics of interaction' typology within the NIS literature. 
"See Roberts and Bobek (2004). 
1 See Radaelli (2005) for a discussion of taxation research as political science research. 
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shape tax policy through such a process. E9 While the latter would be expected to 
include lobbying, this study enhances our understanding of such lobbying activities in 
practice and establishes %%hether the endogenous process extends beyond lobbying. 90 
Such findings would help establish whether these MNCs and their tax executives are 
`active players' or `passive pawns' (Scott, 2001) when it comes to dealing with 
proposed and actual tax changes. Their strategic responses could be categorised as 
one of Oliver's (1991) five strategic behaviours: acquiescence, compromise, 
avoidance, defiance and manipulation. Evidence of all forms of response was found 
in this study in relation to existing and new tax laws (see Chapter Seven). 
Manipulation is arguably the `most active response to such regulatory pressures 
because it is intended to actively transform or exert power over the content of the 
regulation of the governmental agencies that interpret and enforce them' (Covaleski 
et al., 2005: p. 125). Suchman and Edelman (1996) assert that the reciprocal 
relationship between law and organisations appears at intraorganisational, 
organisational and environment levels. In relation to the first of these, they make an 
important point in the context of addressing why and how tax becomes perceived to 
be `important', high profile or embedded within an organisation: 
Political considerations will move certain camps within the organization to 
portray a particular legal threat as uniquely fearsome or to portray a particular 
solution as uniquely effective. If the organization acts on these alarms, and if 
other organizations imitate its actions, the standards for compliance in the 
organizational field are likely to strengthen, and the law may matter more than 
the rules on paper would suggest. (p. 939) 
" See Kelly (2003) for an illustration of the endogenous process in the context of a specific tax law 
related to dependent care expense accounts and employer-sponsored child-care centres. 
90 See Chapter Seven for important findings on this. 
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Organisations tend to define the law through their practices regarding compliance, 
usually resulting in `prevailing industry practices' (p. 939). And finally, at the 
environmental level, they assert that the speed at which standards of practice emerge 
and stabilise `depends quite intimately on the structure of communication channels in 
the interorganizational environment' (p. 940). They suggest accordingly that the 
presence of professional networks and trade publications in a sector leads to 
experiencing the law as more concrete and binding compared to sectors where such 
features do not exist. 
In their endeavour to categorise literature on law and organisations, and highlighting 
how they both intertwine, Edelman and Suchman (1997) refer to the `growing 
literature that discusses the endogeneity between law and organisations' (p. 479). This 
development, they posit is still at a very early stage and needs to be developed 
conceptually, but is explained somewhat by the pervasive presence of the legal 
environment (which would clearly include tax laws) within which organisations 
operate today. 91 Suchman and Edelman (1996) refer to the `New Institutionalism' 
organisational theories as providing an appropriate backdrop for synthesising an 
integration of the sociology of law and sociology of organisations. Of particular 
relevance in a tax context, where the regulatory environment is often ambiguous, 
Edelman and Suchman (1997) refer to law developing meaning `through its 
" See also Suchman and Edelman (1996) where they promote an active dialogue between the worlds 
of legal and organisational scholarship and posit that about NIS which is of value for students of law 
and organisations. Essentially, they refer to the central themes within NIS, drawing on many of the 
NIS scholars referred to in the literature review on NIS above. References to the work of Suchman and 
Edelman in this section are restricted to the endogeneity of law construct. 
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interpretation by organized professions, and it develops substance through its 
application by organizational compliance officers' (p. 480). They argue `that 
organizations construct and configure legal regimes even as they respond to them' 
(p. 484), and that it is rare for regulations to `emerge independently of the 
organizational actors whom they ostensibly govern' (ibid, p. 488). 
The notions of `complex networks of power' and organisations working together as 
members of trade associations and industry working groups (for example the various 
taxation industry groupings found in this study to exist in SV and beyond) are central 
to the endogeneity of law perspective. Equally important is the notion that 
organisations sometimes actively seek the implementation of certain types of 
regulations to obtain certain advantages. My study provides insight into the `game- 
playing' or `politicking' that takes place in relation to new tax laws being introduced 
which arguably are more advantageous for a certain few (with the `power' to obtain 
what they seek) rather than for the greater good. Edelman and Suchman (1997) rather 
aptly state that `a great deal of lawmaking seems to respond primarily to the parochial 
interests of targeted firms, industries, and sectors' (p. 489). The endogenous 
relationship continues beyond regulation into compliance, an aspect which is very 
relevant in the tax domain where tax audits take place, the purpose of which quite 
often incorporates assessing an organisation's processes and procedures. The tax 
legislature often fails, however, to provide significant guidance on compliance 
procedures. The organisations themselves therefore also have an influence here in that 
they are often the creators of processes and procedures which are accepted by the 
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regulators and ultimately become the only acceptable processes. Some aspects of new 
taw laws therefore may be implemented in practice not through `hard enforcement' 
but the favoured `informal enforcement methods such as education, persuasion, 
negotiation and publicity' (p. 490). There is a wealth of expertise on tax matters on 
both the regulator and regulatee sides, but an interesting aspect to examine is the 
extent to which the regulated regulators depend on or use the expertise of the 
regulated to help them create/amend tax laws. In so doing, this demonstrates how 
influential certain taxpaying organisations are on the tax regulatory process. This 
essentially addresses the issue of who is more powerful in terms of tax knowledge 
production. The wider implications of where such power resides should be addressed. 
Edelman et al. (1999) suggest that while organisations might seek to respond 
rationally to law, `The definition of rationality is constructed and evolves at the 
environmental level, driven by institutionalized stories about the value of particular 
organizational structures and actions' (p. 411). In responding to new tax legislation for 
example, I have found evidence that tax executives look to other tax executives 
(isomorphism) outside of their organisations (on an individual basis or via 
professional institutes), and to their advisors to help them to respond in what becomes 
an accepted form of rationality. 
Inextricably linked with NIS, Edelman and Suchman (1997) refer to the `culturalist' 
(NIS) accounts of law and organisations calling: 
Attention to the important role of professional discourses in constructing the 
meaning of initially ambiguous laws, in determining the situations to which 
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legal reasoning applies, and more generally, in advocating for the legality and 
legitimacy of particular worldviews. (p. 499) 
In describing the cultural perspective on the regulatory environment (which maps 
well onto the NIS), Edelman and Suchman (1997) argue that the social construction 
of meaning often takes place at the organisational field level, which ultimately points 
to the relationship between law and organisations being `not so much reciprocally 
causal as endogenously coevolutionary' (p. 501). Karayan and Swenson (2007) 
describe tax rules as `social constructs resulting from political processes' (p. 30) 
which are essentially a combination of official and unofficial actions taken by 
different government representatives over time. Such social construction (through 
dialogue, litigation and so on) thereby explains the transition from `law-on-the-books' 
to 'law-in-action' 92 which has significant explanatory power in the context of this 
study (particularly in relation to Research Question Four). Edelman and Suchman 
(1997) see this as a rather messy process, whereby the legal rules and organisational 
practices move `in tandem' and `as the underlying belief system permeates both the 
legal and the organizational worlds, the boundaries between these realms become 
increasingly ambiguous. ' (p. 502) Similarly, Suchman and Edelman (1996) describe 
the relationship between organisational practice and legal mandate as one which 
`evolves collectively over time, may be collaborative rather than confrontational, and 
involves normative and cognitive as well as instrumental dynamics' (p. 922). They 
also state: `the law is made as it is enforced, often with as much input from those who 
are its targets as from those who are its custodians' (p. 934). 
92 The focus on law-in-action is within the law and society tradition of research according to Suchman 
and Edelman (1996). 
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The institutionalised relationships among the social actors within an organisational 
field (upon which an organisation can rely) have been identified as a resource termed 
`social capital' (Covaleski et al., 2005). They identified the hiring of a former 
Revenue official (an external social actor) as being an essential part of a company's 
strategy in helping to `orchestrate the company's efforts. '93 This person brought real 
knowledge to the table but was also (and, arguably, more cynically) a part of the 
`impression management' exercise being undertaken by the company. For both 
reasons, he and the company he worked for held and exercised this `power' in 
advancing their vested interests, their action representing the `strategic manipulation 
of institutional logics by skilled entrepreneurs' (p. 144). Another source of power 
demonstrated in this case was the `threat' that if the company did not essentially get 
what it wanted, it would have to withdraw company expansion from that region and 
instead expand it elsewhere. I revert to the potential of this use of power in my 
findings. 94 This study responds in the tax domain to the call of institutionalists 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991a, and 1991b) to investigate and probe the manipulation 
of institutional logics (around dealing with uncertainty, of any size, on the meaning of 
tax laws) by skilled entrepreneurs (experienced and sometimes highly influential tax 
executives within and outside an organisation). 
93This study demonstrated how a Tax Incremental Financing programme was manipulated by the 
regulated company through its strategic action. This official was the architect of various state policies 
when working with the Revenue. 
94 Some MNCs in this study, for example, have the power to come to governments using the `carrot' of 
employment creation as a bargaining tool for, inter alia, securing a favourable tax regime. 
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In contrast, the notion of `symbolic capital' put forward by Covaleski et al. (2005) 
refers to a form of power: 95 
Linking the various forms of capital available to an organisation by exploiting 
inherent defects in their logics; controlling the language used within the field 
of social actors, strategically redirecting key definitions, and shaping the 
social setting to serve vested interests. (pp. 3-4) 
Whatever source of power is used by companies when negotiating on the meaning of 
laws, Covaleski et al. suggest: 
[W]hat is needed is the resolve of politicians at multiple (e. g. local and state), 
reinforcing levels of government who are unafraid of face to face 
confrontations with regulatees (Frug, 1984), and who will back government 
agencies in the enforcement of legal provisions of whatever level of 
specificity is applied in order to make New Public Management efforts work. 
(p. 143) 
Interestingly in this case, where uncertainty of the law was expected to be at a 
minimum, the resolve of the company and its CEO resulted in outcomes that did not 
reflect `the form abided by the letter or spirit of the law as written'. Importantly, they 
conclude that `the construct of uncertainty is a rich and multi-faceted variable which 
lies at the core of many complex organisational and political relationships 
characterising the New Public Management' (p. 143). 96 Is uncertainty within tax 
legislation in itself therefore, effectively a source of power? This is the view of 
Picciotto (1995) as noted in section 1.3. 
Covaleski, Dirsmith and Weiss (2007b), in demonstrating the endogeneity of law 
process, highlight not only the role played by regulatees in shaping the meaning of 
95 The authors draw on Bourdieu and Waquant's (1992) conception of capital. 
96 The new public management literature has not been addressed in this study as empirically the focus 
is on the private sector perspective. 
91 
Literature Review 
the laws they are governed by, but also how `regulators anticipate this regulatee 
response and seek to contain its effect in their strategic development and 
implementation of new regulations' (p. 1). The latter, which they describe as a `second 
order effect', suggests essentially some form of pre-emptive strike on the part of the 
regulator being built into the process, which in itself signifies a negotiation process, 
and sets the scene for an interesting and insightful perspective to be gained in relation 
to how `shared meanings' of tax laws, and appropriate processes and practice, might 
come to be in the tax organisational field. This second order effect may well come 
into play and be facilitated in the context of new tax laws during the period between a 
government announcement around some new proposed tax laws and their being 
enacted. 97 
The influential micro-economic-based Scholes and Wolfson paradigm (1992) (see 
section 2.2.4), as noted by Roberts and Bobek (2004), `fails to recognize the state as a 
negotiable contracting party and the structure of tax accounting laws as endogenous 
to a corporation's tax planning activities' (p. 566). While their study does not draw 
upon NIS or endogeneity of law literature, they do conclude that companies `engage 
in political activities in order to influence the structure of tax accounting laws under 
which their corporations must operate' (p. 567). 98 My study examines the nature and 
impact of such political activity in relation to tax laws generally and pursues an 
alternative theoretical perspective as described in this section. 
97 In Ireland for example this can be as long as five months. 
98 They draw on pluralist and Marxist theories and employ a different methodology, based on 
reviewing secondary data and conducting regression analysis. 
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Clearly the call for law and society scholars to engage with NIS scholars (Suchman 
and Edelman, 1996) is recognised and welcomed by the NIS theorists. 
Scott (2001) posits that institutional theory will `benefit greatly by continuing to 
cultivate connections with law and society scholars..., students of society and 
accounting... all of these communities bring theoretical insights and useful 
methodologies to our understanding of institutions and institutional change 
processes. ' (p. 199-200) Incorporating the endogeneity of law construct in this study, 
in which interviews are conducted at the organisational level, is also a response to 
Roberts and Bobek (2004). `Organizational level studies are needed to investigate the 
motivation and execution of managerial strategies that are undertaken to influence tax 
laws' (p. 587). 
The next section addresses the extent to which NIS has been applied to research in the 
accounting and taxation domains to date. 
2.3.5 Institutional Theory in Accounting and Taxation 
Institutional theory has certainly received significant attention in the accounting 
domain over the last twenty years, and continues to do so, both in terms of 
theoretical-based and empirical-based publications (Covaleski et al., 1986; Bums and 
Scapens, 2000; Baxter and Chua, 2003; Moll, Burns and Major, 2006). These 
publications address the three strands of institutional theory recognised in the 
literature (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Moll et al., 
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2006), namely old institutional economics, new institutional economics and NIS. 99 
The focus of this study is NIS and this section presents a brief overview of a number 
of papers which draw on NIS to a large extent, and alludes to their potential relevance 
to this study, as appropriate. It is important to recognise support for the NIS 
perspective in the accounting domain. For example, Carruthers (1995) stated `the new 
institutionalism has much to offer those interested in accounting' (p. 326), and Baxter 
and Chua (2003)100 present NIS as one of seven main perspectives that have 
flourished as alternative approaches to management accounting research. Moll et al. 
(2006) position institutional theory (including NIS) as a popular choice for studies in 
accounting, and they provide a detailed, yet not exhaustive, review of accounting 
studies which have through this perspective sought `to understand why accounting 
becomes what it is, or is not' (p. 183). In relation to NIS specifically, they noted: 
Scholars have used NIS insight to explain how the adoption of particular 
accounting systems can be understood in terms of a need to conform to 
external pressures as opposed to an overriding (rational-optimising) drive for 
increased internal efficiency. (p. 187) 
While such a review is clearly not the purpose of this section, the papers referred to 
here provide clear evidence of the explanatory power of NIS to help understand how 
the practice and process of tax planning has become what it is, or is not, in MNCs. As 
can be seen from this review and others, as referred to above, NIS has received very 
" See DiMaggio and Powell (1991a) and Moll et al. (2006) for a comparison of these three 
institutionalisms. As noted by Moll et al., 'NIS and OIE approaches both offer a wide range of 
applicability for understanding the practice of accounting in organisations and share several traits in 
common' (p. 188). 
10° This article refers to some of the same key authors in this area as identified in this study, namely 
DiMaggio and Powell, Meyer and Rowan, Covaleski and Dirsmith etc. It focuses on alternative 
management accounting research in AOS from 1976 to 1999. 
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little attention in the taxation domain to date. Application of the NIS perspective in 
this study therefore is a contribution to the NIS and taxation literatures. 
Hines, McBride, Fearnley and Brandt (2001) focus on legitimacy when examining the 
work and effectiveness of the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) in the 
UK. 101 Eden, Dacin and Wan (2001), Carpenter and Feroz (2001), Hussain and 
Hoque (2002) all focus primarily on identifying and explaining isomorphic forces in 
different contexts. Eden et al. (2001) develop a model of cross-border diffusion of 
standards (isomorphism) drawing on NIS and the logic of embeddedness (time: who 
follows and when; motivation: why follow; form-perfect or imperfect diffusion) and 
transactional interdependence. 102 They draw attention to the fact that `institutional 
isomorphism has been much less studied at the international level' (p. 2). The idea of 
who follows and when is of particular relevance in a tax planning context, noting 
their proposition that `fast followers adopt the standard for performance reasons 
whereas latecomers adopt for legitimation motives' (p. 5). 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) integrate NIS with resource dependency theories to 
explore how institutional pressures on four state governments influenced their 
decision to adopt/resist the use of general accounting principles (GAAP) for external 
101 Hines et at. conducted content analysis on the FRRP's annual reports and identified six potential 
myths. They then carried out semi-structured interviews with company directors and audit firm 
partners. Overall evidence suggested that the FRRP is an effective regulator although some 'myth 
building' was also found to have taken place by the FRRP. They focussed very much on 'legitimacy' 
and noted that perceived legitimacy may depend somewhat on the organisation's ability to project the 
myths about itself and that 'an organization is designed and functions to meet social expectation in so 
far as its operations are visible to the public' (p. 62). 
102 They apply the model to the evolution and diffusion of the arm's length standard within North 
America from 1917 to the present. 
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financial reporting. ' 03 They also reported a decoupling of the budgetary decision- 
making process from the external financial reporting process (post GAAP adoption) 
evidencing their conclusion that GAAP is `a symbol of legitimacy in the public 
sector' (ibid, p. 593). When reviewing literature on mimetic isomorphism they 
interestingly state that `uncertainty can be a powerful force that encourages 
organizations that are viewed as being successful in their organization field' (p. 571). 
This has obvious implications for tax planning due to the uncertainty of some pieces 
of tax legislation and the idea that drafting (tax) law is fallible (McBarnet, 2001a). 
Hussain and Hoque (2002), 104 found that several institutional forces influence a 
bank's performance measurement system. 105 Soin, Seal and Cullen (2002) were 
concerned with the role of management accounting in organisational change. 106 They 
draw heavily on the work of Bums and Scapens (2000) using a model of 
institutionalisation with an old institutional-economics perspective. Significantly 
103 Interesting pressures looked at here included resource dependence, activity level in professional 
associations (which facilitates early education process) and the role of powerful interests, all of which 
represent pressures coming from within and outside an MNC influencing approaches to tax planning 
(see Chapters Four to Seven inclusive). While their study was conducted in the public sector, the case 
studies revealed findings of relevance for the private sector too, with particular reference to the tax 
planning function. For example, profound influences were 'personal beliefs of key organizational 
decision-makers, organization imprinting and culture, professional accounting education programs, and 
institutional pressures for change emanating from the credit markets. ' (p. 567) 
104 They focused on non-financial performance measurement practices in Japanese banks. 
1os Ten areas of focus and/or influence were included in their NIS-based framework: economic 
constraints, competition, copying best practice from others, central bank's regulatory control, 
accounting standards/financial legislation, socioeconomic-political institutions' pressures, 
professionals, top management/corporate culture, organizational strategic orientation and 
organizational characteristics. All of these would fit into Dillard et al. 's (2004) framework referred to 
later in this section. 
106 They report on a longitudinal study of implementation of activity based costing system in a bank. 
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however, they draw on NIS for `important extra features' (p. 253). 107 Importantly, in 
terms of positioning this research in the field of institutional theory, they state, `the 
particular version of institutional theory that we drew on, enabled us to explore the 
micro processes of the organization rather than the influence of the more macro-level 
structures that are often associated with institutional theory' (p. 269). 
Chung, Gibbons and Schoch (2000) address control issues related to three major 
flows among MNC subsidiaries namely, knowledge, product and capital flows. MNC 
literature is drawn upon which, central to my research, highlights the importance of 
applying alternative theories and will thereby `gain greater understanding of the 
complex social issue surrounding controls in MNCs' (p. 648) and `further enrich our 
understanding of the organizational complexities of the modem MNC' (p. 663). Tax 
planning is one such organizational complexity. Noting the possibility that mimetic 
and normative forces of isomorphism may be getting stronger in MNCs, Chung et at. 
posit `this may be particularly true in the accounting and control arena where 
professional norms, certification, and continuing education diffuse "best" control 
practices rapidly' (p. 662). 
An important theoretical contribution, with particular relevance and applicability to 
my study, was provided by Dillard et at. (2004). In their attempt to expand the focus 
of institutional theory, they develop a framework of the context and processes 
107 Various interrelationships (with other agents of organisational change) are explored and the authors 
evaluate the organisational change, drawing on its dichotomies of formal versus informal change, 
revolutionary versus evolutionary change, and regressive versus progressive change (see Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). 
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associated with creating, adopting and discarding institutional practices. Their 
framework incorporates institutional theory and structuration theory, is underpinned 
by the sociology-based institutional theory used by Barley and Tolbert (1997) and 
draws on the previous work of Clegg, DiMaggio and Powell and Weber. Their 
framework contains three levels of social systems, namely, economic and political, 
organisational field and organisational level. It integrates institutional dynamics and 
the context of institutional practices, and is a rather holistic representation of the 
institutionalisation process. The recursive nature of the process is very important, 
resulting in `a significant degree of structural stability enabling and constraining 
action' (p. 513). It is also the key to understanding `change in the institutionalised 
process since taken-for-granted norms, values, beliefs and assumptions may be 
continually revised at all three levels of the model' (p. 514). They believe the 
advantage of the new sociology-based approach (NIS) is that it facilitates the 
consideration of the `social, political and economic aspects that make up the context 
within which an organization functions' (p. 511). They refer to the call made by Miller 
in 1994 for accounting scholars to refocus their efforts towards the better 
understanding of how accounting influences, and is influenced by, a `multiplicity of 
agents, agencies, institutions and processes' (p. 506). Dillard et al. posit that their 
framework does this and provides a better understanding of institutions, accounting 
practices and change processes. It explicitly recognises the political nature of 
institutional change (both incremental and radical) and provides a basis for a more 
complete understanding of the dynamics involved in such a change. 
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Dillard et al. (2004) posit that institutional theory has heretofore treated 
institutionalisation as an outcome whereas their framework focuses on it as a process 
which is political, thereby `reflecting the relative power of organized interests and the 
actors who mobilise around them' (p. 510). They pitch Burns and Scapens' (2000) 
work at the organisational level but they maintain it is limited in recognising the 
higher levels (social, political and economic) that influence and define the 
organisational context. Neither does it address the ways and means by which the 
organisational level may influence the institutional context at the other levels. The 
latter represents the recursive nature of their framework. Dillard et al. then specify 
three constructs, namely representation (drawing on the social constructionists' 
conception of same), rationality and power (drawing on Weber). They use these `axes 
of tension' to describe the domain content of their institutional analysis and thereby 
operationalise the three levels of their framework. Representation concerns the way 
reality is framed or symbolically described. Rationality provides the legitimating 
conditions for evaluating criteria and practices. Power refers to the means and degree 
of control over human and material resources. 
Hopper and Major (2007) in their study of why a Portuguese telecommunications 
company adopted activity based costing and the consequences of this drew 
substantially on Dillard et al. 's (2004) framework (see section 3.4 for further details 
on this framework and how it has been drawn upon in this study's conceptual 
framework), extending it further by triangulation with other theories to encapsulate all 
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of their observations. 108 Dillard et al. (2004) concluded that `given its emerging 
dominance in the organization theory literature, we expect to see an increase in 
institutional theory-based research that addresses accounting related organization and 
social issues' (p. 533). The tax planning research which is the subject of this thesis 
goes some way to meeting this expectation. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter consisted of a review of three strands of literature: tax planning, new 
institutional sociology and endogeneity of law. Core aspects of each of these strands 
of literature are drawn upon to construct the conceptual framework which provides 
the theoretical lens through which the findings of this research are analysed and 
discussed in Chapters Four to Seven inclusive. 
A major `gap' in the tax planning literature was identified (section 2.2), namely, a 
need to understand how organisations create, formulate and administer their tax plans 
i. e. tax planning in practice. Other `gaps' in this literature were identified, concerning 
for example, the area of research methodology. While the literature reviewed is 
clearly interdisciplinary and comes from a diverse range of academic disciplines (for 
example, accounting, law, organisational theory), very distinctive themes emerged, 
which provided the impetus for the structure of the tax planning literature review 
presented here. Many aspects of this literature were drawn upon when constructing 
the interview schedule, and will be revisited in the course of analysing the findings. 
108 Theoretical triangulation was achieved through integrating economic, labour process and actor 
network theories. 
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Section 2.3 described the core concepts within NIS, drawing primarily, although not 
exclusively, on seminal literature primarily, although not exclusively in the 
sociological/organisational theory domain. Section 2.3.3 set out an extended NIS 
perspective which deals primarily with what is, by now, a recognised shortcoming of 
earlier NIS-based research i. e. the role of power and politics. Section 2.3.4 reviewed 
the pertinent literature on the endogeneity of law construct representing a theoretical 
extension of NIS and a form of theoretical triangulation being applied in this study. 
Finally, section 2.3.5 provided a brief review of literature in the accounting/taxation 
domain which has drawn on the theoretical underpinnings of NIS. 
These strands of literature provided the basis for developing a theoretical framework 
which is described in detail in the next chapter (section 3.4), along with other key 
aspects of the methodology employed in this study. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the four research questions along with their 
associated objectives, the overall research approach taken to this study, the theoretical 
framework, data collection and analysis. Section 3.2 presents the research questions 
and objectives which were formalised following a detailed literature review and 
consideration of the findings of exploratory interviews undertaken at the early stages 
of this research. Section 3.3 addresses the overall research approach taken to this 
study drawing on five basic research concepts: methodology, method, domain, theory 
and hypothesis. This study adopts an interpretive approach, the rationale for which is 
presented in section 3.3.1. The potential for such an approach to enhance our 
understanding of tax planning in practice is emphasised. Section 3.3.4 addresses the 
multiple theoretical approach adopted by drawing on theoretical constructs from tax 
planning, NIS and endogeity of law literatures. Section 3.4 presents the framework in 
two stages. The first stage (section 3.4.1) provides a descriptive framework of the tax 
arena, and the second stage (section 3.4.2) presents the core theoretical constructs 
underpinning this study. Section 3.5 explains how the companies and interviewees 
that participated in this study were selected. Section 3.6 describes how the interview 
schedule was constructed and highlights various aspects of the interview process 
itself. Section 3.7 addresses data analysis and section 3.8 highlights some limitations 
of this study. 
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3.2 Research Questions and Objectives 
This study examines the practice and process of tax planning in MNCs. Specifically, 
it addresses four research questions. In order to operationalise this research these 
questions were considered in the context of a number of discrete objectives, which 
were arrived at after detailed consideration of the research questions themselves, 
findings from the exploratory interviews and the literature informing the theoretical 
framework. 
The four research questions and their associated objectives are as follows: 
Research Question One: How is the tax planning function organised and conducted in 
MNCs? 
Objectives: 
" To establish who manages and provides the tax planning function within 
MNCs; what are their backgrounds; what is the structure of the tax 
department; what reporting lines exist; and the implications of such reporting 
lines on the practice and process of tax planning? 
" To examine the importance of tax within MNCs; the existence and 
formulation of a tax strategy; and its alignment with business strategy. 
" To gain an insight into the application of and awareness of the core principles 
of the Scholes and Wolfson (1992) framework, in their approach to tax 
planning, namely consideration of all parties, all costs, all taxes and the 
practice of income shifting. 
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" To establish who are the internal and external customers of the in-house tax 
department and to gain an insight into the interaction (in nature and process) 
between tax and its customers. 
" To examine the interrelationship between tax and accounting functions within 
the MNCs both technically and in an organisational sense. 
Research Question Two: How is the performance of the tax planning function 
measured in MNCs? 
Objectives: 
" To establish what performance measurements are being used to assess the 
performance of tax personnel. 
" To gain some insight into the process of performance measurement of tax. 
" To establish the extent to which any form of benchmarking takes place and 
how such a process is managed. 
" To gain some insights into the extent to which tax performance can be 
measured. 
" To establish whether business units are measured on a post- or pre-tax basis 
and to understand the interviewees' perspectives on this matter. 
Research Question Three: How is tax risk managed in MNCs? 
Objectives: 
" To establish the main tax risks facing the MNCs. 
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" To establish whether these companies have a formalised tax risk management 
(RM) policy and how such a policy (if one exists) is integrated with a 
company's overall RM policy. 
" To gain an insight into how tax risk is assessed and managed in the MNCs in 
terms of practices and processes. 
" To establish what are the greatest recent changes in the tax RM domain and 
how such changes have impacted (if at all) on the MNCs' tax planning 
practices and processes. 
Research Question Four: What is the nature and impact of the relationship between 
the tax planning functions within MNCs and the external environment? 
Objectives: 
" To provide an overview of the constituents/actors of the external environment 
within which tax executives operates, and their impact on the practice of tax 
planning. 
" To gain an understanding of the practice of and the extent to which US MNCs 
engage in lobbying activities with a view to influencing tax laws. 
" To investigate the extent to which leaders and adoptors exist (or are perceived 
to exist) in the wider tax community within which the MNCs are operating. 
" To gain an insight into the engagement of in-house tax professionals with 
professional institutes and how this engagement impacts on the practice of tax 
planning within the MNCs and on tax policy. 
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" To gain some insight into the 'relationship' between the MNCs and Revenue 
. Authorities, and how this 'relationship' is managed. 
" To assess the extent and impact of 'networking' between in-house tax 
professionals and external tax professionals on the practice of tax planning. 
3.3 Research Approach 
It is useful to draw on the five basic research concepts described by Ahrens and 
Chapman (2006)109 briefly as they apply to this research to describe the overall 
approach taken in this study. Table 3-1 summarises the position. 
Table 3-1 Basic Research Concepts 
Concept.; 
Methodology General approach to research 
11I onto this f 
Qualitative 
Method Specific research technique Interviews, secondary data 
Domain Space where data collection takes 
place 
The Field on tax planning in MNCs 
Theory Explanatory concepts Tax planning literature, NIS, endogeneity 
of law 
Hypothesis Testable proposition Not applicable 
109 As adapted from Silverman (1993). 
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In relation to the fifth research concept of hypothesis, there are no testable 
propositions being put forward in this research. Such propositions are typically an 
important element of positivistic studies. In contrast, the interpretive qualitative 
approach, as is being taken here (see section 3.3.1), 110 `seeks to explore aspects of 
social order that are not objectively real but are instead subjectively created through 
the interaction of actors, rarely mentioning the words hypothesis or testing at all. ' 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006: p. 5) No further consideration is given therefore to this 
research concept in this thesis. 
3.3.1 Methodological Approach 
The general approach taken in this research is qualitative, frequently referred to in the 
literature as interpretive or phenomenological (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Tomkins 
and Grove, 1983), which places my approach here firmly in Burrell and Morgan's 
(1979) `interpretive' box. This approach was decided on after consideration of how 
best to empirically address the research questions posed in this study. Research 
questions, theoretical perspectives and data are inextricably linked in any research. In 
this case, consideration of all three moved somewhat in tandem before concluding 
that the best fit between these three core aspects of the research would be achieved 
through a qualitative approach. 
110 Qualitative research can also be undertaken within a positivistic methodology, although this is not 
common, see Scapens (2004). Subsequent references to qualitative research denote interpretive 
qualitative research. 
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A qualitative approach is certainly an alternative to positivism and is frequently 
perceived as being oppositional to it. "' The latter is based on the ontological 
assumption that `empirical reality is objective and external to the subject' (Chua, 
1986: p. 611), and the former assumes `social reality is emergent, subjectively created, 
and objectified through human interaction'(Chua, 1986: p. 615). Hopwood (1983), an 
advocate of qualitative research observed `[w]hat is needed are more substantive 
investigations orientated towards providing bases for understanding or explaining the 
working of accounting in action' (p. 302-303). 
He has repeatedly called for research to study accounting in the context in which it 
operates, emphasising its wider social and economic context ((Hopwood, 1987), 
(Hopwood, 1990), (Hopwood, 1999). The four research questions being addressed in 
this study are concerned with establishing insights and understandings of various 
aspects of the process and practice of tax planning in MNCs such i. e. tax planning in 
action. To gain such insights and understandings a subjective approach is imperative. 
This approach, which assumes `organisational activity is meaningful in practice' 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006: p. 16)1 2 is clearly relevant to the work of tax executives 
in business as it involves studying the working of tax planning/management in 
everyday practice. Pursuit of this subjective approach is not at the expense of rigour 
(as may be argued by positivists) when internal validity is considered at the design 
and analysis stages of the research, as was the case in my study (see section 3.7). It is 
"'A detailed discussion of the tensions that exist between these oppositional positions was not 
considered necessary in this thesis. See Denzin and Lincoln (2005), Chapter One, for a detailed 
discussion of qualitative versus quantitative research. 
112 As drawn by Ahrens and Chapman (2006) from Hastrup (1997). 
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more a consequence of studying situations and context within which meanings can 
sometimes be fluid (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006), resulting in what Abernethy, Chua, 
Luckett and Selto (1999) describe as `multiple layers/shades of meaning'. For 
example, the range of answers received from the interviewees suggested a lack of 
consensus over the meaning of `tax strategy' and even `tax planning' itself. 
As noted by Lamb and Lymer (2005), rigour and relevance are key research quality 
assessment criteria. In addressing the possible conflict between rigour and relevance 
in the realm of management accounting research, Otley (2001) argues in favour of 
management accounting research which `connects with real organizations and their 
practices' (p. 246), thereby advocating field-based research methods `to investigate 
the wide variety of control mechanisms deployed by organisations in practice which 
can then be used to generate theory inductively' (p. 256). I favour the latter approach 
in relation to the practice and process of tax planning, predominantly through 
conducting interviews in the `tax field'. Through this inductive approach, the findings 
from this study form the basis for theoretical development and generalisability in 
accordance with Abernethy et al. 's (1999) position that field research does not aim to 
establish statistical generalisability but rather theoretical generalisability. Before 
discussing the other basic research concepts, it is important to consider other research 
approaches to tax research to locate this study in its methodological context. 
Ryan et al. (2002) propose that as taxation researchers often find themselves placed in 
Accounting and Finance departments it is reasonable to assume that they take on the 
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traditional philosophy of researchers engaged in accounting and finance which was 
primarily positivistic in nature. Since the 1970s and 1980s however, alternative 
research traditions in the accounting arena have emerged based on behavioural, 
organisational and social theories (Covaleski and Aiken (1986); Humphrey and 
Scapens (1996)); with Tomkins and Grove (1983) contending that accounting 
researchers were dominated by the natural science approach for too long and need to 
look to interpretive humanistic approaches to give greater insight into everyday 
effects of accounting. The interdisciplinary aspect of academic research in taxation is 
well recognised and means the researcher `adopts the perspectives and research 
approaches of more than one academic discipline' (Lamb, 2005: p. 7). While many tax 
researchers are, as posited by Ryan et al. (2002), placed in Accounting and Finance 
departments, tax research has been conducted as part of a number of research 
traditions apart from accounting (Lamb, Lymer et al., 2005), namely legal (Freedman, 
2005), economic (James, 2005), political science (Radaeilli, 2005) and social policy 
(Boden, 2005). Due to the changing approaches being brought to research in 
accounting generally (as noted earlier in this section), and this interdisciplinarity 
factor, taxation research has attracted researchers with differing ontological and 
epistemological standings, and this, inter alia has resulted in a disparate mix of 
quantitative and qualitative research approaches and methods being employed. As 
noted by Shevlin (1999), `[a]ll methodologies can be found in tax research: namely, 
experimental markets, behaviouraUudgement and decision making, analytical, and 
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archival empirical' (p. 427). 113 Hasseldine (2005) points to behavioural studies of tax 
practice involving experiments, surveys and interviews. 114 
From the very early stages of developing the subject matter of this research, tax 
planning in MNCs, inspiration was taken from the Scholes and Wolfson (1992) 
framework. Research conducted in that tradition tends to adopt a microeconomic 
perspective to `analyse settings where taxes were likely important' (Shackleford and 
Shevlin, 2001). Methodologically, the Scholes and Wolfson-inspired research to date 
mostly takes the positivistic approach, as their framework `seeks to explain the role 
and influence of taxes in organizations in a positive and predictive manner' 
(Macnaughton and Mawani, 2005: p. 168). Such research, usually employing highly 
quantitative research methods has become labelled in the academic accounting 
literature as `the microeconomic approach to tax planning' (Macnaughton and 
Mawani, 2005: p. 168). Shevlin (1999) clearly an advocate of such an approach insists 
`it is a mistake for doctoral candidates with a tax background to think that they do not 
need to take advanced econometrics classes' (p. 428). Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) 
call for even more rigorous econometrics to deal with some methodological concerns 
which they have identified. They also view most of this research as `documentation' 
and maintain the move into explanation, understanding and prediction is critical, but 
slow. 
113 See Table I in Shevlin's paper for examples of research from each of these research approaches. 
114 See Lamb et al. (2005) for a discussion on these different approaches also. 
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While Maydew (2001) expects tax researchers to draw more heavily on Economics 
literature he also maintains that certain areas of taxation in need of research (such as 
tax aggressiveness) present an opportunity to engage in qualitative research. I suggest 
the subject matter of this research is one such area. Overall however, research based 
on Scholes's and Wolfson's framework tends to be undertaken by researchers who 
believe empirical reality to be objective and thereby pursue quantitative methods of 
research to provide a basis for general isations. 115 
I suggest taxpayers' (individuals or companies) actions do not speak for themselves 
which would be a positivist view. Taxpayers often behave in the same way for 
different reasons and this behaviour is not always rational in the economic sense. 
Their actions need explaining and interpreting in order to be understood. For 
example, why is tax more strategically aligned in some companies than others? Why 
are some tax executives more concerned with reputational risk than others? To what 
extent do companies simply copy their tax planning techniques from others and so 
on? This study provides findings around these types of issues, 116 enhancing our 
understanding of the role of taxes in business decisions. "? Such insights can only be 
uncovered through the pursuit of an interpretive inductive methodological approach, 
complemented by a supportive theoretical perspective, and by predominantly 
employing a qualitative research method, namely face-to-face interviews with the tax 
115 This needs to be understood in the context of North American accounting research generally, which 
is dominated by the positivistic approach, as discussed by Lee (2004). 
lib Some of which are of concern to Scholes's and Wolfson's (1992) micro-economic-based research 
also. 
117 Also an objective of Scholes and Wolfson based research. (1992). 
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executives in taxpaying organizations, as was pursued in this study. Through this 
process the `black box' of tax planning activities in organisations is opened up. I do 
not consider it possible to operationalise all aspects of tax planning (a necessary 
precondition for a quantitative approach). Arguably, in combining findings from 
different studies, one taking a qualitative approach (like mine) and another taking a 
positivistic approach (like Scholes and Wolfson), answers to good questions may be 
articulated more comprehensively (Black, 2002). 
I am not an anti-positivist and see `qualitative and quantitative approaches as 
complementary rather than antagonistic' (Thomas, 2003: p. 6). However, I believe 
subjectivity is an essential component of understanding and I would argue that while 
my professional background (see section 1.2) could be perceived by positivists as 
being irrelevant, I see it as an asset. It has equipped me to engage with tax executives 
on a one-to-one basis, to interpret and understand their responses. In support, 
Williams and May (1996) posit that `understanding thus begins from commonality' 
and requires `empathy on the part of the investigator' (p. 63). Ahrens and Dent (1998) 
posit a researcher's subjectivity as something to be used `in an attempt to understand 
what organizational actors have in mind' (p. 27). Smith (1998) also acknowledges that 
`personal experiences and participation in social institutions all affect the practice of 
social research' (p. 8). The interpretive approach pursued in this research is a 
reflection of how I see the reality of the tax world and how knowledge of this tax 
world can best be generated. The latter is influenced somewhat by my professional 
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experiences in tax consultancy. I agree with Smith (1998) that `social scientific 
knowledge is shaped by the values and aims of researchers' (p. 10). 
Overall, the tax world is part of a wider social and economic world which is more 
complex than the physical world and is of a completely different nature (Rosenberg, 
1988). A quantitative approach may well fail to enhance our understanding of the 
complex nature of taxpayers' behaviour. It provides evidence which may not at times 
be capable of being communicated to all members of society. The latter, of course, is 
a desirable aspect of the outputs of social science according to Alfred Schutz (Smith, 
1998). 
3.3.2 Research Methods 
Silverman's (1993) second basic research concept is research method. The primary 
research method employed in this research was face-to-face interviews. While 
recognising Ahrens and Chapman's (2006) position that interviews can be used with 
different methodologies `depending on the notion of reality they are supposed to 
explore' (p. 4), in this case, they were used based on a notion of a social reality 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966) of tax planning in MNCs, as opposed to an objective 
one. The interview method enabled me to work towards an understanding of the 
social reality of the tax world within which the tax executives are operating and 
proved to be a rich data source. The use of qualitative methods (including interviews) 
is consistent with the interpretive methodological approach: 
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Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the 
world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the 
world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a 
series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, 
photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative 
research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them. (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: p. 3) 
Interviews have a number of advantages which include: providing the opportunity to 
probe participants' responses, addressing more complex questions and identifying 
errors that go undetected when using other research data gathering techniques such as 
questionnaires (Pedhazur and Pedhazur Schmelkin, 1991). Interviews can range from 
the highly formalised and structured to unstructured and informal conversation. 
Patton (2002) describes three different types of interview which may be used: the 
unstructured interview, the interview which corresponds with the semi-structured 
interview (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2007: p. 312), and the open ended, unstructured 
interview. Table 3-2 presents three alternative typologies. 
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Table 3-2 Interview Typologies 
Interview Interview 
Tf111 1TIT17 
Patton (2002) Standardised General interview 
open-ended guide 
interview 
Healey and 
Rawl inson 
(1994) 
Fontana and 
Standardised -------------------- 
Interview 
Structured Semi-structured 
Frey (1994) interview interview 
Informal 
conversational 
interview 
Non-standardised 
interview 
Unstructured 
interview 
Source: Fontana and Frey (2005); Healey and Rawlinson (1994); Patton (2002) 
The in-depth semi-structured interview guide approach was adopted in this research. 
It facilitated having a framework of issues/themes around the four research questions 
and their associated objectives. This approach permitted me some flexibility and 
spontaneity while keeping a focus on the different themes, and allowed the 
interviewees `a degree of freedom to explain their thoughts' (Horton, Macve et al., 
2004: p. 340). This approach `... helps minimise bias through the prespecification of 
non-directive questions and probes' (Lillis, 1999: p. 87). Probing, used to seek detail 
and clarity is `a skill that comes from knowing what to look for in the interview, 
listening carefully to what is said and what is not said, and being sensitive to the 
feedback needs of the person being interviewed. ' (Patton, 2002: p. 327) 
The highly structured interview approach was not considered appropriate as it does 
not allow the researcher to pursue issues that were not anticipated when deciding on 
the interview questions (Patton, 2002). Pursuit of the highly unstructured approach 
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would not have facilitated obtaining responses around certain common themes which 
were developed carefully and purposefully. The interview schedule and process are 
discussed further in section 3.6. 
In addition to interviews, I examined each company's most recently filed (i. e. 2004) 
IOK. 118 I necessarily examined these IOKs prior to conducting the interviews. The 
IOKs, which includes financial statements, provided important contextual 
documentary information on the nature of the company's business, the countries in 
which they have a physical presence, auditors' identity, detailed financial reports and 
so on. While some valuable information on the companies is available from an 
examination of the financial reports, real insights into a company's tax situation, or its 
approach to tax management cannot be obtained in this manner. This view is 
evidenced by TE 14's comment, "' `I better be careful saying this on tape but 
financial statement disclosures are no more transparent today than they were before. 
You could not tell what we're doing. ' 
This calls into question the value and usefulness of accounting statements from many 
stakeholders' perspectives. 120 It also questions the usefulness of financial statements 
in terms of explaining and understanding tax planning in MNCs. I also examined the 
companies' websites, recent company press releases, press comments, and internet 
accessible executive biographies of the interviewees. In addition, I reviewed some 
118 Form 10K is the annual report that publicly quoted companies file with the U. S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission. It provides a comprehensive overview of the company's business. 
19 TE denotes tax executive. 
120 Further consideration of which is not within the realm of this particular study. 
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material on recent legislation which I thought might come into my discussions with 
the interviewees, the details of which I needed to be familiar with, such as the 
Sarbanes Oxley 2002 Act, and the Homeland Investment Act. 121 
3.3.3 Domain 
In relation to the third research concept of domain or space in which research takes 
place `the shape of the field depends on its usefulness for answering the research 
questions' (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006: p. 6). Through conducting face-to-face 
interviews with tax executives in MNCs and tax advisors, I have explored an 
important element of the `tax field' with a view to answering the research questions 
posed in this study. 122 This qualitative field study approach facilitates `open-ended 
interaction between the researcher and researched' (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006: p. 6). 
See section 3.5 for the rationale for selecting the companies involved in my study, 
and section 3.6 for a description of the interview process. 
3.3.4 Theory 
The fourth research concept is theory and the related explanatory concepts. Theory 
selection is very important as `appropriate theorization can give fuller explanations of 
organizational structures and processes than those held by organization members' 
(Llewelyn, 2003: p. 662). The theories and the explanatory concepts employed in this 
research are encapsulated in stage two of the theoretical framework depicted in Figure 
3.2. This framework represents the convergence of theoretical explanatory concepts 
121 Part of the American Jobs Creation Act 2004. 
122 I am aware of the potential limitations of obtaining one side of a story, a point which is addressed in 
section 3.8. 
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from tax planning literature, NIS and endogeneity of law, representing theoretical 
triangulation, i. e. `using various factors from a variety of theoretical perspectives 
simultaneously to examine the same dimension of a research problem' (Hopper and 
Hoque, 2006: p. 478). Ahrens and Chapman (2006) posited that `events in the field 
may best be explained with reference to multiple theories' (p. 5). Drawing on multiple 
theoretical paradigms lends itself to obtaining a more comprehensive understanding 
of the practice and process of tax planning in MNCs and `can help one take advantage 
of the complementariness of different theories' (Hopper and Hoque, 2006: p. 479). I 
recognise that some of the theoretical constructs drawn in this study from the tax 
planning literature, particularly from Scholes and Wolfson (1992) informed research 
(e. g. income shifting), are rooted in opposing epistemological and ontological 
assumptions to the NIS and endogeneity of law constructs. While such triangulation 
might be considered somewhat ambitious and not strictly `within-same tradition' 
(Hopper and Hoque, 2006), it enhanced rather than constrained the overall 
interpretive approach taken here. 123 The choice of theory is interlinked with the 
overall interpretive approach used in this study. In support of the theoretical approach 
adopted here, Covaleski et al. (1996) posited that IT (encapsulating NIS) has most 
forcefully developed the core aspects of an interpretive perspective i. e. its concern 
with social construction and the spread of rationality and how such rationality impacts 
123 Theoretical triangulation has many advocates in accounting research. See Carpenter and Feroz, 
(1992); Hoque and Hopper (1994); Abernethy and Chua (1996); Covaleski et al. (1996); Ansari and 
Euske (1987). 
119 
Methodology 
the power and politics in organisational functioning. The theoretical framework is 
discussed in detail in the next section. 124 
3.4 Theoretical Framework 
As referred to earlier, this study draws on three strands of literature, namely tax 
planning, NIS and endogeneity of law literatures (see Chapter Two). The core themes 
and theoretical constructs within these literatures provide the basis for the theoretical 
framework developed and presented in this section, which is used and drawn upon in 
Chapters Four to Seven inclusive, when analysing the findings on the practice and 
process of tax planning in US MNCs. 
The theoretical development within this study consists of two separate integrated 
stages. The first stage consists of constructing a descriptive framework, which is a 
useful tool around which and through which to describe and understand the make-up 
and dynamics of interaction in the broader tax arena and environment within which 
corporate tax executives must operate. This framework draws heavily on Dillard et 
al. 's (2004) framework. The second stage brings together the core theoretical 
constructs as drawn from the three strands of literature referred to above, through 
which an understanding of the findings of this study will be enhanced, with a 
particular emphasis on their explanatory power at the organisational level of 
124 Alternative interpretive perspectives, critical perspectives and contingency theory were also briefly 
considered, but not pursued following a review of pertinent literature on such alternatives (Otley 
(1980); Covaleski et al. (1996); Chenhall (2003)). I recognise however, that there are some overlaps in 
relation to core NIS constructs within some of these other theoretical approaches. 
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analysis. ' 25 These core constructs were drawn upon when operationalising the 
interviews conducted at the organisational level (see section 3.6.1 on construction of 
the interview schedule). 
3.4.1 Stage One: A Descriptive Framework of the Tax Arena 
As referred to earlier, Dillard et al. (2004) developed a framework of the context and 
processes associated with creating, adopting and discarding institutional practices i. e. 
a general institutional model of organisational change. Their framework sets out a 
dynamic social context within which institutional change takes place. While the 
primary focus of my study is not on change per se, some insights have been obtained 
into the process by which change in tax planning activities and tax laws are brought 
about., the analysis of which will benefit greatly from having from the outset a picture 
of the broader tax arena, the range of participators/actors engaged in the tax arena, the 
different levels of analysis at which they operate, and the potential interplay between 
all of the actors involved. Applying the Dillard et al. framework in an international 
tax context provides a particularly rich tool for `setting the scene' and for identifying 
the players at each level of analysis. This in itself is a valid pursuit, particularly in a 
study of this nature where the application of NIS in a tax planning context is new. 
This framework depicted in Figure 3-1 encapsulates three levels of social systems: the 
economic and political level, the organisational field level and the organisational 
12S This is very important in the context of this study as almost all of the interviews conducted were 
with tax executives within the MNCs - the organisational level of analysis in accordance with the 
Dillard et al. (2004) typology. 
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level, implicitly representing a hierarchy of institutional influence. 126 For example, 
`the societal level sets the dominant ideology for the organizational field to translate 
into organizational controls' (Hopper and Major, 2007: p. 56). Different `actor sets' 
exist and are presented at each level in the tax arena, with some being more 
influential than others. Different roles are played out at each level, ranging from the 
implementation of tax plans and associated processes at the organisational level, to 
developing and setting standards of practice at the organisational field level, to 
developing and enacting tax laws at the economic and political level. 
The Tax Arena: A Descriptive Framework 
ý 
Levels of Social Systems Actors 
ý 
Economic and Political 
Organisational Field 
Organisatjpnal Levels 
Innovators Late Adoptors 
ý"European Commission 
1Government 
Officials 
"Tax Collection and Enforcement 
Agencies 
OECD 
-Regulatory Agents 
"Professional Tax & Accounting 
nsstutes 
"Industry tax representative 
groups 
"Geographically based tax 
representative groups 
-External Tax Advisors 
"Auditors 
Shareholders 
-Other MNCS including supplers 
and competitors 
Market Analysts 
PCAOB 
`Media 
"CFO 
-Tax Executives 
Figure 3-1 Theoretical Framework: Stage One 
1 
126 These three levels map well onto Fligstein's (1991) `institutional spheres' representing the three 
contexts within which organisations operate namely, `the existing strategy and structure of the 
organization, the set of organizations comprising the organizational field, and the state' (p. 312). 
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Arguably, they share a common interest in the jurisdiction and legitimacy of the 
taxation profession as a whole. However it is important to recognise that actors and 
interest groups at each level are operating in different contexts, have different 
interests, different sources of power and different audiences to whom their claims for 
legitimacy must be articulated (Perrow, 1985). There will accordingly be tension and 
controversy between the different levels around for example, new tax planning 
practices and processes. My study provides some insight into the nature of such 
tension and controversy, how it arises in the tax arena and how resolutions are often 
found. The latter is reflected in the dynamic, dialectic and recursive relationship 
between the levels of analysis, as indicated by the directional arrows. These actor sets 
as depicted in Figure 3.1 are sourced in part from interview findings, secondary 
research, and my prior knowledge of the tax arena acquired through working in tax 
practice dealing with MNCs' tax affairs. The three levels of analysis, their associated 
actors and agencies, and sources of legitimacy are described below, and the potential 
dynamics of this framework in a tax context are considered. 
3.4.1.1 The Economic and Political Level 
The first level is the overall economic and political level within which norms and 
values of a society are established. They identify formal rationality, private property 
rights, wealth accumulation and free trade as the norms and values of western market 
capitalist societies: 
The recursive institutionalization process.. . can generally be viewed as a 
process contextualized by the most general and widely taken-for-granted 
norms and practices accepted at the societal level where political and 
economic systems.. . use symbolic sense making criteria... in articulating and instituting legitimate norms and practices. (Dillard et al., 2004: p. 513) 
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The MNCs in SV that participated in this study, being members of such a western 
market capitalist society, approach tax planning on the basis that a company aspires to 
and actively engages in tax planning with a view to minimising its worldwide tax bill 
(and thereby maximise return to its investors). This is the `norm' and is very much 
accepted generally at the societal level. Some interviewees spoke of this being a 
`taken for granted' starting point, whereby there was no question of tax planning per 
se being perceived by the wider community as `frowned upon' or `illegitimate' 
practice. Clearly, however, as the findings reveal, some companies engage in 
different levels of `risk-taking' in their tax plans, and some arguably take a less 
patriotic view when putting tax driven structures in place vis-a-vis it giving rise to 
(more or less) US taxes versus non-US taxes (in absolute terms). 
The primary actors at the societal level include government officials, regulators and 
legislators. As the government of the day can enact and change tax laws, the state can 
arguably `alter the environment more profoundly and systematically than other 
organizations' (Fligstein, 1991: p. 315). It can act as mediator and be a source of 
change or stability. The various tax laws namely the `elements' of the political and 
economic system in a tax context, `represent the properties of the prevailing systems 
of social integration' (Dillard et al., 2004: p. 513). The existence of these tax laws and 
the (rather simplistic) assumption that all tax planning is `legal' contributes towards 
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this perception at the societal level of tax planning being legitimate. 127 The practice of 
tax planning therefore enjoys a strong support from this level. In addition, broadly 
speaking, it could be said that political systems worldwide, through governments, 
approve of, support and facilitate tax planning activities by MNCs (by for example 
introducing tax-based incentives). 128 There is a tension at this level between a 
government needing to enact tax laws that are `good for business' which effectively 
renders it an `investment partner' (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992), yet satisfy the diverse 
range of social and economic objectives that are typically part of any programme for 
government, many of which may not be perceived as `good for business'. This results 
in compromise on the part of government in terms of both tax legislation and the 
implementation thereof. While there are different political and tax governance 
structures in place throughout the world (and these MNCs operate in many different 
countries), generally, the primary actors identified at this level in a tax context 
include government officials such as governments leaders and finance ministers, tax 
collection and enforcement agencies such as the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) in the 
US and the Revenue Commissioners in Ireland, the European Commission and the 
OECD. 
3.4.1.2 The Tax Organisational Field Level 
As stated earlier (see section 2.3.2.4) the organisational field is possibly the most 
important and influential level generally in an NIS context and more specifically in 
127 Of course, the attitudes of some tax executives towards dealing with such uncertainties vary which 
in itself may be problematic in terms of this working assumption at the societal level. 
128 I recognise that within this, the governments are in competition for a revenue base, but further 
discussion on this is not directly relevant to this thesis. 
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the context of understanding the tax arena. DiMaggio and Powell's (1991b) definition 
is worth restating at this stage: `Those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute 
a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or 
products. '(p. 64) 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) also alluded to the potential for the influence of the 
organisational field on an organisation to be even more enhanced when dealing with 
an uncertain terrain (such as interpretation of tax laws in this instance). Constituents 
of this group would include professional institutes, industry groupings, and 
geographical groupings, industry leaders, trade unions and external consultants. 
Relationships between organisations in the field can be described in network terms 
according to Fligstein (1991), the nature of which ranges from `formal relations to 
personal friendships' (p. 313). He goes on to address the issue of stability within an 
organisational field as being an important variable when addressing change in any 
organisation positing `where the rules exist and a pecking order of organizations is 
well established, fundamental change is less likely' (p. 313). Within this level the 
economic, political and social values referred to above are translated into `field 
specific expectations' (Dillard et al., 2004: p. 513). Professional tax institutes, other 
tax representative groups, for example, develop certain `best practices' in relation to 
tax planning practice and processes within the economic and political context. 
Professional associations `enable the formation and reproduction of shared meanings 
and understandings' (Greenwood et al., 2002: p. 61), and enable organisations to 
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`collectively attempt to shape institutional requirements and redefine environments' 
(Scott, 2001: p. 152). While recognising the normative aspect of field level activity, 
Fligstein's (1991) view of it as `a construction of powerful organizations that is based 
on the interests of those organizations' (p. 314), is also noted and taken into account 
when analysing the findings in this study. 
Some actors, interest groups and representative groups may be more powerful than 
others in setting such best practice parameters, a point which will be revisited in the 
findings (Chapters Four to Seven inclusive). From an NIS perspective this is very 
important as `the perceived "better practices" are implemented by other organizations 
within the organizational field and become expected practices (institutionalized)' 
(Dillard et al., 2004: p. 515). 
Fligstein (1991) proposes two principles as the bases for certain organisations 
controlling the field. The first concerns the relative size of an organisation and second 
recognises that certain actions in practice tend to suit all organisations in the field. For 
instance, some tax plans and related processes suit all companies in SV, due to the 
commonalities they face in terms of industry, structure and global challenges `to the 
degree that all members benefit from the formation of stable rules governing 
legitimate actions in the field, cooperation is to be expected' (p. 314). 
As noted by DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: p. 65), `the structure of an organizational 
field cannot be determined a priori but must be defined on the basis of empirical 
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investigation'. Based on the findings of this research, the tax field consists of. tax 
professional associations/institutes such as the Tax Executives Institute; industry 
specific representative groups such as the Semi-Conductor Industry 
Association; 129 geographically-based tax representative groups such as the Silicon 
Valley Tax Directors Group; external tax advisers, auditors, other regulatory agents, 
tax academics, other MNCs including suppliers, distributors and competitors, 
financial analysts, the media and others to whom the profession articulates its claims 
to legitimacy and status (for example shareholders). 
Greenwood et al. (2002) identify professional associations as important regulatory 
agents which `play an important role in theorizing change, endorsing local 
innovations and shaping their diffusion' (p. 58). The latter reflects their partaking in 
the dynamics of institutionalisation (Dillard et al., 2004) which takes place by, inter 
alia: `hosting a process of discourse through which change is debated and endorsed: 
first by negotiating and managing debate within the profession; and, second, by 
refraining professional identities as they are presented to others outside the 
profession. ' (p. 59) Such discourse could typically be facilitated through educational 
programmes and conferences (Greenwood et al., 2002). 
While the primary empirical level of my study is at the organisational level, a small 
number of interviews were conducted at the organisation field level with tax advisors 
129 See section 7.2 for a comprehensive description of all constituents at all levels of analysis. 
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to MNCs, the findings from which provide another insightful perspective on the 
process and practice of tax planning. 
3.4.1.3 The Organisational Level 
This is the individual organisational level i. e. the individual MNCs. The primary 
actors here include leaders of the tax function (typically a Tax VP, and CFO) and all 
tax executives within each company. These are the individuals charged with 
managing the tax function in their respective organisations, which incorporates both 
tax compliance and tax planning. This is the primary empirical level of investigation 
in this study as most of the interviewees are senior in-house tax executives. As the 
findings from this study demonstrate, the `power' of the tax function varies from one 
organisation to the next for many reasons, but tends to be influenced hugely by the 
individuals in key roles who exercise their power through both `formal and informal 
authority structures' (Fligstein, 1991: p. 313). 
These individuals tend to be concerned with their legitimacy both internally vis-a-vis 
other functions and externally vis-ä-vis other tax executives, auditors and tax 
regulators and so on, thereby providing a rich terrain of tension at this level. 
Dillard et al. (2004) incorporate the distinction between innovators and late adoptors, 
a categorisation with particular relevance in a tax context. Scott (2001) referred to 
three classes of variables: attributes, linkages and reference groups. These may help 
identify organisational features associated with early adoption rates which appear 
potentially relevant in the tax domain, particularly in the context of MNCs adopting 
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the latest tax plan/structure that has been adopted elsewhere in SV. Company size is 
clearly identified as an important attribute. Scott (2001) draws on studies which 
linked the characteristics of certain individuals within an organisation with adoption 
rates, for example CEO background and his/her power vis-ä-vis the corporate Board. 
With respect to tax, the impact of the characteristics of the CFO is worth 
investigating, as is done in this study. The latter emphasizes the potential power 
vested in certain individuals within an MNC: `[p]ersonal influence is dependent on 
the particular unique actor' (Zucker, 1991: p. 86). Adoption rates in the tax domain 
may also be examined through assessing the linkages that MNCs and their tax 
directors have with other actors in their environment, such as other tax executives and 
institutes. The third variable, reference groups, raises the question of which 
organisation to copy or emulate. This is important in the tax context where often the 
interpretation of tax legislation is uncertain and tax executives arguably may get 
comfort from the fact that they are interpreting the uncertain tax laws in the same way 
as certain other organisations have already done, which ultimately may lead to the 
mentality that they (the `experts') all cannot be wrong. Factors arising from research 
in this area as analysed by Scott (2001) include, geographical location (all of the 
companies in my study are based in SV), company similarity (same industry, often 
facing many similar tax issues/opportunities), closely tied through for example 
sharing information, board interlocks, and the impact of the perception of `successful' 
or `prestigious' individuals/companies with respect to tax planning. As noted by Scott 
(2001), `[t]he arguments associated with these variables range from strictly 
institutional ones to vicarious learning to political manouvering' (p. 168). The findings 
130 
Methodology 
of this study provides evidence of leaders and adoptors co-existing (often quite 
harmoniously) when it comes to tax planning practices and processes among MNCs 
in SV (see Chapters Four to Seven inclusive). 
3.4.1.4 Dynamics of the Framework 
As stated earlier, the focus of this research was not on tracking change in the tax 
arena per se, and this descriptive framework is being used primarily as a tool for 
describing the tax arena in terms of different levels of social systems and the actors 
and agencies `at play' at each level. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this 
framework has significant explanatory power in terms of understanding the 
institutional relational dynamics between the three levels, particularly in relation to 
Research Question Four. ' 30 This model represents the recursive nature of the 
institutionalisation process, resulting in the context of the tax domain in `a significant 
degree of structural stability enabling and constraining action' (Dillard et al., 2004: 
p. 513). As is suggested by the findings of this research, tax laws, while not always 
liked by business are often `negotiated', and well anticipated by tax executives, who 
are often allowed sufficient time, for example between announcement and enactment, 
to take account of, and/or adjust for, such new laws in their tax plans. The latter of 
course, presupposes the necessary dynamic aspect of effective tax planning (Scholes 
and Wolfson, 1992). 
It should be recognised that despite the hierarchical representation inherent in this 
framework, not all organisational fields or indeed organisations will always agree on 
130 These dynamics will be revisited in the findings (Chapters Four to Seven inclusive). 
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the same values, beliefs and norms which in itself results in friction which ultimately 
may lead to changes at all levels. Also, organisations sometimes deal with very 
different internal and external pressures. Whatever the dynamics involved `recursivity 
is the key to understand change in the institutionalization process since taken-for- 
granted norms, values, beliefs and assumptions may be continually revised at all three 
levels of the model' (Dillard et al., 2004: p. 514). 
There are vested interests at all levels of analysis, from the political leaders, to 
representative groupings, to individual corporations and to individuals within these 
corporations. Arguably, it remains in all of their interests to maintain an acceptable 
and workable level of stability and change within the broader tax environment. 
Fligstein (1991) referred to one great cause of stability being in `the interest of any 
given set of organizations and the actors in them in maintaining some distribution of 
power and resources' (p. 314). 
Notwithstanding the hierarchical representation inherent within this framework, 
importantly, this study demonstrates clearly that actors at all levels engage with actors 
at the other two levels. Individual tax executives engage with their representative 
groups at the organisational field level. They engage with actors at the political level 
either indirectly (for example through having views on some tax law related through a 
representative lobby group), or directly when for example, meeting with a finance 
minister of a country into which the company is considering putting a new plant. The 
framework therefore, represents a complex web of interaction between the three 
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levels. This study provides insights into the dynamics of interaction between the 
different levels, highlighting various points of tension. For example, how and to what 
extent do professional institutes set norms within tax planning, and to what extent are 
such norms adhered to in practice? Is there some evidence of decoupling or loose 
coupling of such norms when it comes to tax planning practice and processes in 
action? (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) This gives rise to interesting questions around who 
sets the agenda at the field level and the embracing (or not) of this agenda at the 
organisational level. The interviewees are themselves (or one of their tax team) 
members of many different representative groups, all of which have similar and 
varied agendas. Managing one's interaction and relationship with these different 
groups in itself appears to be something of a challenge, particularly when the different 
agendas do not coincide. The latter is also explored further in Chapter Seven. 
While Dillard et al. (2004) in developing their framework were focused on expanding 
institutional theory, it is important to remember that it embraced the core theoretical 
constructs within NIS, including the recent calls for consideration of power and 
politics all of which were described in Chapter Two. These core theoretical constructs 
constitute the lens through which the findings in relation to all four research questions 
are analysed. In relation to Research Question Four however, there is also a critical 
link between the extension of NIS being pursued in this study to take account of the 
endogeneity of law construct (see section 2.3.4) and the `dynamics of interaction' 
typology within the Dillard et al. (2004) framework when describing the process of 
institutionalisation. While Dillard et al. 's `dynamics of interaction' has explanatory 
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power in relation to all four research questions, its alignment with the endogeneity of 
law perspective is particularly noteworthy in relation to Research Question Four. 
These two theoretical approaches combine well and together provide a very rich 
platform from which to explain and understand the findings in relation to Question 
Four. Section 2.3.4 referred to the conceptual link between the endogeneity of law 
literature and the writings of McBarnet/McBarnet and Whelan (as referred to in 
section 2.2.4 when reviewing the tax planning literature). Following on from this, 
there is also a conceptual link between their writings and Dillard et al. 's `dynamics of 
interaction' particularly with respect to the role of the regulated in actively resisting 
tax laws. 
3.4.2 Stage Two: Core Theoretical Constructs 
Stages one and two of the theoretical framework are inextricably linked. Stage one, as 
represented in Figure 3.1 provides a descriptive framework which sets the scene of 
the tax arena in terms of three levels of social systems, the various actors at play at 
each level and the dynamics of institutionalisation in the tax arena through a complex 
web of interaction between actors at the different levels of analysis. Stage two, which 
is addressed in this section brings together the core theoretical constructs from three 
strands of literature: tax planning (section 2.2), NIS (section 2.3) and endogeneity of 
law (section 2.3.4), through which the practice and process of tax planning in MNCs 
and the dynamics of institutionalisation in the tax arena in SV are analysed. 131 
131 While the former two strands of literature are drawn upon conceptually in relation to all four 
research questions, the endogeneity of law literature is of most relevance in the context of analysing 
the findings in relation to Research Question Four only. 
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Stage two of the framework is diagrammatically represented in Figure 3.2. As the 
above three strands of literature have been reviewed thoroughly in Chapter Three, 
they will be revisited only briefly here as the context requires. 
Core Theoretical 
Constructs 
3 Strands of Literature ) 
Tax planning 
Strategic Aügrf cC: 
-Communication & 
interpersonal skills 
-Dynamism and Flezbility 
-Performance Evaluation 
"AII Taxes, Pames, won-tax 
costs 
-Income shitting 
"Creanve Compliance 
-Risk Management 
ý.... >, 
\ 
ý 
NIS (as extended) 
"Legiomacy (Social ano 
Economic Pressures) 
"Isomorphism (Coercive, 
Normative and mimetic) 
"Decouphng 
-Power and Politics 
"Three Levels of social 
systems and dynamics of 
nstitutionalisation (See 
rigure41) 
ý 
ý...... ý 
Endogenelty of Law 
Reciprocal relationship 
between regulated & regulatee 
-Strategic responses to 
legislation 
-Networks of power 
"Law-in-action 
ý 
................. ....................... >-ý 
11 1 Social Construction of Reality 
of Tax Arena/World 
ý 
Figure 3-2 Theoretical Framework: Stage Two 
3.4.2.1 Tax Planning 
This literature makes two distinct contributions to the study. Firstly, it was drawn 
upon when deciding what aspects of the tax function to discuss with the interviewees 
(see section 3.6.1). These aspects of the function emerged as central themes and were 
the basis on which my literature review was presented earlier (section 2.1). The 
second contribution is by way of some rich theoretical constructs which now 
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constitute an important part of this stage of the theoretical framework as represented 
in Figure 3.2. 
The key theoretical constructs are drawn from tax planning literature which 
principally addresses normative attributes of effective tax planning, and a sample of 
the relevant references is as follows: 
" The strategic alignment of tax was put forward as both normative and 
aspirational in the literature (for example, Valente, 2002; Yancey and 
Cravens, 1998; James, 2005; Karayan and Swenson, 2007). 
" Communication and interpersonal skills were identified as critical to ensure 
inter alia, that senior management and in-house tax personnel work towards 
optimisation of after-tax profits (Wilson, 1995; Levine and Lerner, 1993; 
PWC, 2001). 
" Dynamism and flexibility were considered core attributes of effective tax 
planning (Hoffman, 1961; Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; James, 2005). 
" Performance evaluation of the tax function was broadly considered important 
and necessary, though little consensus exists on how best this can be carried 
out (Douglas and Ellingsworth, 1996; Rego, 2003; Phillips, 2003). 
" All taxes, all parties and all non-tax costs should be considered as part of any 
effective tax planning (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Wilson, 1993; Yancey and 
Cravens, 1998). 
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" Income shifting is advocated by many as an effective form of tax planning 
(Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Samson, 1998, Fallan et al., 1995). 
" Creative/innovative approaches to tax planning discussed in the literature, 
whereby adherence to the strict letter of the law is of more concern than 
adherence to the spirit of the law (McBarnet, 2001a, 2001b, Fallan et al., 
1995). 
" The need to have and exercise a tax risk management policy, dealing with 
operational, planning and compliance risk is extremely important in the 
context of operating within what is sometimes an uncertain legal environment 
(Hoffman, 1961; PWC, 2001). 
All of the above are captured in Figure 3.2 and findings are provided in this study 
with reference to these normative principles from the literature on tax planning. 
3.4.2.2 New Institutional Sociology 
The core theoretical constructs within NIS (as extended in this study: see sections 
2.3.3 and 2.3.4) provide a particularly rich lens through which to analyse and discuss 
the findings pertaining to all four research questions in this study. These constructs 
and a sample of the relevant references are as follows: 
" Legitimacy is a core concept within NIS and is rooted in the idea that, in order 
for organisations to survive in their social environment they need to be 
socially acceptable and credible. Achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the 
world, the professions and so forth, is extremely important and valued (Scott, 
2001; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Carruthers, 1995). An important 
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theoretical progression (see section 2.3.2.1) recognises the co-existence or 
interaction between social and economic pressures, whereby efficiency 
concerns and institutional processes are not oppositional (Scott and Meyer, 
1991; Powell, 1991; Hopper and Major, 2007). This framework therefore 
takes account of both social and economic sources of legitimacy, with 
however, a greater focus being given to the social sources when discussing the 
findings. 
" Institutional isomorphism constitutes the adaptation of institutional practice by 
an organisation. Three classifications (although not mutually exclusive) are 
recognised in the literature: coercive, mimetic and normative (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
Scott, 2001). My study provides evidence of all three sources of isomorphism 
in action in the SV tax arena. 
" Decoupling which refers to the situation in which the formal organisational 
structure or practice is separate and distinct from actual organisational 
practice. The resulting formal structures may well be in conflict with 
efficiency criteria. (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Scott, 2001; Carruthers, 1995). 
" Power and politics is an extension of the NIS perspective (Perrow, 1985; 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Dillard et al., 2004; Hopper and Major, 2007) 
and is incorporated in this framework to capture the role of powerful actors 
inside and outside of their organisations. 
" Three levels of analysis or levels of social systems and the associated 
dynamics of institutionalisation are well recognised within the NIS literature 
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(Dillard et al., 2004; Hopper and Major, 2007). These are incorporated in 
Figure 3.2, where they are cross-referenced to Figure 3.1, in which they are 
described in detail (see section 3.4.1 also). 
3.4.2.3 Endogeneity of Law 
As described in section 2.3.4, this perspective pays attention to active agency and the 
play of power and politics in the context of understanding the social construction of 
the meaning of tax laws, and helps explain the transition from `law-on-the-books' to 
`law-in-action'. In their strategic responses to tax regulations (Oliver, 1991), and 
through various networks of power, organisations frequently play a role in the 
construction of the law that regulates them (Suchman and Edelman, 1996; Edelman 
and Suchman, 1997; Covaleski et al., 2007b). There is thereby a reciprocal 
relationship between the regulator and the regulatee reflecting a political process 
around the making and implementation of tax laws, which is an important aspect of 
this framework as depicted in Figure 3.2.132 
Suchman and Edelman (1996) refer to the inherently ambiguous nature of law 
creating: 
Room for manipulation, interpretation, and enactment on the part of actors 
both within and outside of organizations ... Indeed the social construction of legal threat can become a primary vehicle by which individuals, subunits, and 
132 See Suchman and Edelman (1996) for their views on what NIS has to offer the law and society 
tradition, providing new insights on understanding compliance with the law, specifically `[d]epicting 
legal compliance as institutional isomorphism recasts law as a broad cultural framework that 
influences organizations both mimetically and normatively, not merely through coercive material 
incentives. ' (p. 920) 
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professions and advance their own status. (p. 935) 
As referred to earlier there are conceptual alignments between some aspects of the tax 
planning literature (McBarnet, 2001a; McBarnet and Whelan, 1992), the dynamics of 
institutionalisation (Dillard et al., 2004) and the endogeneity of law (Suchman and 
Edelman, 1996; Edelman and Suchman, 1997; Edelman et al., 1999; Covaleski et al., 
2007b) literatures which is represented by the dotted line in Figure 3.2. Finally, this 
diagram depicts the social construction of the reality of the tax arena which the 
findings of this study supports. These are interpreted through the lens of NIS (as 
extended), endogeneity of law perspectives and tax planning principles. 
3.5 Selection of Companies and Interviewees 
This study focuses on the practice and process of tax planning in US MNCs in the 
information technology (IT) sector. The headquarters of all of these companies are 
based in the SV area of California (see section 1.3 on SV). 133 US MNCs were chosen 
in 2002 for a number of reasons. There was (and still is) a significant number of US 
MNCs operating in Ireland. 134 US investment in Ireland continues to be extremely 
important to the Irish economy. In 2001, when the companies studied were selected, 
1,240 overseas companies had a base in Ireland. Forty three per cent of Industrial 
Development Authority-assisted overseas companies in 2001 were US MNCs 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003). This figure was in excess of 46% in 2002 
133 Although one company has a Cayman Islands-based tax structure. In this context it is interesting to 
note Hines' (1999) point: 'It is striking that, in spite of the appeal of low tax rates, very few 
multinational firms actually relocate their corporate homes to tax havens. In part, this reflects the tax 
and regulatory costs of doing so, but in part, it also reflects the unwillingness of governments to 
impose excessively heavy tax burdens that encourage widespread departures' (p. 313). 
14 I am a lecturer at the National University of Ireland, Galway and have therefore a natural interest in 
all companies operating in Ireland. 
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(American Chamber of Commerce Ireland, 2003). According to American Chamber 
of Commerce Ireland (2003), in April 2003 `there are 570 US companies, employing 
over 90,000 people in Ireland. US Foreign Direct Investment is valued at over $34 
billion'. The then Irish Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment reinforced the 
importance of US companies in Ireland as she believed 'US investment is crucial to 
Ireland's current and future success, both as an investor and a significant trading 
partner' (American Chamber of Commerce Ireland, 2003). 
In 2000 and 2001, in excess of 50% of the total Irish corporation tax yield came from 
manufacturing and internationally traded services companies (Forfäs, 2002,2003). I 
have spoken with a member of personnel working in the statistics section of the Irish 
Revenue Commissioners who provided this information and she is very firmly of the 
view that a significant proportion of these manufacturing and internationally traded 
services companies are in fact US MNCs. Accordingly, this group of taxpayers are 
and I expect will continue to be of great importance to the Irish Exchequer. US MNCs 
continue to be attracted to Ireland due to, inter alia, Ireland being one of the most 
profitable locations in Europe for overseas investors. 
Many US MNCs have centralised their European/worldwide finance and tax 
functions in Ireland. The latter facilitated to some extent my getting access to the 
relevant tax experts within the companies finally selected. US MNCs operate in many 
jurisdictions throughout the world and accordingly have many and varied tax issues to 
address on a worldwide basis. There is a prima facia need for tax executives within 
these companies to understand the business and its organisation in order to effectively 
141 
Methodology 
create, formulate and administer tax plans. Equally, there is a need for non-tax 
managers to be aware of the potential role of taxes when structuring business 
activities and transactions. Choosing US MNCs is a deliberate attempt to seek out 
companies and individuals engaged in the processes being studied. This `purposive 
sampling' approach is a common technique employed by many qualitative 
researchers (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 27). 
US MNCs invest heavily in tax planning activities (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). 
There is evidence to suggest that this investment is economically worthwhile. Mills et 
al. (1998), who examined the tax related expenditures of 365 large US corporations, 
estimate that on average, large corporations save $4 for every $1 spent on tax 
planning activities. There is no research which indicates the extent to which, if at all, 
the Irish Exchequer is losing out as a result of these tax planning activities of US 
MNCs. However, the research conducted by Mills et al. (1998) suggests any tax 
authority should be aware of US MNCs' tax planning endeavours and the potential 
impact on Exchequer returns. The latter should assist the Irish tax authority (and 
others) in maximising or at least protecting what is rightfully theirs in terms of 
Exchequer returns from these companies. Finally, US MNCs are a well recognised 
and acceptable data base for conducting academic research. Much of the Scholes and 
Wolfson-based (1992) based research conducted to date, for instance has been based 
on US companies. 
I have chosen to focus on US MNCs in the IT sector, based on initial conversations 
with contacts in the Irish Department of Finance who perceive this sector as being 
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very significant. There are a number of very large operations in Ireland in this sector. 
In addition, focussing on one industry facilitates more in-depth interviews. 
Companies operating in the same industry will frequently face similar business and 
planning issues which have to be managed from a tax perspective and focussing on 
one industry in this context should, inter alia, provide insights into the commonalities 
or otherwise of how and why such companies create, formulate and manage their tax 
plans. 
Having identified the relevant MNCs grouping, I then set about gaining access to and 
securing interview time with the heads of tax in some companies in this grouping. I 
successfully obtained interview time with such individuals largely through pursuing 
two primary sources of contact with these companies. Obtaining access in this way, I 
believe resulted in a less time consuming process than might normally be the case, 
particularly when seeking interviews with such tax `elites' (Odendahl and Shaw, 
2001). Firstly, I personally knew individuals who worked in the finance function for 
such companies based in Ireland,. Secondly I `luckily' introduced myself at a Tax 
Research Network Conference to a tax professor based at San Jose State University, 
who happened to know professionally (and personally in some cases) the head of tax 
in a number of SV-based IT companies. Both of these `contacts' were very happy to 
ask their `contacts' within the companies to facilitate my research through giving 
interviews. Resulting from this process, I secured interview time with tax executives 
in fifteen US MNCs in the IT sector. Table 3.3 presents some background facts on all 
fifteen companies, covering the nature of their business, turnover, number of 
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employees and so forth. I interviewed 26 tax executives from these companies, many 
of whom were heading up the tax function in their organisations. The others were all 
in senior management positions reporting directly to the head of tax. It was very 
important to interview the `right' people, namely the ones who could answer the 
questions posed in the interview schedule. I thought the interviewees chosen were 
well positioned to do so, and certainly proved to be well equipped to provide the 
types of insights being sought in this study. In addition to interviewing in-house tax 
executives, I interviewed three tax advisors to US MNCs. Two of these advisors are 
senior tax partners with two of the `Big Four' accountancy practices based in Dublin, 
Ireland. Due to my own background as a tax manager with one of the Big Four in 
Dublin, I was well positioned to secure these interviews myself. The third advisor is a 
SV-based tax advisor to these companies and he is a partner with a large US legal 
firm. He agreed to the interview when asked by one of my personal contacts (who 
knew him professionally) as referred to above. I chose to interview these tax advisors 
as I believed again they were well positioned to give the type of information being 
sought in this study as they specialise in providing tax advice to US MNCs, many of 
whom are in the IT sector. The interviews with the advisors were carried out at an 
earlier stage of the research process (see section 3.6 for more details). Having 
conducted all of these in-depth interviews I was happy that a point of information 
saturation had been reached, and further interviews were not necessary for the 
purpose of this study. 
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Gaining access to these interviewees, all `elites' in the tax arena, is, almost 
unprecedented. These are all in extremely senior positions in their respective 
organisations with huge demands on their time. Obtaining interview time with such 
elites would be almost impossible without using personal contacts as described above. 
It is also extremely important that the interviewer has `credibility' with the 
interviewees, which was helped by my having a professional tax background in a Big 
Four firm. 
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Table 3-3 Companies' Details 
C1 Manufactures computer products 
and develops software 
Cupertino CA 1970s Big 4 Nasdaq 10.000- 
15 000 
10K" 6,000m- 
12 000m 
C2 Provider of services and 
equipment for semi-conductor 
industry 
Santa Clara CA 19603 Big 4 Nasdaq 10.000- 
15.000 
18 6,000m- 
12,000m 
C3 Provides consumers and 
advertisers with information 
retrieval products 
Oakland CA 19903 Big 4 Nasdaq 500-1,000 6 Less than 
1,000m 
C4 Provider of Internet Marketplace San Jose CA 1 19903 Big 4 Nasdaq 5,000- 
10,000 
26 3,000m - 
5.000M 
C5 Technology solutions provider Palo Alto CA 19303 Big 4 NYSE In excess 
of 75,000 
62 30.000m - 
80,000M 
C6 Semi-conductor manufacturer I Santa Clara CA 19603 Big 4 Nasdaq In excess 
Of 75000 
10 30,000m - 
180.000M 
C7 Manufactures disk doves San Jose CA I 19803 Big 4 Nasdaq 1 10.000- 
15.000 
15 3,000m - 
5'000M 
Ce Developer of network 
administration and security 
software 
San Jose CA 19903 Big 4 Nasdaq 1,000- 
3,000 
16 Less then 
1.000m 
C9 Enterprise software 1 Redwood CA 19803 Big 4 Nasdaq 40,000- 58 6.000m- 
12.000m 
C10 Developer of sales and marketing 
information software 
San Mateo CA 19903 Big 4 Nasdaq 3,000- 
5 000 
31 1,000m- 
2.000m 
C11 Content and network security s/w, 
it consultin and trainin 
Cupertino CA 1980s Big 4 Nasdaq 5.000- 1 
10 000 
30 1,000M. 
2.000m 
C12 Developer of design automation 
software for integrated circuits etc 
Mountain View 
CA 
1980s Big 4 Nasdaq 3.000- 
5,000 
21 1.000m. 
2,000m 
C13 
d 
s 
Manufactures programmable 
I's evicend provides design 
oftware 
San Jose CA 1980s Big 4 Nasdaq 1,000- 
3,000 
14 1.000m- 
2,000m 
C14 S 
t 
cientdic instruments and vacuum 
ehnolo ies 
Palo Alto CA 1940s Big 4 NYSE 3.000- 
5,000 
15 000m- 
2.000m 
C15 M 
s 
an. storage devices and provides 
torage related software I 
Scotts Valley, 
CA, (Cayman 
Islands based) I 
1970s Big 4 NYSE 40.000- 
50,000 
18 6,000m- 
12,000m 
' Only Inland and Japan listed 
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3.6 Interview Schedule and Process 
3.6.1 The Interview Schedule 
As mentioned earlier, the primary data collection method employed in this study was 
face-to-face semi-structured interviews. There were two phases of interviews. In the 
first phase, I conducted six `preliminary' interviews. 135 These first phase interviews 
which took place in October and November 2004, were carried out in order to, inter 
alia, establish links with players in the US MNC tax planning arena; help give focus 
to the research questions; give me an idea of what kind of information such 
interviewees are willing to divulge; establish what such individuals consider to be 
critical/of interest to the tax planning business community; to help me decide on what 
types of questions are most likely to provide answers that will ultimately explain and 
help understand the practice and process of tax planning; and to assist me in 
considering possible conceptual frameworks for interpretation of findings from 
subsequent interviews to be conducted in phase two. These interviews were extremely 
valuable, the findings from which were pivotal in terms of the future direction of the 
research. The findings were very rich and therefore I have integrated these findings 
with the findings from the phase two interviews in Chapters Four to Seven inclusive. 
Two different interview schedules were used by me as a guide for these interviews, 
one for the in-house tax executives and one for the tax advisors (see appendices I and 
135 Two of these took place with 'Big Four' tax advisors (as described above) at their offices in Dublin, 
and one was a telephone interview with a SV-based tax advisor. One was with an international tax 
director with a US MNC who was based in SV, but gave me this interview when visiting the Galway 
site. That interview took place in a meeting room in a Galway hotel. The other two interviews were 
with Irish-based employees of two US MNCs, each of which had tax responsibilities. Both interviews 
took place in their offices, one in Dublin and one in Galway. 
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2). These schedules were drawn up based largely on a review of the tax planning 
literature and preliminary reading on possible theoretical perspectives. The 
interviewees were told in advance what the interview would be about in broad terms. 
Following these interviews, the process of constructing an interview schedule for the 
phase two interviews (as described below) began. This was a very detailed process 
consisting of. analysis and consideration of the findings from phase one interviews, 
revisiting the tax planning literature, and in-depth consideration and development of 
the potential theoretical underpinnings of this research. 136 The second phase 
interviews, all with in-house tax executives in US MNCs took place in summer 2005. 
One of these interviews took place in the company's Dublin office. The other 
interviews all took place in the interviewees' offices in the SV area. (See section 3.6.2 
for more details on the interview process). The final interview schedule was sent via 
email to all of the interviewees in advance of the interviews. This schedule was 
informed by many aspects of the tax planning literature, the draft theoretical 
framework, findings of exploratory interviews and by secondary research conducted 
on the MNCs participating in the study and on some topical international tax planning 
areas. Questions contained in the interview schedule revolved around the following 
themes: 
136 Which ultimately focussed on NIS at that stage. The integration of the tax planning, NIS and 
endogeneity of law theoretical constructs into a comprehensive theoretical framework as presented in 
section 3.4 took place after the phase 2 interviews. 
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" The organisation of the tax planning function within the MNC; 
" Tax strategy and its alignment with overall business strategy; 
" Outsourcing and use of external advisors; 
" Performance measurement of the tax planning function; 
" Tax and accounting, from both organisational and technical alignment 
perspectives; 
" Tax risk management; 
" Technical approach taken to tax planning within the MNC; 
" External influences/actors in the corporate tax arena. 
Section nine of the schedule included one `company-specific' question which was 
based on company-specific research I had carried out before the interview. In addition 
to gaining additional insights, asking such a tailored question helped to demonstrate 
that I had researched the company in advance of the interview. Appendix 3 contains 
`my copy' of the interview schedule which included all of the company-specific 
questions, any my probing questions. Each interviewee received a copy of the 
questions only (without probes), including his/her company specific question. 
3.6.2 The Interview Process 
Most interviews were on a one-to-one basis. In a small number of cases two 
interviewees were present at the one session and in one case three interviewees were 
present in the one session. All interviews took place in the interviewees' office 
buildings except one which took place in a hotel meeting room, and one other 
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interview was by telephone (as mentioned previously). 137 The majority of the 
interviews therefore took place in the SV area which helped to give me a sense 
geographically as to just how small the SV tax environment actually is. Interview 
sessions lasted for between 45 minutes and 1 hour and 30 minutes. 
Generally, I found the interviewees to be extremely welcoming and open in our 
conversation, despite clearly being very busy and, as with elites, people for whom 
time was very precious (Odendahl and Shaw, 2001). Like Horton, Macve and 
Struyven (2004: p. 345), there were a number of times when I was surprised at the 
`depth of feeling about the issues that had arisen' in the interviews. 138 They were also 
very interested to know who else I was interviewing. Upon knowing who else or what 
other companies were participating in the study, a sense of additional `legitimacy' 
appeared to be given to my study by them. The asking of this question in itself, 
indicated their unending concern with what other tax professionals in SV are doing 
(see Chapter Seven). 139 Some interviewees sent me emails before or after the 
interview providing clarification on some point. In one case I was sent a company's 
mission statement via email. 
137 The telephone interview went very well even though it was a little more difficult to read the 
interview, resulting in a number of unplanned interruptions and silences. One interview was conducted 
in the staff canteen, which although not very busy at the time, I found it somewhat distracting. It also 
gave rise to ultimately unfounded concerns about the quality of the recording. 
138 For example, the view expressed by some that it is only a small number of companies acting 
irresponsibly that has given rise to all the new costly regulations. 
139 Another academic subsequently described this line of questioning to constitute the interviewees' 
establishment of my being `inside the fortress', and they were therefore happy to talk to me. 
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Interviewees were careful not to disclose any specifics of tax plans, nor did I ask for 
same. TE 26 (one of the preliminary interviewees) had informed me that tax VPs 
would happily discuss generalities of tax but not specifics. I respected that and 
understood the sensitivities around potentially commercially sensitive tax details. 
Notably, in a small number of cases I interviewed different tax executives from the 
one organisation (for example a VP and the international tax director). Their 
responses were very similar. A different perspective from within an organisation, on 
the research questions posed in this study, would only be gleaned I now suspect from 
interviewing executives outside of the day-to-day running of the tax function. 
My professional tax background was a real advantage when conducting the 
interviews. It meant I was familiar with many of the technical tax terms which 
invariably came into the conversations, such as permanent establishment, transfer 
pricing etc (see section 1.3). It also gave me a certain credibility in the eyes of the 
interviewees. 140 In my current and prior work experiences I have conducted many 
different types of interviews and this, combined with my technical tax background 
enabled me to quickly develop a friendly and professional rapport with the 
interviewees, and employ the necessary investigative skills `to draw people out 
and.... ward off premature closure' (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 38). I was also 
mindful not to be `passive' (so I nodded, and smiled for example, where appropriate) 
which can be unsettling for interviewees (Silverman, 1993: p. 96). 
140 I had forwarded a brief curriculum vitae in advance of the interviews and a number of them referred 
to my tax background in the interview. I also sent them a one page executive summary of my research 
project in advance (see Appendix 4). 
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I drew on my probes throughout the interview (see Appendix 3), `as aids to help the 
interviewer flesh out the question, as prompts for items the informant may have 
overlooked, or as subquestions derived from previous research' (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: p. 37). Throughout the course of the interviews, patterns emerged 
and I tended to draw on certain probes more than others, an advantage of using semi- 
structured interviews. Some probes became more appropriate than others in the 
context of stories around the main themes of enquiry emerging. Importantly, through 
this process, `the validity of responses is to some extent confirmed by their 
consistency among different interviewees, which enabled a reasonably coherent 
overall picture to be developed' (Horton et al., 2004: p. 348). 
All interviewees were reassured about confidentiality and anonymity. One 
interviewee was particularly concerned about this as his company has just one major 
and one minor competitor in SV. I asked permission to tape each interview at the very 
start. All interviewees were happy to be taped and appeared quite at ease being taped. 
Taping the interviewees was invaluable as it allowed me to probe the responses more 
deeply, not having to worry about taking notes. Also, as noted by (Bucher, Fritz et al., 
1956), one cannot rely on notes and recollection of interviews. While all of the 
interviewees followed a similar pattern, some interviews did have a different `feel' to 
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others. Immediately following each interview, I wrote some notes on the tone of the 
interview, overall impression formed, and any other observations I had. 141 
3.7 Data Analysis 
As noted earlier, interviews were the predominant research method employed in this 
study. The interview transcripts, post-interview notes and email correspondence 
received from interviewees before and after the interviews constituted a large amount 
of qualitative data requiring detailed analysis. Qualitative data analysis involves 
processes of reduction, classification and interpretation (Lillis, 1999) and the 
challenge lies in making sense of large volumes of data (Patton, 2002). 
The interviews were professionally transcribed. I then listened to all of the interviews 
and made some minor corrections to the transcripts and incorporated some extra 
points such as noting an extra emphasis being placed on a particular point by an 
interviewee. Having researched available coding and computer aided qualitative data 
analysis (CAQDAS) software, and having discussed the usefulness of such software 
with some colleagues who had recently used some CAQDAS, I finally decided on 
using QSR NVivo to assist in data management and to facilitate data interrogation 
and analysis. CAQDAS is now widely used and recognised within social science and 
organisational research (Fielding and Lee, 1991) and provides a form of `audit trail' 
as well as facilitating data management (Bringer, Halley Johnston et al., 2006). 1 
141 For example, some individuals were keen to distinguish his/her company from others in SV using 
phrases like: 'we are different', `maybe other companies don't do it this way', 'SOX may have 
changed things for other companies, but not for us'. 
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found NVivo to be relatively easy to use and used it primarily as a tool for organising 
and coding data, although it has other uses including performing text searches and 
modelling. I was always mindful that coding does not constitute analysis, sometimes 
an apparent misconception about CAQDAS (Weaver and Atkinson, 1994). As noted 
by O'Dwyer (2004: p. 395), `CAQDAS is merely a tool designed to assist analysis'. 
Data analysis was still very much my responsibility as `the researcher still must ask 
the questions, interpret the data, decide what to code, and use the computer program 
to maximise efficiency in these processes' (Bringer et al., 2006: p. 248). 
Coding, a form of `ongoing, iterative reflection' (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p. 56) is 
a critical element of qualitative data analysis. Having converted the transcripts and 
other data (as referred to above) into rich text format, I input the documents into 
NVivo and subsequently coded all of them. This was largely an iterative process, 
although I started with a number of codes initially based on the themes addressed in 
the interview schedule. Upon reading all of the documents again, new codes were 
created and eliminated as deemed appropriate. The latter is part of a grounded theory 
approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to the development of coding, although as noted 
by Bringer et al. (2006), CAQDAS, including NVivo is not dominated by grounded 
theorists. In totality, the codes are, as noted by Anderson-Gough (2004), `a mix of 
things that the researchers are interested in prior to actually starting the interviews 
and things that become salient as the interviews are undertaken and the transcripts 
read' (p. 375). The latter she posits is `standard practice'. I carried out a final check on 
all documents to make sure that all lines in all the documents were coded. A number 
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of lines/paragraphs were coded simultaneously under a number of different codes as 
at this stage it was unclear where best some lines belonged. The coding process was 
very time consuming, and took place through immersion in the data, allowing themes 
to emerge without much concern for the theoretical constructs. I was very focussed on 
allowing the story of the data in its `raw' state to emerge. The task of drawing 
theoretical inferences was for later. The codes (consisting of principal codes and 
`subcodes' in some cases) 142 developed are presented in Appendix S. I did not 
consider it necessary to use abbreviated terms as is sometimes done. 
Following the coding process, I created NVivo Coding Reports (for principal and 
subcodes), and saved these as Word documents. I then read and re-read these word 
documents and started the process of extracting the richest and most appropriate 
quotations, bearing in mind at all times the four research questions posed in this 
study. This was followed by further analysis of those quotations, drawing theoretical 
inferences, resulting in predominant themes which became the platform from which 
the structure and presentation of the findings' chapters evolved (Chapters Four to 
Seven inclusive). 
3.8 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to this study which are acknowledged in this 
section. 
142 Referred to as nodes and child nodes respectively in NVivo parlance. 
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The qualitative approach adopted in this study, involving interviews with tax 
executives from fifteen companies means the findings are not statistically 
generalisable. To achieve the latter however was not my objective. Rather, it was, to 
explain and enhance our understanding of tax planning in practice, and as noted in 
section 3.3.1 to form the basis for theoretical development, which it does. (See 
Chapters Four to Seven inclusive for many instances of the richness of the theoretical 
framework developed and drawn upon in this study when interpreting the findings). 
All of the MNCs involved in this study (apart from the tax advisors) are based in SV, 
California. It is arguably a unique place with a physical concentration of IT 
companies. It is possible therefore that some of the findings are very particular to SV- 
based companies, although I feel it is unlikely. 
For the most part, this study sought the perspective of in-house tax executives and as 
such provides only one perspective. It could be argued for example that obtaining the 
perspective of non-tax in-house executives in relation to the embeddedness of the tax 
function in an organisation, or the perspective of the legislators on corporate tax 
lobbying, would provide a more complete story and enhance our understanding of tax 
planning in practice even more. The latter has been included among the 
recommendations for further study (section 8.4). 
As with any qualitative research a limitation arises from the necessary judgement and 
subjectivity in the analysis of the findings. As noted in section 3.3.1 however, 
subjectivity is not at the expense of rigour in this study (see section 3.7 also on data 
analysis). 
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3.9 Summary 
In addition to presenting this study's four research questions and their associated 
objectives, this chapter has described and explained key aspects of the overall 
approach taken to this study. The interpretive approach adopted was discussed in 
detail, and placed in the context of other approaches to tax research. The suitability of 
the primary research method chosen (face-to-face interviews) was presented, as was 
the construction of the interview schedule itself and various aspects of the interview 
process. The study's theoretical framework was presented in two stages: a descriptive 
framework of the tax arena and core theoretical constructs from the three strands of 
literature: tax planning, NIS and endogeneity of law, which are uniquely integrated in 
this study. This framework will be drawn upon in the context of interpreting the 
findings of this study (see Chapters Four to Seven inclusive). Selection of companies 
and interviewees, data analysis and limitations of the study were also addressed. 
The next four chapters present and interpret the findings of this study, drawing on the 
theoretical framework presented in this chapter, all of which serve to enhance our 
understanding of tax planning in practice. 
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4 Tax: Organisation and Strategic Fit 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings in relation to the first research 
question. Research Question One states: How is the tax planning function organised 
and conducted in MNCs? (see section 3.2 for associated objectives). As noted in 
section 1.3, while this study is predominantly concerned with tax planning in MNCs, 
I recognise that the work of tax executives involves both compliance and planning 
type work. As this section provides information on the organisation of the tax 
function in the MNCs, it necessarily incorporates some reference to tax compliance 
also. Some distinct themes emerged within the findings which are reflected in the 
structure of this section. Section 4.2 provides the necessary background information 
on the make-up (profile) of the various tax departments. Section 4.3 addresses the 
issue of resources given (or not) to in-house tax departments. Section 4.4 looks at the 
internal and external customers of an in-house tax department which incorporates the 
internal marketing of tax. Section 4.5 examines the interplay between tax and 
accounting from both technical and personnel perspectives, while section 4.6 presents 
the findings on various aspects of tax strategy and its alignment with business 
strategy. 
4.2 Profile of In-House Tax Department 
The profiles of the tax departments of the companies that participated in this study are 
quite diverse in terms of number of personnel, and their location as summarised in 
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Table 4-1. These details were provided during the course of the interviews, and due to 
the structure of the interviews, some interviewees provided more details than others, 
resulting in a less than complete picture of all of the tax departments. These facts 
provide however, an important context within which to explore and understand the 
workings of the various in-house tax departments. 
Table 4-1 Profiles of Tax Department 
Company 
Company 1 
º mployc 
17 
es US ;?. "4 
17 
Iºn -US º 
Company 2 2+ ? 3 
Company 3 1 
Company 4 11 ? ? 
Company 5 135 < 68 >68 
Company 6 c. 160 110 50 
Company 7 3 3 
Company 8 2 2 
Company 9 57 ? ? 
Company 10 9 8 1 
Company 11 40 33 7 
Company 12 19 18 1 
Company 13 10 8 2 
Company 14 4 4 0 
Company 15 14 13 1 
The number of tax employees as represented in Table 4.1 refers to employees who 
work exclusively in the tax department. Interestingly, while these companies are all 
MNCs trading internationally with a number of foreign operations, with the exception 
of companies Five and Six, the tax personnel are substantially physically located in 
the US. For the most part, these employees are all involved in tax planning and 
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compliance work. Exceptionally, Company One has some staff engaged in 
compliance work only. 
Many of the companies also have some non-tax specific personnel based in foreign 
operations, typically a `finance' person, `managing a compliance process as distinct 
from necessarily having a material role in the decision making as to what is going on' 
(Advisor 1). 143 Based on the above facts and other findings presented in this chapter, 
tax planning in these companies tends to be US-centric, where the tone is set and the 
real tax planning decisions are made: `the fundamental tax decisions are made in the 
US' (TE 25) 144 and is thereby `centralised' (TE 12). The tax executives interviewed 
were almost all heading up the worldwide, US, or international tax function in their 
respective organisations from the US, and the three tax advisors were partners in large 
tax advisory firms with a US MNC client base. Therefore, I am very confident that I 
interviewed the `right people' for this study, people who have a great knowledge 
about the practice and process of tax planning within these MNCs. Notably, three of 
the interviewees hold senior VP positions, which according to Advisor Three is very 
unusual for tax executives. The higher the level/position held in an organisation by 
the head of tax, the more embedded the tax function is likely to be (see section 4.6.3), 
whereby one's position and status is a source of `power' within the organisation. Job 
titles held by the tax executives included: Senior Director of Taxes, VP Tax and 
13 As noted in Chapter Three, in addition to interviewing in-house tax executives in MNCs, I 
interviewed three tax advisors to such companies, hereafter denoted as Advisor One, Advisor Two and 
Advisor Three. 
144 TE denotes in-house tax executive. Both male and female tax executives were interviewed. 
However to protect anonymity, all of the interviewees are referred to as he/his/him etc. as the context 
requires. 
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Trade, VP Tax, VP Tax, Licensing and Customs, International Tax Director, Director, 
US International Tax and Audits, and Senior VP Taxation. The minor variations in 
title reflect I expect different organisational structures and cultures. As can be seen 
from some titles, a number of the interviewees are responsible for more than tax, 
which may be of some significance in the context of making tax important within an 
organisation (see section 4.6.3). 
Another source of `power' for tax stems from reporting lines. In most of these 
companies, the head of tax reports directly to the CFO, and this was seen as 
important. In one company, the VP Tax reports to the VP Finance who in turn reports 
to the CFO. In another company the tax director reports to the VP Accounting who 
importantly was the tax director previously (which means he is sympathetic to and 
supportive of the tax function). TE 8 emphasised the importance of having non-US- 
based tax employees reporting directly to the head of tax based in US. He argued that 
having them report locally does not always serve to encourage them or indeed reward 
them for coming up with tax solutions outside of their own country or region (for 
example, Europe). He similarly accuses tax advisors of the same parochial type 
thinking. One company has `a very strong dotted or matrix' (TE 11) reporting line 
between the international tax managers who are located outside of the US and the 
International Tax Director. Arguably, from a country manager's perspective, having a 
direct or `dotted' reporting line to the US elevates his/her status within the 
organisation also. 
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The tax personnel working in these companies are mostly accountants or lawyers, 
having trained with and worked for one of the Big Four accountancy practices or a 
large legal practice. In addition, some tax executives are Masters in Tax or MBA 
degree holders. Therefore, they constitute potentially a group of knowledge experts, 
likeminded individuals who understand each others' perspectives, are similarly 
trained and may know each other from prior work experience. They have thereby 
(perhaps unintentionally) sown the seeds of a terrain for the social construction of 
reality within the broader tax domain (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), providing 
sources of normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). 
Some of the interviewees have been employees of their respective organisations for a 
very long period of time and TE 2 recognised the value of the knowledge of the 
business and structures which himself and his boss built up over the years: '45 
`Something that most companies don't value enough is institutional knowledge. It's 
not something that you can replace. You either have it or you don't'. Such 
`institutional knowledge', coupled with long-term internal business relationships 
provides a rich internal source of `power' which helps the profile of tax within any 
company. 
Company Seven which only has three in-house tax executives engages two ex-Big 
Four Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) for two-three days per week. These CPAs 
also work for other companies in SV. They are aware of, and indeed contribute to, 
how things are done in other companies (mimetic isomorphism) from a tax 
145 One tax executive for example was with his company over 18 years. 
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perspective, and effectively act as a mechanism through which information is shared 
between organisations. These are `very smart guys... very knowledgeable' (TE 13). 
There is evidence to suggest that some companies engage in strategic hiring of certain 
individuals. Some of the larger companies have employed ex-IRS and state officials. 
In some cases they were simply the best applicants, in others they were targeted 
strategically to `orchestrate the company's efforts' and manage impressions 
externally (Covaleski et al., 2005): `they had the relationships that were needed' (TE 
6), 146 and the companies certainly do value and use these relationships. In the context 
of IRS officials moving to tax practice, as opposed to industry, TE 14 sees them 
being hired: 
... because of their ability to get things 
done. They have channels inside of the 
IRS but they also know the inner workings, what is it that makes the IRS 
click? What is it that makes the IRS do what they do? 
Similarly TE 15 referred to the hiring of their two ex-IRS economists, to bring the 
perspective of the `other side' and importantly `they'll fight them when they step out 
of line... and they step out of line a lot'. Also, hiring economists could reflect what 
Meyer and Rowan (1991) refer to as `[t]he rise of professionalised 
economics... econometric analyses help legitimate the organization's plans in the eyes 
of investors, customers... and internal participants' (p. 51). 
146 The implications for the IRS from losing such personnel warrants further examination but is not 
relevant for this study. 
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The bringing in of certain types of expertise to a corporate tax department could be 
seen as part of the legitimating exercise in itself. For example, Company Nine, 
through having economists on board, apart from them truly adding value, could be 
perceived as adding value as it is assumed that this company acts rationally when 
deals/transactions are analysed by economists (Meyer and Rowan, 1991: p. 51). TE 
13 held the view that the value an ex-Revenue official has in terms of connections in 
the IRS does have a limited life, probably three to four years. However, in business 
(particularly in the IT sector), this could be a long time and a lot of value could be 
added by having an ex-Revenue official in an MNC's tax staff. Some of these 
officials were creators of the laws which they are now abiding by, which is extremely 
important in the context of recognising tax law making as an endogenous process (see 
section 2.3.4 and Chapter Seven). Byrnes and Lavelle (2003) refer to companies 
building `powerhouse tax departments staffed with former government tax experts'. 
Not all companies are interested in this type of hiring practice however. `I haven't 
found one yet that I would want to have in my organisation. There are certain 
characteristics and traits that I look for in people and I don't see them in the IRS' (TE 
24). 
The individual in the above quote does not have any lawyers on his tax team and gave 
the impression that this was deliberate. Somewhat surprisingly, TE 15 who has not 
hired ex-IRS officials, said they `tend not to be the ones who did the best in school... 
it's not normal just to go out and hire those kind of people'. Whatever the academic 
credentials of these officials, the reasons they are hired as evidenced here, are more to 
do with relationships and their understandings of the workings of the IRS. Another 
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building block of the `powerhouse tax department' is the tax practitioner: `The most 
remarkable recent trend is the fact that they are taking partners in-house to really 
build up technical capabilities in the larger companies' (Advisor 3). 
This trend clearly has implications also for the tax and legal practices. One of the tax 
advisors (himself a partner), did however believe that only those without partner 
potential would move into industry, unless: 
The range of issues would be perhaps as diverse as the range of issues that 
they might come across in practice and the challenge as a consequence would 
be as big and the reward possibly could be as big. Depending on the nature of 
the company, you could have bigger hitters going in at that level I think. But 
again bigger hitters would go into bigger teams I suspect. (Advisor 1) 
Notwithstanding divergent views as to the value of strategic hires, there was a 
consensus about what type of people are looked for to join in-house tax departments, 
with a strong preference for individuals with both practice and industry experience. 
Specifically they look for: `experienced people, somebody who has already had a 
background in industry and were public accounting' (TE 26). They may also seek: 
... the very best candidate. We don't care what colour they are... I 
like people 
with either a Big Four or a law firm experience and corporate 
experience... someone that's grounded in the practical basis but knows your 
SAP system has to work and your accounting group has to book it and those 
kinds of things. (TE 10)'47 
Similarly, TE 15 referred to `walking the line between someone who has the very 
technical background versus people who have good industry experience. "48 There 
147 SAP is accounting software. 
148 Levine and Lerner (2003) refer to the tax executive needing to be able to combine technical 
competence with understanding corporate goals etc, as does Wilson (1995). 
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was a strongly held view that without the corporate experience, `they don't 
understand how real companies work' (TE 10). The implication here clearly was that 
accountants/lawyers with practice experience only, often have wonderful ideas (in 
theory) that are simply not executable in a particular organisation or industry: 
People from accounting, and law firms also tend not to be concerned on, you 
know, how it ultimately ends up. They want to just sit there, you know, with 
pie in the sky and come up with a great idea and they're not really interested 
in seeing how it ends up being ultimately worked through the chain. (TE 10) 
I think there is something of a `chicken and egg' situation here. TE 15 believed it 
takes about four years for a certified public accountant (CPA) to be `integrated into 
industry', so it may be somewhat unfair therefore to be very critical of the CPA's lack 
of industry perspective. 
One interviewee, although as qualified as the others, emphasised adding value 
through his general management and people management skills: 149 
I thought I'd be a better manager because I'm good at handling people. I'm 
good at handling strategy, I'm a strategic thinker, I'm someone that really 
belongs more in the business set but I have tax, some tax knowledge, right? 
So, after I got out, I went into industry, that's where I developed my skills 
well. (TE 24) 
While it was recognised that boardrooms are becoming more tax aware than ever, in 
this post-SOX era, rather significantly, no interviewee was aware of any company 
with a tax director on the Board. 
The size of an in-house tax department (in terms of staff and other resources) is 
dependent on both internal and external factors, but size and complexity of the 
company and the amount of resources a company is willing to put into tax, and the 
149 As advocated by Wilson (1995). 
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increasing demands on tax departments arising from the changing regulatory 
environment, were the recurring determinants referred to by the interviewees. TE 14 
(one of two tax employees in his company) was hired because the company: 
Had crossed through the two hundred to three hundred million dollars and 
they were beginning to get complex enough that their accountants were 
saying, you know if you don't bring in help it's going to become more 
expensive and you are going to be missing things, you don't want to rely on 
Ernst & Young or whomever to be managing the tax function. 
TE 19 attributed, in part, its recent increase in tax staff to a move towards pulling 
more compliance in-house. The issue of resourcing the tax function was quite 
contentious among the interviewees and is dealt with separately in section 4.3. 
Overall, there are significant commonalities in the make-up of the MNCs' tax 
departments. Most of the personnel are CPAs or lawyers, who qualified with either a 
Big Four accountancy practice or a large legal firm, and have a combination of work 
experience in practice and industry (the IT sector specifically). Professional 
qualifications and general work experience in themselves therefore are unlikely 
sources of heterogeneity (Powell, 1991) within the tax planning arena but represent 
powerful sources of normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). In 
response to many calls in the literature (for example Perrow, 1985; Dillard et al., 
2004), this study addresses the role of `power' within NIS. For tax to be taken 
seriously within these MNCs, the function itself and even more importantly, the head 
of tax must be, and be seen to be `powerful'. Some clear sources of such power are 
evident from these findings: the title held by the head of tax (the more prestigious the 
better); reporting lines (directly to the CFO in US is most powerful); length of time 
working in the one company (builds up `institutional knowledge'); raw tax 
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knowledge and expertise gained through qualifications and experience (the tax 
`knowledge experts'). The importance of combining tax knowledge with effective 
communication and people management skills as advocated by Wilson (1995) is also 
supported. There is some evidence to suggest the building of `tax powerhouse 
departments' (Byrnes and Lavelle, 2003) through the strategic recruitment of ex-IRS 
officials and ex-partners from accounting and law practices, with the latter in 
particular being well positioned to `orchestrate the company's efforts' in the 
endogenous process of tax law making (Suchman and Edelman, 1996 etc. ), and 
manage impressions externally (Covaleski et al., 2005). 
4.3 Resources 
Many interviewees believed that if they had more resources they could do things to 
reduce the ETR or cash rate, to avail of opportunities to create more value for the 
company, and do a better job of keeping up to date with changes and anticipated 
changes in tax legislation around the world. With regard to the latter, they would 
prefer to have more local tax personnel situated in some countries (outside of the US 
and Europe) in the belief that `it's best to have a local person who lives and breathes 
it all the time to be able to effectively analyse what should be done over there and to 
melt it into the worldwide tax. ' (TE 3) 
However, when asked about the resources being given to the tax function, and 
particularly tax planning, interviewees' responses revolved around staffing and 
finance, with a distinct split between those who very happy with their resources and 
those who were very unhappy. These findings, inter alia, address the reasons (drivers) 
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as perceived by the interviewees for the adequate or under-resourcing of the tax 
function. 
The influence of the CFO (to whom the head of tax usually reports directly) was 
evident when it comes to providing resources, particularly for tax planning. `Is he 
willing to provide more resources to reduce the rate through some more aggressive 
planning, no? ' (TE 3). TE 7 who spoke of looking for more headcount, complained 
of his department head being `somewhat passive and likes to present good news', the 
implication clearly being that needing more tax staff was somehow perceived as a bad 
thing. Notably, that company has gone from 200 employees to 9,000 in 6 years, with 
an almost static tax headcount. 
Interviewees who were unhappy with the level of resources within their respective 
departments described their tax departments as `leanly staffed' and `running on 
empty' for a long time (TE 2), and the issue of headcount as an `ongoing battle' (TE 
20). TE 2 did allude to additional staff about to come on board but he was not overly 
excited however about the level of staff coming in, saying they could really `use more 
people that are able to do thorough research, thorough planning, instead of having to 
outsource' as advocated by Porter (1999a). He would prefer to have an initial attempt 
at it in-house first, and send a memo to the advisor for external validation. This 
would, he believes: 
Save a lot of money because we're not having them get some associate 
working for twenty hours, we are just cutting to the chase saying here is the 
issue, here is what we researched, please validate yes or no. So it's a very cost 
efficient way of doing it. We could definitely use more resources within the 
department to do that kind of work. (TE 2) 
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TE 2 argued that the need for adequate resourcing of the tax department is the biggest 
challenge he is facing. His argument articulates very well the potential impact of fast 
changing business and regulatory environments ('external shocks') on the tax 
department: 'so 
I am reaching a point where I feel that there is a high likelihood of making a 
mistake somewhere along the way because the risk is getting greater... and I 
think it is because the businesses are so quick to market, so there is not a lot of 
time to react to different initiatives and then there is also your core work, 
addressing IRS audits, doing compliance. So I just feel.. . the biggest challenge is just making sure that there is proper coverage because all of those things are 
important. Not one of them is more important than the other although one will 
probably get you in jail faster. But you have to be able to go to bed at night, 
feeling that it's all been properly looked at or considered and that is I think my 
biggest concern right now. (TE 2) 
Similarly, another interviewee referred to the department's shortage of resources 
being explained in part by the recent acquisition mode of the company, which has 
kept them very busy, sometimes foregoing tax planning opportunities (not necessarily 
relating to the acquisitions): 
We just didn't have the resources within our tax group to take advantage of it 
or even understanding what the resource needs might be outside of our tax 
group to be able to put other folks and other departments through that sort of a 
process. (TE 20) 
However the need for increased resources in the tax function due to the increasingly 
demanding external regulatory requirements being placed on these companies should 
not be underestimated (see section 1.3 also), resulting in perhaps the tax function 
potentially becoming more compliance driven than planning driven. Advisor 1 
150 Shocks (like these and including mergers and acquisitions) require responses which may lead to 
changes in institutions as per MS. This also recognises Wilson's (1995) external terrain and the need 
to operate within it. 
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referred to this also, which would have implications for the nature of tax services 
being offered by tax advisors to these firms. 
The technology sector in which these companies are operating are changing very 
quickly in terms of technologies, geographies, mergers and acquisitions, and ways of 
doing business, all of which gives rise to new tax obligations and opportunities. 151 TE 
2 referred to the `learning curve' that comes with new opportunities which he 
believes need `time, and people don't have time and so if you are not properly staffed 
or resourced you will never benefit, truly I believe, from those opportunities that are 
given to you'. 
Poorly resourced tax departments (from the interviewees' perspective) can also be 
explained by the underlying overall financial state of the company vis-ä-vis its tax 
position. Some companies have significant net operating losses (NOLs) for tax 
purposes, which means that investing in tax planning activities (through increased 
resources) will serve only to increase NOLs, as opposed to save tax dollars. It is not 
therefore, easy for the head of tax in this type of organisation to justify an increase in 
resources, which is frustrating. Interestingly, in one case, despite having NOLs, the 
company decided (according to the interviewee) to appoint a VP Tax (the interviewee 
in this case), but then proceeded to starve him of resources. Was it the case that being 
seen to have a VP Tax in place in itself is important, and if so to whom? Is it 
lit For example some of these companies have recently entered the retail market for the first time. 
Selling direct to the consumer whether through a retail shop or the internet means there are new tax 
implications to be examined and managed. 
171 
Tax: Organisation and Strategic Fit 
effectively a symbol of legitimacy (Scott, 2001)? Having significant NOLs has also 
some implications for tax risk management which is addressed in Chapter Six. Other 
tax departments are under-resourced as `there is a focus on admin cost containment' 
(TE 23). Does the latter suggest that tax is perceived in some organisations as an 
administrative overhead rather than a pursuit with value-adding potential? 
A small number of interviewees (generally from the larger companies) were quite 
happy with their current level of resources. TE 8 stated they are `excellently 
resourced... and what we don't have in people we make up in consulting dollars'. 
Notwithstanding this, he did say that at times they are not always working on the 
highest and best priorities because they don't have the resources to do so. One 
interviewee spoke rather proudly of recent down-sizing that took place in his 
department, advocating his belief in quality over quantity. `We've upgraded the 
quality of the organisation, the people and the kind of characteristics, the team work, 
the kinds of things that help leverage your resources' (TE 24). Interestingly, another 
interviewee happy with the level of resources given to tax, links the resource level 
with the successful performance of tax (measured by the ETR) and provides evidence 
of a powerful player in action (Perrow, 1985): 
As much as you don't like the tax rate as being the sole test but if the tax rate 
is going down and if tax is looking good and you know the company sees 
objective results I think [Sr. VP Tax] is getting resources and will be able to 
continue to get resources in this environment. (TE 17) 
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The different levels of resources available to the tax departments in these MNCs are 
driven by such factors as the power of the head of tax and the overall financial 
position of the company and are evidence of a source of heterogeneity (Powell, 
1991). Accordingly, this helps explain some differences between these companies in 
terms of the practice and process of their respective tax planning activities. Securing 
adequate resources is an ongoing challenge in light of tax needing to, and being best 
positioned to, respond to the ever-changing external business and regulatory terrain 
(Wilson, 1995; Porter, 1999b). This frequently provides sources of external shocks 
which ultimately may result in deinstitutionalisation and re institutionalisation of tax 
planning practices and processes. Resources themselves, for example having a VP 
Tax in place, regardless of the exact nature of his/her activities or real power vested in 
him/her, can facilitate the company being seen to take tax seriously, and thereby act 
as symbols of legitimacy (Scott, 2001). 
4.4 Customers of In-House Tax Departments 
Interviewees were asked who they perceived as internal and external customers. 
There certainly was some consensus on who the internal customers are, although as 
was noted, `customers is always a hard word in tax' (TE 9). 152 TE 19 thought 
customer was an `interesting' word particularly when he spoke of their relationship 
with their accounting department which she described as `a very close relationship 
and interdependency' (see section 4.7). Many companies prioritised the operations 
groups, sometimes referred to as business units (BUs) as being a very important and 
152 Taxpayers are also referred to as customers now by the state in many countries which can be 
contentious. See Lamb, Tuck & Hoskin (2003) and Tuck (2004). 
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sometimes the most important internal customer (see section 4.6.1 which captures the 
interviewees' perspectives on the BUs as customers when addressing the strategic 
alignment of tax). 
Other customers identified by many interviewees include the CFO; country directors; 
payroll; stock services; financial reporting; human resources; the rest of the finance 
group; the executive office/management team; sales personnel (reviewing contract 
customer contracts etc); legal department; treasury; business development group 
(responsible in one company for acquisition and licensing activity); the technology 
and manufacturing group (specific to one company in which this group determines 
plant location and expansion decisions and tax feeds into the cost analysis). 
Interpersonal skills were highlighted as being critical to the success of dealing with 
these internal customers who sometimes may not know they are customers until 
someone from the tax department approaches them and says 'if you use tax as a 
resource here is what I can do for you' (TE 14). In this context interviewees spoke 
very emphatically about the need to internally sell tax and educate others within the 
organisation about the value add capability of tax. Indeed, this matter became a 
recurrent theme throughout the interviews. For TE 25, how the tax function 
`advertises its successes and how it sells itself' s one of the greatest challenges facing 
tax departments in MNCs. In stark contrast, notably only one interviewee was so 
happy with the ongoing strategic positioning of tax in its organisation that education 
and selling was not an issue: `Don't need to do any selling at all here' (TE 24). 
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Some tax executives focus on the need to educate senior management around ETRs: 
`they really don't understand how it all inter connects', even though they have been 
warned many times that it will fluctuate due to `a lot of things outside of your 
personal control' (TE 3). TE 14 sees it as incumbent upon the Tax Director to educate 
management on why its ETR is different to other companies in the sector. TE 7 spoke 
of the need to constantly remind non-tax executives of the tax benefits of their tax 
structure as tax is not `foremost on the executive staff's mind'. Rather proudly, TE 5 
referred to presentations he gave to the European staff who were `inherently 
sceptical' but subsequently were quite surprised when shown the dollars and cents 
impact of some tax planning. TE 26 referred to his department having educated senior 
staff on tax risks and costs of business decisions but it does tend to be on a 
reactionary basis in response to particular developments that present tax concerns. TE 
19 did a series of web discussions and presentations around the tax function, the 
impact of the rate and `what the drivers are to continue and sustain what we have'. 
Following a recent significant acquisition `we have got a whole bunch of education 
we need to do'. A big one-off event therefore may well present a good opportunity for 
re-educating the whole organisation and getting the tax function noticed. 
Education by the tax department of new staff in the BUs was identified as critical for 
reasons specific to the com boom/bust era: 
For us it's a constant re-education process of every new person that comes in 
to a business unit because they're usually coming from a small failed dot. com 
where they've been a VP - and I'm sure you've heard this one before you 
know with their Harvard MBA and they had two plus years in the defunct 
company and then they come here and they're very used to going by the seat 
of their pants and we don't function that way. So it is our job to educate and 
evangelize for the tax department in the different business units. (TE 7) 
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There would appear to be a greater need to educate the non-US personnel, the 
`foreign folks' (TE 6). Physically visiting these people was acknowledged as being 
highly effective and important in the context of `building relationships' (TE 21). 
A number of mechanisms are in place through which the internal education process 
takes place. Company Two has weekly 'staffies' where the controllers and VP Tax 
meet to discuss ongoing and developing issues. Importantly, this VP finds his 
involvement with the trade group (he is VP, Tax and Trade) a good selling and 
educating opportunity. Some companies' tax departments conduct roadshows visiting 
all locations outside of the US outlining the work of the tax department: what 
information is needed for tax purposes; country-specific tax issues; how they fit in 
with the overall tax structure; how tax fits in with the business world generally 
(Company Four). TE 23 visits sites based on his availability and needs to `talk to 
them about what are current developments, what are new issues they have to be 
prepared for, what are planning opportunities'. TE 25 presents formally from time to 
time at sales meetings, but recently has experienced difficulty getting `revenue 
recognition' on the agenda as the attendees wondered `well do we really need to 
understand this'. Company Five have dedicated business tax contact people to spread 
the tax word to the business. As it measures the performance of `the businesses' on a 
post-tax basis, it is also very much in the BUs' own interest to educate themselves on 
what tax can do for them, although they still need to be educated and `controlled' by 
the tax department. (See section 5.4 for a detailed discussion on post-tax performance 
measurement. ) 
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Only a limited number of responses dealt with external customers. This could be 
partly explained by the fact that I tended to ask about internal and external customers 
in the one question. Arguably however, most of the interviewees do not perceive 
themselves as having external customers or at least they are not as important (or as 
clearly defined) as the internal ones. `I don't know that we have any external 
customers' (TE 24). Three interviewees (from Companies Six, Eight and Eleven) did 
however state that ultimately the shareholders are their customers also. 
Based on the range of internal customers which tax has, it is quite clear that tax 
crosses a lot of operational matters in any company which clearly presents great 
challenges and opportunities for tax executives. Interpersonal and communication 
skills (Wilson, 1995) are of major importance to facilitate tax executives serving their 
internal customers well. External customers do not appear to be top of the tax 
executive's agenda which must cause some concern from a shareholder perspective. 
Contrary to PWC's (2001) recommendations, for the most part there are limited 
formal regular presentations made by tax personnel to non-tax personnel. There 
would appear therefore to be missed opportunities for the in-house tax executive to 
educate non-tax personnel on the value add capability of tax (Levine and Lerner, 
1993). Importantly, however there is some evidence that supports the need for 
education around ETRs which is driven ultimately by the need to achieve legitimacy 
(Scott, 2001) in the eyes of various external constituents (Carruthers, 1995). 
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4.5 Tax and Accounting 
This section presents the findings firstly in relation to the interplay between tax and 
accounting personnel, and secondly in relation to the technical interaction between 
tax and accounting, with a particular emphasis on the extent to which financial 
reporting impacts, if at all, on tax planning. 
4.5.1 Interplay between Tax and Accounting Personnel 
Due to the significant relationship between these two disciplines and their 
interconnectedness technically, the nature of the relationship between the personnel in 
both functions warrants investigation. According to TE 21 90% of tax's inter- 
company focus would be with accounting personnel. This study examined the nature 
of the relationship and process of interplay between the two sets of personnel, taking 
cognisance specifically of the impact of such interplay on the tax function. 
There was a general recognition of the need for a good relationship to exist between 
accounting1S3 and tax personnel and many interviewees said it was good although in 
TE 3's case it is somewhat `ad hoc' and `sometimes we may not call somebody and 
they get upset because they weren't called or vice versa'. TE 15 sees tax and 
accounting personnel as business partners. TE 5 described the relationship as a 
`symbiotic' one. He has an `informational' relationship with the head of accounting 
which is a good communication channel, albeit an informal one. TE 14 described the 
153 Financial Reporting Division 
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relationship rather comprehensively and suggests the relationship is not quite an equal 
one: 
Accounting can live without tax, but tax cannot live without accounting. 
Accounting must buy into and support tax structures/planning - they must 
help "enforce" policies and procedures to ensure the company does not do 
anything contrary to the rules, regulations of the government. Accounting 
must also book all the tax entries related to tax provisions, taxes paid, and 
intercompany transactions as a result of tax planning/structuring. Accounting 
also acts as an advocate for tax strategies -I spend much time making sure 
accounting understands the benefits of tax strategies so they will help 
"defend" tax to other departments or VPs. 
TE 9 referred to `natural tensions' in the relationship which seem to be around 
information and communication issues. Similarly, TE 15 described a bad interplay: 
You didn't give us that piece of information and you should have. Why didn't 
you tell us about this material and think you did? You know, it's like we can't 
go review every number just to see if you changed something guys. 
The need for communication to be timely, respectful and focused was a recurring 
theme: 
... in getting information and it's not just getting the information but it's the 
timing of the information. Getting it quickly and understanding it etc, so we 
can use it. And we understand that when we request information we need to 
make sure that we're not duplicating requests. That the requests are made in a 
timely manner such that you know everything's not a fire drill. And that we 
make sure that we're going to the right people so it doesn't bounce around 
three organizations. (TE 22) 
This demonstrates the need for good communication. At one company, tax and 
accounting meet quarterly, and yet they `have been criticised for not enough 
communication' in both directions (TE 8). 154 
1S4 Specific reference was made by interviewees to better communication being needed because of 
SOX, where US companies are having a lot of disclosures and material weaknesses revolve around tax 
accounting. 
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TE 20 spoke of the non-stop co-operation and interaction between tax and accounting 
as being a relatively recent development facilitated by: 
A combination of things. It's partly some emphasis by upper level 
management on bringing someone in that can talk to people about some of the 
soft skills within business like feedback, like mentoring, like coaching, like 
interaction, just better communication skills... over time I think we have 
tended to hire those kind of people that fit in to a culture of collaboration and 
co-operation and communication. 
TE 21 works on building relationships with his accounting colleagues, trying to 
`massage the notion.. . that we're all sort of 
in the same boat here'. In terms of how 
accounting personnel view tax personnel, he thinks `they're turning. I think they 
traditionally see us as a pain in the backside to be honest'. 
A recurring area of conflict'55 in the tax/accounting relationship revolves around the 
need for tax to be concerned with tax on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, '56 
whereas accounting is only concerned with the overall consolidated position (initially 
at least). TE 16 referred to tax being concerned with getting the right revenue booked 
to the right legal entity whereas accounting just want to finalise their accounts 
(consolidated where earnings per share (EPS) is not a function of where revenue gets 
booked). TE 18 alluded to the fact that accounting personnel often see it as one big 
pot as opposed to the different tax jurisdictions. Rather sadly, he said they sometimes 
`fall asleep' when he is explaining this. TE 20 described an improvement in the 
tax/accounting relationship in this context: 
155 Represents tension within the organisational level. 
156 Typically an MNC must file a tax return in each separate jurisdiction within which it operates. 
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Now they understand the need for us to have good information on an entity- 
by-entity basis and so they support that and they ask us a lot of questions 
about what we need and whether they can aggregate and summarise certain 
information or whether we need it detailed out... There is a certain amount 
here and there of, it's like, well I really wish they would have done the 
accounting this way to help us figure out what we are supposed to report on a 
tax return. But for the most part its pretty effective, it really does work. 
TE 3 mentioned that some people in operational finance and management accounting 
`couldn't care less' about in what legal entities things get booked. They are only 
concerned with whether a particular product is profitable on a worldwide basis. 
The findings demonstrate some natural tensions and exercises of power (Fligstein, 
1991) in operation at the organisational level (Dillard et al., 2004) between tax and 
accounting personnel. Empathy as well as good communication (Wilson, 1995) 
would appear to be necessary to ensure a smooth and effective working relationship 
between tax and accounting personnel. The new processes demanded by the 
introduction of SOX demonstrates a clear enactment of the dynamics of 
institutionalisation (Dillard et al., 2004) between the economic, political and 
organisational levels of analysis. Ultimately, these tensions give rise to internal 
friction at the organisational level between accounting and tax personnel, which is 
challenging for both. 157 
4.5.2 Technical Interplay between Tax and Accounting 
This section addresses the idea of accounting (financial reporting in this context) as a 
non-tax cost (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Yancey and Cravens, 1998). Here it is 
157 Actors at the organisational level were also involved no doubt in reaching an 'institutionalised' 
response to SOX requirements, which ultimately resulted in an 'endogenous' process, a matter which 
is addressed in Chapter Seven. 
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viewed as a friction, the consideration of which may sometimes result in tax 
optimisation as opposed to minimisation. The need for tax personnel to understand 
accounting is also partly driven by US tax returns having a section on book-tax 
differences. 
Most interviewees spoke of the importance of being `accounting aware' when 
engaging in tax planning, which in itself supports the idea of financial reporting being 
a friction within tax planning. TE 22 spoke of the need to understand `almost in every 
instance how are you going to account for this', while Advisor 3 stated: 
The tax law sits on accounting results as a base. It then deviates in lots of 
ways. But a good tax advisor has to understand how the accounting rules work 
because the accounting presentation of the books is a starting line. Unless you 
could understand how a company got to that starting line, you don't have a 
very easy job of it to understand how the tax line deviates from the accounting 
base. 
Advisor 2's view was: `I don't know that it's a hindrance or it's a help ... it's a big 
issue.... and needs to be on their agenda'. (i. e. the agenda of company tax 
executives). Company Four does this through their `bridge between tax and normal 
accounting' (TE 6). The `accounting policy' group and tax keep each other very well 
informed which ensures that tax executives' actions does not create any accounting 
issues. 
Interestingly, there was not general support for the view that accounting rules were 
significantly hindering or constraining tax planning activities. TE 8 summed it up 
nicely: `In general it's not a constraint, but there have been times when it has been'. 
TE 15 seemed even somewhat philosophical about it, `there are plenty of places from 
182 
Tax: Organisation and Strategic Fit 
an accounting standpoint that we are restrained but maybe ... I've just accepted those 
so much over the years they're not even jumping into my mind any longer'. Perhaps 
certain accounting constraints are viewed by tax executives differently over time as 
they become accepted and the `norm'. Current topical ones are talked about and the 
`old' constraints become so embedded in the process they are taken-for-granted or 
somewhat forgotten. 
Interviewees really seemed to struggle to provide concrete examples of 
tax/accounting frictions and some even said they couldn't think of any, which may 
mean that many of the interviewees don't see many of the tax and accounting 
differences as problems or hindrances - one just has to work within that framework 
as they are `taken for granted'. However, a limited number of interesting examples 
were given. TE 9 highlighted the existence of 'tax attributes' such as research and 
development carry forwards, NOLs, capital losses forward and so on, which are 
deferred tax assets in the balance sheet. These will be challenged by the auditor, who 
will want them written off if there is insufficient taxable income (in those 
jurisdictions) to utilize them. This could be a `big financial hit' so ironically this 
company sometimes actually seeks to increase taxable income, not decrease it, so as 
to avoid such a `financial hit'. Essentially therefore, this company engages in income- 
shifting (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992) to deal with this: 
Moving income from one year to another, making sure that we have enough 
income of the right type, it could be capital gain income, foreign source 
income, whatever, to use our attributes... even if you don't lose them per se 
from a pure tax law sense, you can have to write them off on your financial 
statements because you are carrying these things as assets. (TE 9) 
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TE 8 referred to an example involving some withholding tax mechanisms being 
considered which would have resulted in debt appearing on the balance sheet. If the 
treasurer and controller did not want that on the balance sheet (even though it is not 
real debt) then TE 8 would probably not do that. The treasurer is interested in this 
because an increase in debt might not be looked on favourably by the rating agencies. 
Therefore, `treasury' or `market impact' is another friction or non-tax 
cost/consideration. Relatedly, TE 19 said it is interesting to see the interplay between 
tax, accounting and treasury, drawing on an example of investing in tax-free bonds 
and fully taxable bonds which was essentially addressing intrinsic versus extrinsic 
tax, having an input from treasury on this and getting accounting involved to ensure it 
works from that perspective also. 158 TE 16 highlighted `revenue recognition... where 
does the title change' as being an area of conflict between tax and accounting. This 
seems to be quite a significant issue (in that company at least) whereby revenue 
recognition can never be disrupted even if there is a great tax plan that may for 
example involve income deferral, but damage may also be done for VAT purposes. 
TE 4 referred to a concern in relation to the financial reporting impact of stock 
options. There seems to be some concern about whether or not stock options have to 
be expensed in the accounts, and the notion of `cushioning' for such a possibility. TE 
11 identified this as an issue for high-tech companies and his company does not 
believe expensing stock options is good accounting. He said the complexity 
surrounding this is `mind-boggling'. This issue seems very current and serious for 
'58 Scholes and Wolfson (1992) address implicit and explicit taxes. 
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some of these companies and it surrounds the valuation of a stock option when it is 
granted. 
Finally, the tax reserve setting process was discussed with the interviewees. Setting 
tax reserves clearly indicates some question mark exists over the eventual tax liability 
attaching to some transactions, and my findings certainly demonstrate this process as 
being quite contentious and essentially amounting to tax risk management. It is 
considered and discussed therefore in Chapter Seven. 
While there was clearly a consensus on the need for tax executives to be accounting 
aware, there was only limited evidence to suggest that financial reporting is a 
conflicting interest (Hoffman, 1961) to be resolved when tax planning, or when it is a 
non-tax cost (Scholes and Wolfson 1992) which constrains tax planning significantly. 
Arguably, many of the interviewees perceive financial reporting rules as `taken-for- 
granted' parameters (institutions) within which tax planning must take place, rather 
than constraints or conflicts. The tax planning areas around which financial reporting 
seems to constrain tax planning efforts include revenue recognition, losses carried 
forward, withholding taxes and stock options. There was some evidence in support of 
`income shifting' being utilised to counter any negative financial reporting 
consequences (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Samson, 1998; Fallan et al., 1995). 
4.6 Tax and Strategy 
As noted previously (see section 2.2.1), very little tax research to date has provided a 
real understanding of how a strategic role for the tax function is defined, mapped out, 
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implemented, managed and monitored on an ongoing basis in complex ever-changing 
organisations like the MNCs in this study. Gaining this understanding therefore was a 
key objective when discussing tax strategy with the interviewees. 
4.6.1 Alignment of Tax with Overall Business Strategy 
There was general agreement that a tax strategy should not drive the business but on 
the contrary, `the business should drive tax and company tax strategies' (TE 14). 
Similarly, TE 5 believes `the tax tail shouldn't wag the operational dog'. It was clear 
that sales drives these companies and that tax strategies should not interfere with sales 
or the company's ability to sell products. Business decisions are generally made in 
principle, for example to set up a shared service centre for Europe or EMEA159 and at 
that point the in-house tax department becomes involved to find the best tax-based 
structure that will also deliver on the business decision. Extending this further then it 
is `incumbent upon tax to understand management's overall objectives and to develop 
strategies that are in line with those objectives' (TE 14). In support of this, TE 15 
stated `it doesn't matter how great a tax planning idea you have if that doesn't align 
with the business interests then there's nothing really of value that we can add'. TE 
10 was keen to point out `we are not an Enron where we view tax as a standalone 
function that should be creating its own planning and savings, tax is an adjunct to the 
business'. One interviewee, TE 21, did hold the view that tax can change the way 
they do business, for example a new or changed tax treaty could lead to a change in 
the location of a sales operation and save significant money. 
'59EMEA denotes Europe, Middle East and Africa. 
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When discussing the strategic alignment of tax with the interviewees, important 
findings emerged with direct relevance to the Scholes and Wolfson (1992) 
framework. Their framework, employed to date by researchers taking a micro- 
economic approach to research, was referred to in section 2.2.4. They advocate a 
strategic approach to tax planning through consideration of all parties, all taxes and 
all costs and engaging in income shifting, all of which are core elements of their 
framework. 
In relation to considering all parties to a transaction, TE 5 did say that while each 
party is out for the best position for itself, to cut a deal there may have to be migration 
towards a compromise and he cited examples where this worked very successfully 
after some back and forth with the other party. In the end he says `it comes right 
down to... it's a business decision, we have got to go with it'. If a deal needs to be 
done, a satisficing tax position will not get in the way. Clearly companies need to be 
careful in this negotiation process and be mindful of how much they wish to disclose 
to the other party about their own overall tax position. TE 14 referred to instances 
where he engages with a third party (a strategic alliance partner, customer) and 
`hammers out all the issues'. When tax gets involved on one side, it tends to on the 
other also. TE 18 provided strong support for the practice of consultation with 
customers to come up with the optimum solution for both sides: 
We work with our customers to go ahead and try and you know when we look 
at deals can we go ahead and structure, how can we go and structure the deals 
so that we can make it go? 
Similarly, TE 23 discussed this in the context of recent acquisitions: 
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It's usually friendly because typically the people we are talking to are 
employee sellers and so they're going to continue and be part of our 
organization.., but they're very focused and their advisors are advising them to 
maximise their after-tax return and they aren't terribly concerned about 
maximising our return ... but you 
know, it's brought up in dialogue and 
sometimes we work towards a middle ground but in most cases we want to do 
the deal, you know we can already taste it, and that if we have to sacrifice 
something on the tax side it's sacrificed. 
Advisor 1 provided strong support for consideration of all taxes arising on a 
transaction, `the best tax solutions are ones which are considered on an all tax head, 
taking everything into account'. However he did go on to explain that a generally tax 
efficient solution may not work in every situation or for every client due to different 
circumstances. Tax plans therefore need to be `personalised' to suit each situation 
(Hoffman, 1961). 160 
While there are clearly many frictions by way of non-tax costs or considerations that 
these tax executives have to consider (as referred to earlier in this chapter), issues 
around operating in non-US jurisdictions appears to be particularly problematic and 
costly. TE 12 spoke of significant clashes between tax and the `business model' in 
China and Singapore. They wanted just capital and labour to go through China and to 
centralise raw materials elsewhere. He said China wasn't very happy with this. 161 it 
appears to have had a significant impact on these operations and TE 12 said `to 
balance that out, you know we have to make some concessions in other places'. In 
this context of investing in different countries around the world he emphasised the 
need to maintain positive relationships with different countries. He referred to the fact 
160 I recognise the vested interest of the advisor in this context. 
161I understood the reference to China here to mean the Revenue Authorities in China. 
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that some countries get `jealous' when you move into other countries (even if 
investment remains in all countries). 
TE 15 identified the all-embracing nature of non-tax costs as being whatever way the 
business has to be run, and what tax comes up with has to be acceptable to the 
business and to the market. `We can't have the business behaving in an aberrant way 
just for tax purposes'. With respect to the latter he added: 
You know, there are certain things that maybe we would like to do from a tax 
perspective that if it got played out in the market.. . would not be seen as 
positive... there's always this balance of you get the best answer that promotes 
the ability within the company to do our business. 
Relatedly, Advisor 1 spoke at length about a change he sees over the last few years 
(post-Enron) where companies are no longer just concerned with technical robustness 
of tax plans but: 
Also from a smell factor perspective of good corporate citizenship... the 
predominant view would be to minimise global tax charges within the 
confines of being able to treat or be regarded as meeting their social and 
corporate governance obligations. 
He agreed that this concern about corporate image is tending to decrease the level of 
tax aggressiveness, although he acknowledges that there will always be people for 
whom technical robustness is all they care about. 
Finally, in support of the activity of income shifting, TE 9 described a lot of the tax 
planning he is involved with as revolving around `moving income from one year to 
another, making sure that we have enough income of the right type, it could be capital 
gain income, foreign source income, whatever'. This is driven by their concern for the 
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efficient utilisation (from both tax and financial reporting perspectives) of `tax 
attributes' such as NOLs and research and development carry forwards. 
How do these companies work towards strategic alignment and thereby add value? 
Reporting lines and the level at which the head of tax operates in the organisation was 
strongly emphasised in this context: 
A tax person should always report to the CFO, not to anybody else. I get equal 
time at our Audit Committee. I'm on our Disclosure Committee. I go to the 
governance meetings. I have to sign off on the IOK, I have to sign off on the 
Rep letters. You know all of those things, those are all critical because if tax 
isn't seen at that level, forget it. (TE 15) 
This company's tax department recently enjoyed increased visibility throughout the 
entire organisation through an acquisition project whereby the tax department decreed 
what could and couldn't happen on a country-by-country basis and those at the 
highest level had to listen and obey with `the threat of a $10 billion capital gain across 
the board' (TE 15). 
Processes that involves regular meetings and updates from the BUs were also 
identified and do take place in these companies. Some companies have quarterly 
meetings, and others have them less frequently. 162 Company Five rather uniquely 
enhances strategic alignment by having a single point of contact between the tax 
department and each line of business. This facilitates what they see as the continuing 
162 For example, Company Twelve has an annual meeting called `Focus' where the President, CEO, 
Finance etc, meet and the objectives for the year are set out and discussed. The tax department like all 
other departments are then expected to ensure its work throughout the year doesn't conflict with these 
overall business objectives but complements them instead. 
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need for tax and business to talk to each other. 163 TE 8 spoke of the importance of 
having a legal structure that is cross-functional and a strong VP for international tax. 
This interviewee also thought the company deals with international tax issues better 
than tax advisors as its tax personnel has more cross-border interaction than the 
advisors do. Specifically, he feels that some European-based tax advisors cannot 
think of solutions outside of Europe whereas a strong VP for international taxes will 
look for a solution anywhere in the world. All of these processes/mechanisms 
facilitate the early consideration of the tax ramifications of any business plan, which 
would be deemed good practice. 
In line with the tax planning literature, there was significant support for the idea that 
tax should not drive business decisions (Valente, 2002; Yancey and Cravens, 1998; 
Karayan and Swenson, 2007). The findings suggest that in-house tax executives work 
towards strategic alignment of tax through, reporting directly to the CFO, having as 
senior a title as possible in the organisation (the latter two have already been 
identified in this chapter as internal sources of power for tax), and regular meetings 
and updates with BUs. All of the latter should enhance the prospect of tax being 
consulted as early as possible on the time line of any business transaction as 
advocated by Holzman (1965), James (2005) and Karayan and Swenson (2007). 
There is also evidence to support the inclusion of all parties, taxes and non-tax costs 
(Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Fallan et al., 1995; Yancey and Cravens, 1998) in any 
163 This works well in this company of course as this idea is inextricably linked with its philosophy of 
assessing business units on a post-tax basis. (See section 5.4 on performance measurement). 
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theoretical framework being applied in a quantitative manner. The nature of the non- 
tax costs may however be very varied over time and across organisations. Application 
of such a framework therefore may have more meaning when applied to a particular 
industry only. In this case the nature of the tax issues and non-tax costs are more 
likely to be homogenous, thereby potentially having more explanatory power. All 
non-tax costs however are not measurable, which in itself perhaps questions or 
challenges the use of the word `costs' which may well conjure up the notion of 
something that is measurable. If it were measurable, it certainly falls into the realm of 
economic efficiency, which has been recognised as not necessarily working against 
the original NIS perspective (Powell, 1991). However, a non-tax cost or friction 
identified in this study does work perhaps in opposition to the economic efficiency 
perspective, namely the need for any tax structure to be viewed as `legitimate' (Scott, 
2001) by the local market be it China, Japan and so forth. This was very clearly 
identified in the context of what tax-based structures are put in place in non-US 
locations. It is very difficult, if not impossible to measure and capture the latter type 
of concept in any quantitative model. This friction may motivate a company to pursue 
a less tax-effective structure but this can only be confirmed from the in-house VP tax 
as opposed to interpreting publicly available financial data. In this type of situation, 
the need for legitimacy, a core concept within NIS takes precedence over what 
Dillard et al. (2004) described as the primary legitimising characteristic of economic 
efficiency, and thereby explains an organisation's `rules and organizing logics' of tax 
planning (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: p. 33). 164 It may also contribute to a change in 
164 See Chapter Seven for more on other non-tax costs. 
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attitude to tax laws by some company executives, an important factor identified by 
McBarnet (2001a) (see section 2.2.4). 
Having clearly reached agreement on the importance of alignment of tax with 
business strategy, the next section looks at the actual tax strategy/mission of these 
companies which needs to, inter alia, facilitate this alignment. 
4.6.2 Tax Strategy/Mission 
This section deals with the specifics of the various companies' tax strategies. Seven 
of the fifteen companies involved in the study have a documented tax strategy or tax 
mission statement. These statements are similar to some extent but vary in length and 
emphasis. Most of the other companies do not have a formal documented tax strategy 
in place but may have monthly or quarterly objectives in relation to tax. While those 
interviewees did not see a real need for a documented strategy they did say that they 
understand what their own company's tax strategy is. TE 19 said he is `more about 
making sure that it's clear to everybody as opposed to putting a document out there'. 
Of course, putting a document out there may be one way of making sure that it is 
clear. 
It may be that having a documented tax strategy is more important for bigger 
companies with bigger tax departments so that `the department people know what is 
going on... and it also helps the bigger broader management understand. '(TE 14) In 
smaller companies, with say less than ten tax employees, they are typically in daily 
communication with each other, the CFO, and in some cases members of the wider 
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company management team. For such smaller companies, a documented tax strategy 
may not add value. TE 12's view was `it's in so few people's heads it could be 
construed... that we have a coherent strategy'. 
One Director of International Tax (TE 2) referred to his own `personal mission 
statement' and was not at all convinced that it would be consistent with the view of 
the senior Director of Taxes (to whom he reports). Somewhat worryingly he said `I 
have never had the discussion with him really ... I am not sure we would ever come to 
agreement'. The same interviewee, when asked about whether they have a 
documented tax strategy, having said no, admitted to now thinking `oh God, should 
we? ' 
What tax strategies/missions do these companies have in place? Many interviewees 
described the company's tax strategy in terms of overall goals and objectives. 
Common goals and objectives filtering through many companies include legally 
minimising the effective tax rate, 165 looking for opportunities to lower taxes further, 
tax law compliance worldwide, keeping out of trouble (with Revenue Authorities), 
and being responsive to internal customers. For example, TE 5 said his objectives 
include keeping, `our effective tax rate below a certain percentage of pre-tax income 
and... it's certainly to minimise our worldwide tax burden consistent with complying 
to all laws and regulations'. One large company's senior VP for taxes (TE 15) 
admitted to having a tax mission statement for the company but rather jokingly said `I 
165 I recognise the term 'legally minimising' is not necessarily a simple one in this context. See 
literature review (section 2.2.4). 
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haven't seen it for a long time. It exists somewhere'. In addition to referring to tax 
compliance, this company's mission statement specifically emphasises optimisation, 
`it is never minimisation; it has to be optimisation with acceptable risk'. 
Importantly, this mission statement recognises there is some degree of risk taking 
within tax management. (The detailed findings concerning the importance of 
recognising, assessing, managing and monitoring tax risk is dealt with in Chapter 
Seven). 
TE 24's tax mission incorporates four distinct elements and distinguishes itself 
somewhat from others through its emphasis on recognising tax personnel as business 
partners, `we are excellent partners who proactively identify tax opportunities, 
minimise risk and efficiently fulfil regulatory requirements'. TE 10's mission has a 
strong focus on compliance but since `the beginning of time' its overriding 
philosophy is `cash is king', so from a tax perspective, `tax just nests right under that, 
where our goal is to make sure that we save cash. Financial statements are nice but 
secondary to cash'. This company is very process-driven and sets annual objectives, 
sets out and deals with `quarterly hots' (items which they expect to happen in the 
quarter), and detailed monthly progress reports. The senior tax team also meets every 
month for a Project Status Review Meeting to deal with and update each other on `big 
ticket items' in order to ensure `everyone's on the same page'. Company Ten, whose 
strategy incorporates minimising cash taxes, also incorporates maximising EPS which 
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are sometimes in conflict with each other. The CFO becomes involved in deciding 
which of these strategies wins out in any particular situation. 
One company's tax mission clearly incorporates the economic-based objective, 
seeking international competitive advantage through its tax mission. It does also 
reflect however the company's desire to foster and encourage a particular type of 
working environment. It states, `to give [the company] an international competitive 
advantage, by minimizing taxes, thereby maximizing worldwide cash and earnings 
per share. To maintain an energetic working environment, where initiative, creativity, 
continuing education and knowledge sharing are highly valued'. 
For TE 19, `managing of world wide tax risk and supporting the business in a cost 
effective manner are two of the key tenets that we hold'. This strategy reflects a 
`tactical focus' as the tax department is under-resourced. When the tax department is 
under-resourced the head of tax quite often has to `pick and prioritise' what one needs 
to work on. Accordingly, some tax-based ideas/strategies do not get pursued. In this 
company the tax department was growing and with recent director and senior 
manager level recruits about to join the tax department this particular interviewee was 
looking forward to enhancing the planning side of the in-house tax function. 
TE 22's mission statement along with sharing many of the objectives of other 
companies, specifically alludes to the tax department being a service provider and 
distinguishes itself somewhat from other mission statements by referring to the means 
by which it seeks to minimise taxes, in line with Scholes and Wolfson (1992), `to 
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provide strategic business and tax planning services, decrease the effective tax rate, 
increase net income in cash and minimise taxes paid by maximising tax deductions 
and tax credits and tax deferrals. '(TE 22) A very detailed documented tax 
mission/strategy statement was presented by TE 8 as follows: 
Increase shareholder value: 
" After tax management reporting166 
" Attract and develop and retain high quality people who think globally 
" Excellent working relationship and credibility with governmental 
authorities 
" Long-term tax rulings and other agreements with governmental authorities 
" Develop, acquire and implement integrated tax planning opportunities 
relevant to [the company's] global tax profile 
" High quality in all we do 
" Strong relationship with the business and global operations 
" Proactive representation of [the company's interests before legislative and 
regulatory bodies 
The eight objectives are prefaced by the overriding objective of seeking to increase 
shareholder value. 167 Importantly, it seeks to recruit the global thinker, is concerned 
about its `relationship' with governmental authorities and significantly and possibly 
relatedly, it is proactive in its representation before legislative and regulatory bodies. 
This mission statement is according to the VP for US tax in this company, `the most 
166 Its first strategy is to measure performance throughout the company on a post-tax basis. It is the 
only company out of the fifteen in this study that does this. This is discussed in more detail in the 
context of performance measurement - see section 5.4 167 This over-riding concern with shareholder value is also part of Vodafone's Tax Code of Conduct 
which Vodafone published as part of its 2006 Corporate Social Responsibility statement. 
(http: //www. vodafone. com) 
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articulated and best crafted one' he has ever seen. It is driven by a `strong leader' in 
the Sr. VP for tax who frequently reminds staff of the above objectives. Essentially 
these things matter `because he makes them matter'. The latter emphasises the power 
of this Sr. VP in this organisation (Perrow, 1985 etc. ). This tax strategy had obtained 
Board approval which in itself may indicate an elevated position for tax within this 
particular company. The Sr. VP stated clearly this company wants to be `squeaky 
clean' and has an overall strategy of `uncompromising integrity'. In relation to tax 
planning, he spoke very openly about their strategy of developing (coming up with 
ideas internally), acquiring (buy and steal) and implementing (completed internally 
and can be a very under-rated function) tax plans. 
Some interviewees dealt with this question of strategy in a more narrow sense 
essentially saying that their overall tax structure constituted their tax strategy. 
Therefore, once this worldwide or European tax-based structure is in place their 
responsibility is to ensure tax compliance within the existing legal structure and to 
monitor the efficiency and appropriateness of the structure on an ongoing basis in 
light of changing tax laws around the world and changing business needs. In that 
sense, the term `tax strategy' was used interchangeably with the term `tax structure' 
by some of the interviewees and thereby presents a company's tax strategy as a once- 
off event (in need of monitoring) for some of these companies. 
Some interviewees appeared more comfortable talking about having a tax `strategy' 
than others, which might suggest that tax is sometimes perceived as being more 
tactical (often relating to structures) rather than strategic. For example, TE 7 said 
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their tax strategy was set up in 1999 in order to minimise taxes. This strategy runs 
into problems when the company acquires a foreign entity which subsequently needs 
to be moulded into the existing overall corporate tax structure. The importance of the 
tax structure being `elastic' and able to `absorb as many entities as needed' was 
emphasised by the interviewee (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992) The benefits of this type 
of worldwide overall tax structure needs to be continually pointed out to country 
managers and executive staff. 168 Also, for companies with these types of overall tax- 
based structures, tax plays a significant role in the future operational side of the 
business. For example, it may preclude setting up an operation in a specific country as 
the latter may negate some of the existing tax advantages arising from the existing 
structure. In that sense, tax is to a greater extent playing a pivotal role in the operating 
of the business. Another somewhat narrow interpretation of what is meant by tax 
strategy was given by TE 3 who stated that its `tax strategizing centres around foreign 
source income planning so we can capture our foreign tax credits in the foreign 
locations'. 
For a minority of companies the idea of having a formalised tax strategy/mission 
appeared to be irrelevant. They were not concerned about it and establishing one was 
not high on their agenda. Surprisingly, one VP (TE 18) stated: `There is a mission 
statement but I couldn't tell you what it was you know ... I haven't updated it'. This 
individual however had difficulty in getting the CFO to believe the tax function could 
add value. TE 26 was of the view that `strategy-wise there isn't a whole lot of 
16S See section 4.4 for further findings on the area of educating the entire company about the role of tax 
and the value the tax function can add when involved in various business initiatives. 
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attention given to actually documenting planning out and I haven't experienced to 
what merit it is'. This company does identify key projects for the year which gives 
some strategic direction (tactics? ). He did acknowledge however that `there is the 
usual departmental mission statement and vision of how you operate-and that's just 
fairly nice and woolly and contributing to the greater good etc'. 
Interestingly, while the tax advisors interviewed said they expected their clients to 
have tax mission statements in place, they had not seen them and clearly were not 
consulted for assistance in putting a mission statement together. It would appear 
therefore that tax mission statements are almost seen as private to the company itself. 
The advisors were not in any way concerned about the fact that they do not have input 
or insight into a company's overall tax mission statement. They were happy that they 
were aware of their clients' viewpoint on tax and their overall risk profile, in one case 
likening it to motherhood. `You kind of know what it is but you have never had 
someone sit you down and preach to you about it'. (Advisor 1) This same advisor 
sees a company's tax strategy being governed by internal policies and `generally 
accepted norms within tax planning circles particularly for US multinationals and US- 
quoted companies'. Advisor 2 said `we probably know their micro-objectives more 
than their macro-objectives' and was quite content with this. Advisor 3 pointed out 
that: 
Taxes tend to be the second largest expense of a company after payroll, at 
least for companies that are profitable and paying tax. The goals of these 
companies should therefore include remaining competitive with their peer 
group in terms of their effective tax rate and not providing surprises to the 
financial markets by having their effective tax rate fluctuate significantly. 
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There was no consensus as to the merits of having a formalised documented tax 
strategy in place. Tax strategy was frequently interpreted as meaning tax structure, 
and some interviewees were less than convinced that having a formalised documented 
tax strategy would add value. Unsurprisingly, those companies that have strategies 
firmly documented believe in their importance and role in tax. 
The various tax strategies and mission statements in place reflected a mix of 
quantitative (as per Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Porter, 1999a) and qualitative goals, 
which collectively reflect the roles of policeman, service provider and business 
partner alike to be provided by tax executives (Wilson, 1995). Many of these goals 
were also indicated as areas of performance on which tax executives are measured 
(see Chapter Five). There was some evidence of frictions (Scholes and Wolfson, 
1992) within a tax strategy, for example where a company aspires to minimising cash 
taxes while maximising EPS. There was little evidence of corporate tax strategies 
seeking or obtaining Board approval as advocated by PWC (2001). There was some 
evidence of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) reflected in the fact that some 
interviewees referred to a tax strategy being in place but rarely if ever referred to it or 
updated it, (suggesting it amounts to no more than myth and ceremony). The tax 
advisors' perspectives on corporate tax strategy and goals provides evidence of 
sources of mimetic isomorphism in their emphasis on remaining competitive and the 
idea of accepted norms within circles of companies in this context. This goes to 
explain a degree of homogeneity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a) throughout the 
MNCs in SV with respect to tax strategy. 
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4.6.3 Importance of Tax in the Company and Tax Embeddedness 
The literature provides some mixed findings on how important tax actually is in 
organisations and on how its level of importance could be improved upon (PWC, 
2001 and Porter, 1999a). The main objective here therefore was to establish how 
important tax is perceived within these companies, how well embedded tax is in the 
organisations and to establish in particular the extent to which tax executives are 
consulted and brought in sufficiently early on in transactions. This all helps explain to 
what extent tax can, and does, play a strategic role in business. 
While all interviewees felt tax is important to the company (often subject to some 
caveats) the findings here demonstrate different degrees of importance and internal 
supports for tax (Wilson, 1995). The level of tax awareness among non-tax executives 
(as perceived by the interviewees) was quite mixed throughout the companies. TE 4 
felt strongly that what tax executives do is not appreciated, it is important but `they 
(the non-tax executives) don't know it'. However, they did refer to a growth in 
awareness but only because `over the last number of years we've raised the profile'. 
TE 2 also spoke of a positive change. `I would have to say that over the last five 
years we have become much more strategic in our role' (although he did 
acknowledge that there are still instances when he is consulted after something has 
happened). This trend towards involvement of tax executives upfront is partly driven 
by the tax personnel pushing themselves forward over time and becoming as engaged 
as possible with the business. It is also driven by the fact that these companies are 
operating in so many different countries so the tax risks are greater: 
202 
Tax: Organisation and Strategic Fit 
I do think that the message is getting loud and clear that tax is a key player 
and especially as we expand internationally, there is a lot of concern about 
taxes, there is a lot of concern about the structure that we have and so the 
groups tend to involve me a lot more early on. (TE 2) 
There was general consensus that the earlier on in a business transaction that tax gets 
involved, the better. As described by TE 24, `if you're not in on the very beginning 
you often miss a lot by the time you get to it'. TE 5 did refer to tax planning however 
as frequently being a case of `damage control', where tax is consulted far too late in 
the process. 
Is tax important in these companies? Four companies stood out in terms of the very 
high regard for tax which they perceived as existing within their respective 
organisations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, three of these were the biggest companies in 
terms of turnover, number of employees, and number of tax employees. TE 11 spoke 
of tax being given a great deal of respect in the company both from a `keeping [the 
company] legal' standpoint and from having `a seat at the table before transactions 
are completed' standpoint. This company's tax function appears to be very visible 
and the country managers regularly approach them for their tax input. TE 24 
attributes its tax function's high degree of integration with the business in part to the 
fact that his boss is one of the five leading executives in the company and has great 
admiration for the tax department. The latter again emphasising the importance of 
having an admirer of tax at a high level within the organisational structure. He lets 
TE 24 know about things before anybody else `just in case'. This tax department does 
not have to `go begging' to be involved. The latter of course supports the view that 
the function must be supported from the top down. TE 23 viewed tax as being 
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important to the organisation because `it's a very material part of our external 
financial reporting'. TE 18, despite having lots of problems internally selling the idea 
that tax can add value, is of the view that within the organisation tax is seen as very 
important due to its impact on EPS. It's a `huge driver' in EPS and is therefore very 
important. 
Other interviewees were not so convinced that the tax function was highly valued in- 
house. TE 25 thought it would be viewed as `being slightly academic and technical 
and something that happens in the background' and in relation to that company's `tax 
structure' he was not convinced that a lot of people in the company understand it, nor 
that `the tax people have ever gone out of their way to explain it, it's sort of on a 
need-to-know basis almost'. Interestingly, this interviewee works in the company's 
shared service centre (located outside of the US) with some responsibility for EMEA 
tax compliance, with little opportunity to participate in tax planning. His view does 
contrast somewhat with that of the Director of Taxes of this company based in the 
US. This interviewee showed significant frustration at the fact that the sales people 
did not (in his view) understand and appreciate the tax structure. There is a clear need 
for the tax department to communicate outwardly also however. 
Advisor 2's view on how important tax is within organisations, is that it varies 
hugely from one company to the next and `it's probably a cultural thing'. He also 
spoke of the impact of `boardroom forces' which can ultimately be driven by `market 
forces' reflected in the need to impact on stock price. 
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There were a number of factors identified as impacting on the importance of tax 
within an organisation. Firstly, the CFO was identified by all interviewees as having a 
very significant role to play with regard to the level of importance attached to tax 
within an organisation. Interviewees held some strong views on this which are dealt 
with separately in section 4.6.4. 
Secondly, the length of time over which the tax personnel, in particular the VP for tax 
is in place is an important factor. For example, one VP for tax who has been with the 
company for eighteen years has `an institutional history, institutional connections... in 
the forefront with the senior management' so that `we sort of are involved, you know, 
pretty early on in transactions' (TE 15). Relationships between the VP for tax and 
senior management are vital. This VP is on the Disclosure Committee, goes to 
governance meetings, signs off on the company's 10K and so forth. 
Thirdly, there was some evidence to suggest that it is driven by businesses becoming 
more profitable and diverse. Both of these changes can make senior executives more 
concerned about tax exposures and about minimising taxes. TE 25 summed this up: 
`as the European operation expands and matures and makes more money, I think tax 
becomes more relevant'. The corollary of this of course which was also evident in the 
interviews, is that it is often very difficult for tax to be treated as important 
strategically when a company has significant NOLs. TE 12 actually described its 
NOLs as a `safety drop'. Therefore, from a tax planning perspective, even if 
something goes wrong the company will not be paying taxes for a very long time and 
the reputation of the tax department is not at stake. It was clear that tax gets noticed 
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and is appreciated much more for reducing ETR significantly than efficiently utilising 
NOLs. 169 For a company with large NOLs it would appear that investment in tax 
planning is well down the chain of management's priorities. TE 25 spoke of ongoing 
tax planning opportunities being limited due to the company's loss making position. 
TE 18 agreed: `people won't pay enough attention to the tax function because it's not 
a cash out'. 
A fourth factor concerns a major tax event or accomplishment which brings tax 
upfront and to the notice of senior executives. Thereafter, tax can often be seen as 
highly strategic. Company Four managed to significantly drop the ETR from a high 
of 44% in a short timeframe. Another interviewee secured a very favourable outcome 
on a potential $140 million tax liability. Even after such events however, tax must 
continue to lobby itself within the organisation or lose its `lustre' (TE 7). TE 17 
spoke of the value of having some `proven accomplishments', related to the Board in 
terms of reducing cash taxes and ETR. 
Fifthly, resources available to the tax department are also indicative of the extent to 
which tax planning is integral to business transactions. Tax planning is sometimes 
seen `as a luxury as opposed to a necessity... for most tax departments that are very 
leanly staffed, tax strategy and tax planning are the first things to go because people 
are just trying to comply' (TE 2). (See section 4.3 also on resources). 
169 Has implications for performance measurement - see Chapter Five. 
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A sixth factor identified is the recent changes in the regulatory environment 
generally, which has put tax high on the Boardroom agenda (see Chapter Six on risk 
management also). 
A seventh factor concerns the extent to which integration processes are in place 
within an organisation to facilitate tax interacting with others in the organisation (and 
thereby becoming integral to business transaction), whether it be the CFO or 
operations people. A limited number of the companies examined are process driven in 
this regard. Company Eight has regular meetings with the CFO, VP Controller, 
financial planning and analysis people and the attorneys (always involved in writing 
contracts which may need a tax executive's perusal). The bigger companies certainly 
have regular meetings and for the smaller companies the need to formally set up 
regular meetings is not necessary as it may be naturally easier to be in regular 
communication with colleagues across the company. Communication however, is 
paramount and providing sufficient opportunities on a formal regular basis for 
interaction might well be good practice and go some way to ensuring that tax is 
engaged with and on a timely basis. 
TE 19 is happy that tax is brought into transactions at the front end which is 
facilitated by quarterly business meetings within finance and with various business 
units which provides a `pulse' on what is happening in the regions and what are their 
concerns. They are in regular communication with key departments such as legal, 
revenue and treasury and have developed very strong working relationships with 
people working in these departments (despite sometimes having conflicting 
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objectives) so that tax gets a `heads up' on transactions that may need to be addressed 
from a tax perspective. He also emphasised the importance of having as many `touch 
points' as possible throughout the organisation to ensure tax gets involved where it 
should on a timely basis. To this end he spoke of the importance of him now dealing 
with trade compliance which gives him `one more point of reference'. Similarly, two 
other interviewees spoke of the benefits of being a member of the trade group (in 
addition to tax). Perhaps having a role in a complimentary function is an important 
avenue for tax personnel to pursue (particularly in smaller companies) in order to 
raise the profile of tax and thereby getting it more involved in a wider range of 
business transactions. 
Many of the factors identified here as influencing the extent to which tax is embedded 
in an organisation can also serve as catalysts for changing the role of tax within 
organisations. In any event, continually internally lobbying for tax, selling and 
educating on the role of tax, plays a significant role in determining the extent to 
which tax is embedded within the organisation. 
While there was evidence to suggest that tax tends to be more embedded in larger 
organisations (Rego, 2003), the degree of embeddedness depends on range of factors 
ranging from the attitude of the CFO, to a change in profitability levels, to increasing 
risk levels arising from international expansion, to a changing regulatory environment 
and the extent of integration processes in place. A recurring theme here however is 
the idea that tax integration and embeddedness is facilitated mostly through good 
communication and relationship skills (Wilson, 1995; Holzman, 1965 etc). It is also 
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useful when the head of tax is also responsible for some other function (for example 
Trade Administration) which provides important `pulse points'. 
4.6.4 Impact of CFO 
For all of the companies involved in the study the tax function sits in the finance side 
of the business and almost all of the tax directors and VPs for tax report to the CFO. 
There was strong evidence to suggest that tax is more likely to be integral to business 
decisions if the CFO highly regards the tax function. The CFO therefore, is in quite a 
powerful position in relation to tax. 
The concern raised by some interviewees around a change of CFO and the impact of 
this change on tax within the organisation provides more support for the view that the 
CFO's attitude to tax is extremely influential. Interviewees felt the tax function has to 
be sold again to the new CFO and this may create uncertainty. `You don't know what 
he's coming in with, how he has done business before, what his expectations are of 
the tax department... we'll see how he pounces on me as to why our rate is what it is. ' 
(TE 15) TE 22 refers to `educating him on the issues that we have and how they 
differ from the issues that he may be used to seeing in his previous employment. ' 
`Well now I've got a new boss and. ' (TE 15) TE 3 expressed the view that the tone 
of the Board and the CFO sets the tax culture in an organisation. 170 TE 14 referred to 
his `uphill battle to make tax more visible' as his current CFO does not have high 
regard for the possible contributions the tax function can make to the business. He 
170 See Chapter Six on the CFO's impact on risk culture also. 
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went on to say that tax, `can be so much more effective with management that 
appreciate the value that can be added rather than seeing tax as just another cost 
centre'. This level of importance attached to tax by the CFO may be very difficult to 
change over time as it becomes `embedded' in the organisation. A change to this level 
of importance may only come about through a change in CFO (the controller of 
resources), pressure from the peer group (organisational field), and changes in tax 
legislation or economic climate (economic and political level). 
Some interviewees were quite happy with the level of interest shown by the CFO. TE 
2 has attributed the relatively new CFO with raising the profile of tax in-house among 
executives, by: 
Slowly coming around to really embracing tax... he is bringing us more into a 
lot of things early on... but we are definitely getting access to information 
sooner and I think that he is trying to make sure that we are included in a lot 
of the discussions. 
This really demonstrates the power of the CFO. TE 24, while recognising the 
importance of having a CFO that understands and appreciates the tax function, did 
add a caveat that the tax function would always need to be successful. `Success and 
results is what matters. ' 
The background of the CFO may well influence his/her perception of the tax 
function. For example, when the CFO does not have a tax background, he/she tends 
to be supportive but not eager to expand the role of tax in the business. Such CFOs 
are often not aware of the value that can be added through the tax function. The 
interviewees generally see part of their job is to inform and educate the CFO on the 
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potential of the tax function to add value. However, CFOs are not always willing to 
listen and have well embedded views about tax such as `it is a necessary evil'. TE 14 
spoke of his endeavours in his previous employment (also in the IT sector) to make 
tax `more visible' to the CFO, but tax `never became a priority. I quickly lost interest 
in him, in the company, and left'. It is clear that ideally (for tax) the CFO will `have 
worked with and will have gained an appreciation for tax people before'. (TE 14) 
The length of time a CFO is with an organisation seems to matter also, particularly 
where the VP for tax and the CFO have been working together within the one 
organisation for a long time. For example, one company's long serving CFO has a 
longstanding working relationship with the VP for tax which resulted in him having a 
`a deeper knowledge of tax planning, the rewards it can bring, the difficulties of it, 
probably than most CFOs' (TE 8). The result of this is that he has embedded tax into 
the `culture of the company'. This CFO was responsible for commencing a post-tax 
basis of assessment, which would be an extremely contentious move for all of the 
other companies involved in this study. The CFO position is indeed extremely 
powerful. TE 24 spoke of the importance of getting `face time' with the CFO. 
Obtaining this face time may well be easier for tax directors and VPs who have been 
working with the same CFO over a long period of time which is certainly the case 
with some of the companies in this study (companies Five, Six, Nine and Fifteen), 
even in different capacities. A trust has been built up over years which cannot be 
undervalued. 
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The power of the CFO in terms of his lack of willingness to understand and engage 
with tax, and bring tax in at the early stages of business transactions was particularly 
evident in one company. Getting the CFO `on board' was proving very problematic. 
TE 18 had recently been almost thrown out of the CFO's office for raising tax 
concerns. He quoted the CFO as saying `you are nothing but a chicken little - get 
out of my office'. This CFO may well be accused of taking the `ostrich approach', 
quite simply not wanting to hear the problems. His view on tax is quite fixed 
believing it is `something that could be done on the back of an envelope'. He is 
perhaps unlikely to ever permit (to the extent that it is within his power) tax to 
become a `business partner' (Wilson, 1995). A change for the role of tax in this 
company may well necessitate a change of CFO. 
A CFO's need to engage with and understand tax is driven to some extent by the 
necessity of dealing with analysts' questions on tax. Analysts, whose commentaries 
may have an impact on share price, are particularly interested in the company's ETR. 
What rate should they use for their modelling purposes and why? Why is it different 
to competitor tax rates? Analysts are members therefore of the organisational field 
with which CFOs must interact. 
Whatever views the CFO has on tax, the nature of the relationship between tax and 
the CFO has to be right for everyone involved. TE 13 summed this up nicely: 
He has to feel comfortable with us and the type of work and the level of work 
that we do. We have to feel comfortable with him that he understands exactly 
what we're doing and why we're doing it. 
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The CFO has emerged as one of the most powerful organisational actors in terms of 
tax being an integral part of how these companies do business. He/she appears to be 
very well positioned to engage in the necessary political processes associated with the 
institutionalisation (Covaleski et al., 2007) of tax, and thereby is a key player in 
setting the tax culture of an organisation. A new CFO can give rise to 
deinstitutionalisation and re institutionalisation. A CFO, in having to deal with 
analysts' questions around a company's ETR and so on, is an example of an 
engagement with the organisational field level (Dillard et al., 2004) which in itself 
pushes tax onto his agenda and thereby represents the dynamics of insitutionalisation 
within the tax domain (see section 3.4.1.4). 
4.6.5 Tax Understanding the Business 
The literature does allude to the importance of tax understanding the business 
(Wilson, 1995; Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). Such an understanding enhances the tax 
executives' abilities to become integral players in business transactions and to be 
strategically aligned with overall business strategy. This section provides the 
interviewees' views on the importance of having an understanding of the business, 
the extent to which they have this knowledge, and outlines what enables and prohibits 
in-house tax personnel from gaining relevant and sometimes necessary business 
knowledge. 
Some interviewees felt very strongly about the need to understand the business. `It's 
invaluable to understand what the business is about and how the business operates, 
absolutely essential to get any perspective on the tax analysis or the tax exposures or 
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risks. ' (TE 26) TE 14 said very firmly `we better' understand the business because `a 
head of a tax department that doesn't understand his business isn't any help to his 
company at all'. Despite this, many interviewees felt they did not have a thorough and 
complete knowledge of the business. However there are a number of factors 
inhibiting this from happening. Firstly, tax executives are so busy with `doing tax 
stuff, they have a very limited amount of time available for learning more about the 
exact nature of the business, its products, manufacturing processes and so forth. 
Secondly, the companies do not appear to require their tax executives to really know 
the business in detail. The tax executives are presumably therefore in no way directly 
measured on their business knowledge per se, so acquiring such knowledge may not 
therefore be a priority. What is not measured may not get done. Thirdly, the physical 
location of the tax personnel vis-ä-vis the operations may be a factor. TE 11 spoke of 
being `disconnected' from the business as his office is based at Corporate in the US. 
Generally, it is easier to understand the business when one is physically located in the 
countries and offices where opportunities exist for `bumping into people in the halls' 
that are dealing with the operations on a daily basis. Fourthly, some interviewees felt 
the technology industry was a particularly difficult one to understand where business 
models are often complex, particularly if you have not worked in the IT sector before. 
TE 26 described his company's product as `invisible largely' and it would be easier 
to understand if the end product was something `you can touch, see and feel'. 
Opportunities to learn about the business do exist, which are availed of to different 
degrees and engaging in such learning seems to be `up to yourself' nd largely a `self- 
service' system and the expectation is that tax executives should be proactive in this 
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context. The one referred to by many interviewees was the intranet. `It's amazing 
how much I could learn, for example, about [the company's] organisation and 
business and products and people just on our intranet site, if I had the time. ' (TE 9) 
On-line training resources and education opportunities are made available by many 
of the companies. TE 9 has a lack of time but said he learns a lot from `hallway 
conversations' which take place throughout the normal course of his required work. 
For senior tax executives overseeing the international tax function, they travel to the 
regions as much as possible and interact with the business people. TE 17 spoke of a 
previous SV company he worked for that would have twice yearly European finance 
team meetings at which business product and sales personnel present to the finance 
team (which includes tax) to update them on the business. 
TE 8 is `too far removed' to understand the company's businesses. However, he has 
assigned a tax department person to every business within the company. This contact 
person is thereby closer to the business and develops strong business and personal 
relationships in some cases with the business personnel (admittedly some better than 
others) and meet on a weekly, monthly or quarterly basis depending on the tax 
sensitivity of the different businesses. This facilitates tax staff being kept in touch 
with how the businesses operate and what developments are happening and being 
planned that may need a tax input. Similarly, TE 24 spoke of continuous education 
taking place through `business partnering relationships' among the senior tax staff, 
meetings of trade managers from around the world (this VP is in charge of the trade 
group the benefits of which were alluded to in the previous section), and many 
employee meetings where there are communications directly from the CEO, chief 
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operating officer and CFO. In Company Eleven, the tax staff meets regularly for a 
presentation by a guest speaker from the business such as the chief technology 
officer. 
While there was a consensus that a tax executive's integration with the business 
would be enhanced through a sound knowledge of the business (Wilson, 1995; 
Scholes and Wolfson, 1992), for the most part, such business knowledge seems to be 
at a minimum among tax executives in SV companies. Such limited knowledge is 
obtained on a `self-service' basis, and with time clearly at a premium, where tax 
personnel are mostly working physically at a distance from the BUs, they are not 
rewarded directly for their level of business knowledge per se. The IT sector is 
inherently multi-faceted and difficult to understand and so perhaps this limited 
knowledge is to be expected. Only a small minority of companies have formalised 
business partnership relationships to facilitate tax executives understanding the true 
nature of the business. Does such business knowledge give these companies a 
competitive advantage? Or perhaps tax executives are not concerned because they 
know from each other that most executives in SV companies are in the same boat, 
thereby representing a form of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991b)? This, in itself, may well reflect a `cosiness' for tax executives within the 
`black box' of tax. How can these executives aspire to being `business partners' 
(Wilson, 1995) without understanding the business? Arguably, Wilson (1995) over- 
rates the importance of business knowledge in this context. 
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4.7 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the key findings in relation to Research 
Question One and its associated objectives. The profile of each company's tax 
department was presented. Attention was drawn to the homogenous nature of the 
typical in-house tax executive in terms of professional qualifications and work 
experience, the very significant degree of centralisation of tax planning decisions that 
takes place in SV, strategic hiring of ex-IRS officials and Big Four tax partners, and 
various sources of power at play in determining the importance of tax planning in an 
organisation. The CFO emerged as a very powerful player in this context, which in 
turn directly affects the resources given to in-house tax executives for tax planning 
activities. The findings demonstrate a consensus around the need for tax to be 
strategically aligned with business strategy, but not driving it. Initiatives in place to 
secure such alignment are highlighted. Companies' tax strategies were presented, and 
in some cases the existence of a formalised strategy seems to be more about myth and 
ceremony (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) than a strictly adhered to document. 
This chapter questions the capability of the Scholes and Wolfson (1992) approach to 
tax planning research to identify and capture all non-tax costs (frictions) and/or 
measure them accurately. A company's decision to pursue a less-than-efficient tax 
plan may sometimes be explained by its greater need to have its tax plans and overall 
approach to tax planning viewed as `legitimate' (Scott, 2001). 
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5 Performance Measurement 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings in relation to the second research 
question. Research Question Two states: How is the performance of the tax planning 
function measured in MNCs? (see section 3.2 for associated objectives). Firstly, a 
number of observations arising from the interviews in relation to PM of tax generally 
are presented in section 5.2. This is followed by a representation and discussion of 
findings revolving around the specific areas of the effective tax rate (ETR) and post- 
versus pre-tax PM, contained in sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. These were the two 
aspects of PM that exercised the interviewees most and were recurring themes 
throughout the interviews. 
5.2 General Observations 
Whatever a company's approach to PM of tax is, as noted by TE 19, tax can be `a 
difficult one to measure'. Many companies formally set objectives and goals, often on 
a quarterly basis (see section 4.6). The PM of the tax personnel then tends to revolve 
around the extent to which, and the effectiveness with which, these objectives are 
met. Other companies do not formally set out goals and objectives for the purposes of 
PM. According to TE 23, this lack of formality is due to company size and tax 
budgets. He identified the need to have larger departments and budgets to address this 
area by way of formalised goals and objectives. 
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Typical objectives of performance being measured include (although definitely not 
agreed upon nor used within all of the companies involved): timely and accurate 
compliance; tax personnel's ability to interact with its customers to provide timely 
and accurate advice; responsiveness to management's questions, issues and concerns; 
staying within budget guidelines; staying ahead on issues; `keeping us out of trouble' 
with Revenue Authorities around the world; reaching settlements with the Revenue 
(extremely important for Company Seven); '7' impact on the `bottom line'; dollars 
saved; successful and efficient completion of specific projects; presenting tax 
planning opportunities; tax risk minimisation; reacting to the unexpected (for example 
a Revenue audit); maintaining/reaching a specific ETR (see section 5.3 for discussion 
on ETR); and the cash tax rate. These measures are a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative measures, many of which are self explanatory, and their importance and 
usefulness were agreed upon by many of the interviewees. Such measures are not 
therefore discussed further. 
Importantly, TE 15 holds a very strong view that `no-one in the tax department 
should be directly rewarded, a link created between the benefit they produce and their 
own compensation' (for example, decreasing ETR or saving a certain amount of tax 
dollars). He believes this gets `some tax departments into trouble'. Such PM 
techniques do, in his view, encourage aberrant behaviour and may result in taking 
unwise tax risks. Interestingly, his argument continued that the tax personnel who 
engage in this tax aggressive manner may well have left the company by the time any 
171 Company Seven had recently succeeded in reaching a favourable agreement with the IRS. 
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ramifications are felt. He jokingly added `I should have gone about fourteen years ago 
because you shouldn't stay or get audited right? '. This is a very serious point which 
exposes a very short-sighted perspective which some tax personnel may take towards 
tax planning. Arguably it should encourage tax authorities towards a shorter rather 
than a longer audit cycle. 
TE 15 manages their PM process by producing a very summarised and `very cryptic' 
list of achievements of the tax department which is delivered annually to the CFO 
either orally or handwritten on a piece of paper. This is then sent onto `the Boss'. 172 
This is done before bonuses or pay rises are decided on every year. When questioned 
about this somewhat mysterious process with apparent inattention to metrics, the 
sensitivity of this with respect to the IRS was evident: `I don't really want it to fall 
into the IRS's or anyone's hands. ' When asked about the nature of the achievements 
that might be listed, no specifics were given, but he said there are qualitative and 
quantitative ones and `a lot of it has to do with is there a feeling that the tax 
department is in control of what's going on'. Interestingly, TE 10 also emphasised 
the qualitative nature of PM: `we don't use metrics for this stuff. ' 
Somewhat at the other end of the spectrum in terms of process, TE 24 was very proud 
of the company's very formal PM system now in place for the last five years whereby 
all tax personnel have personal goals and objectives set up in such a way that there is 
a very clear alignment within the company of everybody's objectives and how their 
performance will be measured so that 'it aligns directly to what the company is trying 
172 `The Boss' was the CEO and was named in the interview. 
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to accomplish and its gotten to be... a pretty good system as it's been perfected. ' A 
key factor he identified was how well tax supports the business, namely `business 
partnering'. Tax personnel in this company, rather exceptionally are rated by their 
internal customers (e. g. operations group, VP logistics) through administering a 
survey on performance against expectations and requirements and so on. The VP Tax 
has frequent one-to-one meetings with tax personnel to ensure everybody is clear on 
the objectives and to monitor how all of these objectives are being met. Interestingly, 
this company does not look to the ETR for PM as its overall tax structure is such that 
it has a very low ETR. It is important therefore for this VP to look to other measures 
of performance. 
In relation to very specific tax planning strategies, TE 2 viewed the measure of 
success as `is it sustained on audit', and are the tax benefits effectively kept intact? 
`Audit' is rather comprehensive here incorporating internal audit, external audit, 
auditor's auditors and IRS audit. Rather amazingly, TE 18 admitted there is no formal 
PM of the tax function, which he attributes to the way the business is organised and 
its NOL position. 
There was general support for the Douglas and Ellingsworth (1996) view that the 
CFO is the primary internal evaluator of tax, with one notable exception where all of 
the internal customers (from BUs to logistics) are involved in such evaluating. Most 
of the performance measures referred to in the literature (Porter, 1999a; Douglas et 
al., 1996) were mentioned by many of the interviewees, although not all of them were 
being utilised by any one company. A number of interviewees did emphasise 
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qualitative rather than quantitative measures, and although PM was recognised as an 
important, albeit difficult function, there was no consensus on the degree of formality 
around the PM process. 
5.3 Effective Tax Rate 
The interviewees talked at some length about the ETR as a measure of performance 
of the tax function. Firstly, however I sought to clarify and assess the degree of 
consensus as to how a company's ETR is calculated and reported. Scholes and 
Wolfson (1992) provide two possible definitions of ETR as follows: 
1. Tax currently payable and deferred tax expense/net income before tax (which 
they posit is popular for external reporting purposes); 
2. Taxes paid currently/net income before tax (which is popular with tax 
reformers such as citizens for tax justice). 
Having reviewed the most recently filed l OKs of all of the companies involved in the 
study, the ETR is computed as the provision for income taxes/income before tax 
provision, which is in line with the first definition above. This is therefore, the 
definition based on reporting requirements and was also confirmed to me by some of 
the interviewees. 173 Importantly however, TE 14 referred to another ETR that the 
investors and analysts are interested in which is a `pro-forma' ETR based on the core 
business activities only and does not include the impact of items such as acquisitions, 
disposals, write-off of goodwill and so forth. Similarly, TE 19 referred to being 
measured on a non-GAAP rate which is calculated based on `our normal 
173 All interviewees were not asked to confirm their agreement (I dropped it from the questions I asked 
when I was happy the replies were consensual towards the first definition above). 
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operations'. ' 74 The process of how that is managed, monitored and communicated is 
very important as opposed to the actual rate itself. While being aware of the existence 
in some cases of the alternative operations only based definition referred to above, the 
following discussion is based on the first Scholes and Wolfson (1992) definition of 
ETR above and which is based on US GAAP. Table 5-1 sets out the 2004 ETRs for 
the companies calculated using this definition, based on the information contained in 
their IOK returns. ' 75 While Companies Three and Thirteen stand out for their 
relatively low ETRs, having an ETR in the high 20s/low-to-mid 30s would appear to 
be `normal'. 
Table 5-1 Effective Tax Rates 
C1 
C2 
C3 
28 
26.10 
8.10 
C4 30 
C5 16.7 
C6 27.8 
C7 32 
C8 Tax benefit 
C9 32 
CIO 36 
C11 31.6 
C12 18.8 
C13 13.6 
C14 35 
C15 Tax benefit 
14 In the U. S. GAAP denotes Generally Accepted Accounting Principles i. e. accounting rules used to 
prepare, present, and report financial statements for a wide variety of entities, including publicly-traded 
and privately-held companies, non-profit organisations and governments. 
175 These rates refer to each company's 2004 year end which was not the same in each case. 
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Quite mixed views and opposing philosophies emerged in relation to ETR being used 
for PM purposes. In Company One for instance ETR does not feature for PM 
purposes at all. Some of the debate with respect to ETR in a measurement context 
revolves around meeting (or not) the forecasted ETR. 176 As pointed out by TE 19 
when the ETR comes in above or below the forecasted rate, there is then `a 
communication between you and management to make sure that they understand 
what the drivers are in that and what may change it'. TE 3 talked in terms of having 
an acceptable ETR range (27-35%) and staying within that range means `nothing 
horrible is going to happen'. The latter means there are no negative repercussions for 
the tax function. Getting the CFO and others to understand that fluctuations outside of 
this range is mostly out of the tax function's control relates back directly to the 
continuing need for education internally about tax (see section 4.6). The forecasted or 
target ETR appears to be set (in some cases) by people outside of the tax function. 
For example, the CFO and company president at Company Three set the target ETR. 
Its tax director does not understand how it is decided upon and claims it may even be 
`arbitrary' but is still `my measure' and appeared to be quite content with this 
situation as he is currently meeting this objective `comfortably'. Would his view be 
different if he wasn't meeting this particular objective comfortably? He did 
understand why tax directors might have a problem with being measured in this way 
as it can put `pressure on you to perhaps do things that you might not normally do. It 
does incline you to be more aggressive' (TE 5). This provides some important insight 
perhaps into what drives and determines the tax risk profile within an organisation 
176 In accordance with US GAAP, an ETR is forecasted for the year, but each quarter this is re- 
evaluated, and if it changes the tax provision must be re-evaluated. 
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(see section 6.4 on tax risk profile). Similarly, TE 22 spoke of the CFO and the head 
of tax setting the objective ETR, he himself, being quite removed from and unsure of 
the process. 
Company Five's tax group as a whole is measured primarily on the company's ETR 
so everything the tax group does is assessed in terms of its impact on the US GAAP 
ETR. More than 50% of what the Sr. VP for taxes in this company is measured on is 
the ETR. One of the interviewees at this company contrasted this with his previous 
employer (another one of the companies in this study) that believed the ETR does not 
impact on stock price and that it should not take on high tax risks (presumably with 
the intention of reducing the ETR) as well as its existing high technology and market 
risks. Again is the latter a possible explanation of a company's tax risk profile? 
TE 8 was adamant about the appropriateness of ETR as a measure of performance, 
content that he personally can influence it. This is in striking contrast with TE 14 who 
`would never sign up for a job where bonuses were conditioned upon a certain 
effective tax rate or a certain amount of tax savings'. He sees these as being out of his 
control, `based on law and.. . much more a 
function of statutory tax rates than of 
planning'. He believes that it is management that has not worked with tax before that 
tries to tie the success of tax with `the amount of money that does not have to be paid 
to the government'. He argued that one would wish to be measured by something else 
when new tax reliefs are introduced which one's company simply cannot avail of. 
This raises the question as to what extent tax policy (through for example introducing 
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certain tax reliefs/incentives), might at times interfere with the marketplace by 
facilitating tax planning for some companies but not all? '77 
Interestingly, the second individual I spoke with from this company who has 
responsibility in the EMEA tax compliance domain said the Director of Tax `is 
probably monitored on the overall rate and why it is, what it is, and what we need to 
do to change it'. TE 24 feels sorry for `poor tax directors getting screwed', being 
measured on the ETR, a small portion of which they can control. He believes the ETR 
is an inadequate and inappropriate measure of performance as it is accounting-based. 
He posits that there are legitimate accounting alternatives available for transactions 
which facilitate changing or creating different ETRs on the same set of 
circumstances. Quite infuriated he said `what kind of measure is that? ' This suggests 
`creative accounting' techniques can be employed to deliver the required ETR to the 
market. TE 18 who would not want to be measured by the ETR posited, `it's the 
business that controls your effective tax rate really... been going all over the place but 
that's as a result of the business side'. TE 23, while believing the ETR is very 
important was emphatic that in his organisation `there is no pressure or goal to arrive 
at a desired rate'. They strive towards an `optimal' rate, `within the organisation and 
operation that we have and so there is no pressure to be entering into activities that 
don't coincide with our normal business operations'. For companies with significant 
NOLs, the ETR did not feature for PM purposes. However, it was very unclear as to 
how tax performance was measured in these companies. In one case it appeared that 
177 Further consideration of this question, while important, is beyond the scope of this study. 
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because the ETR was not appropriate, there was no need to measure the performance 
at all which is somewhat surprising. 
Interestingly, there was evidence to suggest a link between the ETR and resources for 
the tax function, with it sometimes being used as a `sword' to defend against 
inadequate resourcing, `if we can't spend money on X, Y and Z the effective tax rate 
is going to go up two points'. (TE 3) `If tax rate is going down and ... the company 
sees objective results I think he's [Sr. VP Tax] getting resources and will be able to 
continue to get resources in this environment'. (TE 17) For TE 20 an important 
aspect of managing the ETR is that it shows, `that a company is putting some 
resource, some emphasis on effective tax planning, to minimise what could be a 
pretty significant cost to the company'. This really does not sit well with the 
interviewees who do not respect it as a measure of performance. 
TE 19 spoke of the possibility of doing some `one time things' that would lower its 
ETR towards its competitors rate, but he and his company are against a one-time hit 
because `it's too painful to have to go back'. Equally, going too low is `very hard to 
sustain' and at some stage is likely to `pop back up again' with possible negative 
consequences. Instead, his strategy is clearly to stick with a more consistent ETR 
performance over time. Notwithstanding the above, this company is cognisant of the 
competitors' ETR. When they look at tax planning ideas they address the short and 
long-term impact on the rate, what other companies are doing, the investment 
community reaction and finally talk it through with the executives. This process 
provides them with a balanced perspective on managing the ETR. 
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Indeed, predicting the ETR for the market (the Street), and the subsequent reaction by 
the investment community/market/street was a recurring theme in the discussion on 
ETRs. It appears that when a company sets a target ETR, it is monitored and changed 
typically on a quarterly basis, and fluctuations from the rate given to the market are 
generally perceived as not good news, which ultimately can impact on share price. 178 
TE 3 referred to his company being criticised when the rate fluctuates as the analysts 
have built what turns out to be an incorrect ETR into their business models. Arguably, 
the market's attention to companies' ETR is itself a source of coercive isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). As noted by TE 21, the ETR, `is something that the 
investor relations side of things focus on big time ... we know that the investor 
relations people and the Wall Street guys look at it so we have to look at it'. 
The importance for these companies of having an ETR that does not fluctuate 
significantly and is competitive with peer group companies was highlighted by 
Advisor 3. This `importance' however attached to ETR on the Street does not always 
filter through to the companies in terms of PM as seen above. TE 11 believes the 
ETR is `a lot more important I think to Wall Street' than to [his company], although 
the CFO does need to understand and be able to talk to the analysts about it. TE 1 
stated, `if for whatever reason, for legitimate reasons, the rate is higher than our peer 
companies... that would be ok, as long as there was a good explanation for why'. This 
interviewee was more concerned however with explaining to the CFO rather than the 
"$ Interviewing market analysts on the significance they attach to the ETR is included in section 8.4 as 
a recommended research idea arising from this study. 
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Street. TE 15 described his mechanism for dealing with and managing market 
reaction. He said there are so many `flying points' (factors which may influence the 
ETR) that he is only prepared to say to the market what its ETR will not exceed. He is 
not prepared to say what it actually will be. 
Despite many interviewees' reservations about the appropriateness and validity of the 
ETR as a measure of performance, comparison of a company's ETR with its peer 
companies certainly happens, and seems to matter seriously to the tax executives, the 
CFOs, and the investment community. 179 TE 8 for example, presents at least yearly to 
the Board concerning the ETR, specifically comparing and explaining the company's 
ETR vis-ä-vis its competitors. He did emphasise however that this did not present a 
pressure which would make them more tax aggressive. Instead, he might `work on 
resources differently, prioritise things differently'. Clearly, the Board are interested in 
the company's ETR (this interest could be driven by many things), which filters 
through to PM in the tax group. He sums up the importance of the ETR as, `I think 
it's a competitive advantage to [my company] to have a lower tax rate than [a named 
competitor company] and I work on it' (TE 8). TE 12 monitors its competitors and 
sees this as a `key measure'. This interviewee raised specific concerns about not 
being able to match a competitor's ETR which is based on `an extremely aggressive 
tax structure.. . we can only hope that the IRS goes after them from now on'. 
"9 The investment community's interest clearly goes beyond this comparative context however as can 
be seen from the previous paragraph. 
229 
Performance Measurement 
One really interesting aspect of PM with respect to how a company is doing vis-a-vis 
its competitors concerns the idea of absolutes versus relativities. TE 26 suggested that 
having a very low ETR vis-a-vis your competitors may in fact pose a question mark 
in terms of tax risks, with the obvious possible negative impact on the market. He 
explained that a relatively low ETR: 
Attracts a lot of attention and the Board, the CFO may not necessarily see it as 
a positive to be sort of six points ahead of your competition... beating the 
market rate by extra points is not perceived to be a critical factor. 
The view of his US-based colleague (who has greater visibility I expect) was a little 
different however. This colleague stated they try to be `at or below' their competitors' 
ETR as they would see this as a competitive advantage. 
TE 15 spoke of the rather lengthy and detailed presentation he used to do in the past 
to the Audit Committee (of the Board) explaining the differences between his 
company's and its competitors' ETRs. Part of this analysis involved trying to `glean' 
what they could from the competitors' financial statements. This is not done any more 
as it was rendered 'meaninglessi180. They discovered that even a company listed as a 
competitor (he named an example) has such a different business model, that they are 
not really comparable in any meaningful way. He believed that the market doesn't 
care about these differences. He did caveat this however by adding `unless we were 
sitting there with a 40% effective tax rate or something'. His colleague in the 
interview did point out however another factor i. e. the 'CFO network'. When these 
180 This provides support for the argument that looking to financial statements for meaningful tax 
information is of limited value and was not therefore considered an appropriate predominant research 
method to employ in this research. See section 3.3.2. 
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CFOs talk to each other they become very aware of why other companies' ETRs may 
be lower than theirs. For example, there may be some structural differences and the 
CFOs often come back to the VP for Tax wondering why their company can't 
restructure to match or beat the competitors ETR so `there is some level of 
comparison' with competitors taking place. The over-riding point here does appear to 
be having an awareness of why your rate is different to your competitors and to be 
able to explain this satisfactorily to the CFO. TE 23 spoke of the need to `explain to 
the CFO or in some cases the CEO the differences between the character of our 
competitors and ourselves'. The latter may be particularly relevant in the context of 
the companies operating in the SV area whose businesses and business models could 
vary significantly across a wide range of technologies. 
While TE 2 claimed not to benchmark himself against competitors and claimed no 
external influences exist at all in terms of PM of tax, his boss (TE 1) did allude to the 
fact that he contacts a small number of companies in SV on an informal basis, 
`keeping an eye on what other companies are doing'. In this way these other 
companies do have an influence on decisions and ultimately therefore performance 
and PM. 
There is certainly a great awareness of the ETR among all of the interviewees. 
However, there is no consensus regarding the extent to which it is used in practice to 
measure the performance of tax executives, with only one company's tax executives 
being very content to be measured based on the ETR. The philosophical position of a 
number of the interviewees was very clear i. e. the ETR is an inappropriate measure of 
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performance as it is not totally within the control of the tax executives, and may 
encourage aggressive tax planning if it were used to measure performance. It moves 
due to other factors such as business activity, new tax laws and so forth. In any event, 
as suggested by Slemrod (2005) a relatively low ETR may in the eyes of the `savvy 
investors... result from a more aggressive stance that pushes the limits of what is 
legal' (p. 95). I am not suggesting however, that all investors are the same and there 
may well be a `clientele' very happy to invest in a company with a very low ETR, 
notwithstanding the degree of tax aggressiveness it might portray. Educating the 
CFO, the CEO and so on, as to why the ETR has fluctuated appears to be paramount 
in securing legitimacy and credibility internally. Nonetheless, the market, a source of 
coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 199b) attaches great importance to a 
company's ETR, and therefore managing it and explaining it is very important. The 
market is thus an important constituent in the organisational field level of the 
descriptive framework put forward in this study and the analysts are important actors 
at this level (section 3.4.1). Whether tax executives like it or not, they must pay 
attention to the ETR purely because this important organisational field member does 
so, in a way that could impact ultimately on shareholder wealth. This is somewhat 
concerning and dangerous, especially taking account of the fact that the findings do 
not really support the validity of the ETR as a measure of performance and it clearly 
seems to be subject to manipulation through creative accounting or flexible 
accounting standards (Bauman and Shaw, 2005). 
Support for the inclusion of competitors and peer companies as important 
organisational field members in the descriptive framework (see Figure 3.1) was 
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significant, with most interviewees being quite exercised with his/her company's 
ETR relative to competitor companies' ETR. While some interviewees believe a 
lower ETR is a competitive advantage, a relatively low ETR could also signal 
aggressive tax planning with possible negative consequences. The need for tax 
executives to be able to explain the basis of the difference between companies' ETRs 
to CFOs, the market and arguably tax executives/CFOs in the competitor companies 
appears to be very important and necessary and a mechanism towards achieving 
legitimacy (Scott 2001), often revolving around different business models. Such an 
explanation or understanding cannot be obtained through an examination of a 
company's published financial statements. It would appear the case for legitimacy is 
stronger than economic efficiency with respect to the ETR, itself a possible measure 
of economic efficiency. Identifying and recognising the influence of external 
constituents like competitor companies and the market enhance our understanding of 
`the relationship between organizational structures and the wider social environment 
in which organizations are situated' (Hussain and Hoque, 2002: p. 164). Strategically, 
many companies work on the basis that there is an `acceptable range' of ETRs which 
will not give rise to any unwanted questions from analysts, or get unwanted attention 
from their peer group companies, thereby securing external legitimacy (Scott, 2001). 
This is arguably important for their personal survival within the SV tax arena. 
Contrary to Karayan and Swenson's (2007) suggestion, comparing a company's ETR 
to the standard US corporation tax rate of 35% did not feature as important in the 
interviews. These findings do question the validity of the ETR as a measure of the 
effect of tax planning, yet it has been used by many researchers for that purpose 
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(Zimmerman, 2003; Mills et al., 1998; Rego, 2003). It should clearly continue to be 
used therefore with great caution as suggested by Phillips (2003). 
5.4 Post-Tax versus Pre-Tax Performance Measurement 
All companies in the sample except one, measure the performance of the business 
units and the non-tax personnel leading these units (typically VPs for different 
operations) on a pre-tax basis. Very strong views were held by the interviewees on 
this topic. Most interviewees shared the same philosophy and were clearly not in 
favour of tax being treated as a business expense of the business units. 181 
In the one company where the post-tax basis applies, the bonuses of the VPs of the 
different businesses depends in part on how much taxes his/her group pays so `he 
cares a whole lot about taxes' (TE 8). TE 9 (with the same company) acknowledged 
the counter argument to measuring on a post-tax basis but explained why it can work: 
The businesses can get too aggressive and... unconstrained. . .a business could do all sorts of less than fully kosher things from a tax accounting view... it can 
be controlled and I think you have to have a strong respected central tax group 
that sets the rules. 
TE 8 admitted this is politically a difficult area and most tax directors attitude would 
be, `my gosh the businesses will run crazy with this stuff and they do. They will do 
anything now to save taxes and they do and you have to control them and you have to 
educate them'. In terms of who drives this PM approach, it goes firmly back to the 
CFO in 1984-85 who introduced it because he said `the only way you are going to get 
181 In the one company which applies the post-tax basis, it applies to income on earnings only. 
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these people to manufacture stuff in Puerto Rico and Singapore is if we put it in their 
performance'. 182 
Only one other interviewee (TE 2) indicated that he would like to see a post-tax basis 
of PM because he is really big on `accountability' and thinks `it would be good to 
include tax as a cost of their business'. This view was not shared however by his tax 
colleague who believes the BUs `are pulling tax in now as it is' (TE 1). Two other 
companies could see some merit in it but only in certain situations, but even then said 
it would be difficult to apply in an equitable fashion. TE 14 spoke of the difficulties 
with trying to assess on a post-tax basis referring to the fact that some countries like 
Ireland have a significantly lower corporation tax rate than others such as. Italy. 
Therefore these countries would have to be compensated differently. 183 
The predominant finding was that companies employ a pre-tax basis of PM on BUs 
and almost all interviewees philosophically agree with this approach. TE 11 posited, 
`I don't want the businesses worrying about the tax rates and making decisions'. His 
colleague (TE 10) agreed, `absolutely, do not want ever to be measured on an after- 
tax basis.. . people should be looking at the 
business side of things and let the tax 
department worry about tax'. Specifically, in relation to transfer pricing it would 
result in tax executives constantly `fighting with your operations... they all want to 
optimize their own P&L as opposed to what's the correct thing' (TE 10). This 
company held this viewpoint very strongly which is interesting as the two largest 
182 Manufacturing in these countries typically leads to lower tax payable by the manufacturing groups. 
183 Standard Irish corporate tax rate on trading income is 12.5% compared to 33% in Italy. 
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companies in the study held completely oppositional stances philosophically and in 
practice on this matter. TE 18 was also keen to retain control over the tax expertise 
and focus: 
I don't think that the business should really concern themselves (sic) with 
something that they have zero control over. That's my job to come in there 
and try and control that... sometimes what happens is, what could be good for 
one group might be bad for another group and you'd have to have all these 
different battles all over the place. 
TE 19's concern about moving to a post-tax basis is `you start to get people focused 
more on the process than on what they really should be doing which is the core 
business'. TE 23 would find the notion of post-tax basis as quite `worrisome' and 
thinks it would put a pressure on business managers that he would not be comfortable 
with. He referred to the fact that many of the local operations are headed up by sales 
people and: 
The character of those people is to be aggressive and to want to achieve goals 
that they've established, or goals in most cases that they haven't established, 
somebody else has established for them and you know I would not want to see 
them under that pressure and therefore be susceptible to overly aggressive tax 
strategies. 
All except one of the companies in this study measures performance of BUs on a pre- 
tax basis. The company which engages in the post-tax basis, is aware that it is part of 
a minority of companies in SV. Its approach however is well embedded, in fact 
`institutionalized' (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) as it was introduced by a very 
powerful internal actor over 20 years ago. The philosophy and practice within this 
company would not move I suggest, without a change at CFO level to somebody with 
an opposing philosophy. This would thus signify the role of the powerful actors or 
`elites' in the institutionalisation process, who are themselves through their exercise 
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of power `sources of heterogeneity' in the tax institutional environment (Powell, 
1991). However, the chances of this company employing somebody with an opposing 
view on PM are very slim I suggest, thereby demonstrating at times how unlikely 
deinstitutionalisation is to take place. A post-tax approach to PM is arguably at this 
stage a `cultural rule' (Edelman and Suchman, 1997) within this company which 
explains some of its rules and organising logics (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a) with 
respect to tax. Interestingly, this company is perceived as a `leader' (Dillard et al., 
2004) with respect to other tax-based activities (see Chapter Eight), yet it has not 
been followed by other SV companies with respect to post-tax PM. Another very 
large company in the SV, facing many of the same tax planning opportunities and 
challenges, does not share the post-tax measurement philosophy which again could be 
explained by an internal cultural perspective created and sustained by some powerful 
internal actor(s) in the tax domain. 
These findings support the KPMG (2005) position that pre-tax PM still predominates. 
The tax executives for the most part were keen to retain a sense of power through 
being the exclusive tax knowledge experts in the business. Despite not being terribly 
close to the business, and not always understanding the business (as evidenced in 
section 4.6.5) they feel they are best positioned to address the tax implications of the 
business activities both in terms of expertise and character. It appears something of a 
contradiction to demand the BUs to consider tax (through early consultation with the 
tax executives) in their strategic business decision making yet not reward them for 
doing so through, for example, a post-tax PM system. 
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5.5 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the key findings in relation to Research 
Question Two and its associated objectives. A number of key general observations 
relating to the practice of performance measurement in US MNCs was presented and 
discussed. For example, many of the performance measures referred to in the 
literature are employed in these companies ranging from timely and accurate 
compliance to reacting to the unexpected such as a Revenue audit. Some interviewees 
put a greater emphasis on qualitative as opposed to quantitative measures. The CFO 
emerged as a key evaluator of the performance of tax executives. However, there was 
no consensus on the degree of formality around the PM process. Two distinct aspects 
relating to PM particularly exercised the interviewees, namely the effective tax rate 
and post-tax versus pre-tax PM. Many interviewees do not perceive the ETR as being 
an appropriate measure of performance, yet they are very aware of it. and the 
interviewees need to be able to understand and explain to internal (the Board, CFO 
etc. ) and external (market analysts) interested parties, its make-up and why it differs 
from their competitors' rates. The latter demonstrated clearly the importance of 
relativities over absolutes in this context. Only one company subscribes to and 
employs a post-tax measurement of performance to BUs. Most interviewees shared 
the view that a post-tax basis might only serve to increase tax risks, preferring instead 
for the in-house tax executives to remain the exclusive tax knowledge experts within 
their organisation, and to be rewarded on that basis. 
238 
Tax Risk Management 
6 Tax Risk Management 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings in relation to the third research 
question. Research Question Three states: How is tax risk managed in MNCs? (See 
section 3.2 for associated objectives. ) It was important firstly to establish the 
importance of tax RM to these MNCs. The findings in this regard are presented and 
discussed in section 6.2. Section 6.3 goes on to identify the key types of tax risks that 
the in-house tax executives encounter and deal with, some of which are `technical' 
tax issues while others are not of a tax-technical nature. Section 6.4 then provides 
insights into the tax risk profile of these companies as defined by the tax executives. 
The range of mechanisms and processes employed by the in-house tax executives to 
manage the various tax risks identified are addressed in section 6.5. Finally, the 
importance of having a formalised tax RM policy in place, and the extent to which 
these companies do this, are discussed in section 6.6. 
6.2 The Importance of Tax Risk Management 
The need to address RM at all in a tax context arises due to the inherent infallibility 
aspect of tax laws, which gives rise to uncertainty around their interpretation. Where 
there is uncertainty, there is a risk to be quantified and managed, which ultimately 
links RM with degrees of tax aggressiveness and attitudes to the law. As supported by 
TE 14: `Tax laws, generally, are less than "black and white". There is always some 
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room for "interpretation"'. Almost as a direct result of this alone, (leaving aside risk 
profiles, which are addressed in section 6.4) there will always be some companies 
(and individuals) who are more aggressive (or perceived to be so) than others and 
`pushing issues to the "envelope"' (TE 14). 
The interviewees were quite exercised about tax RM, an attitude which is driven 
partly by uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of tax laws (which is not new), 
as referred to above. They were also concerned about by what appears to be an 
increased level of interest in RM generally by Management in a post-corporate- 
scandals era (the impact of Enron was mentioned by many interviewees in this 
context). ' 84 This post-Enron environment presents a new risk terrain for these 
companies, consisting of new regulations (with increased penalties) and specifically, 
complying with the Sarbanes Oxley 2002 reporting requirements as they apply to 
tax. 185 As noted by TE 21, `Sarbanes-Oxley pretty much ... rules the roost' and TE 
10 stated `it has changed the world'. This is an important context within which to 
understand and reflect on the findings of this study with respect to tax RM. 
The post-Enron environment has without doubt led to an increased interest in tax RM 
by Management (the CFO, CEO and Board of Directors were all mentioned by 
interviewees in this context), and the need for tax executives to keep Management 
informed of the tax risks to a greater extent than before has become part of the 
internal tax RM process. This appears to be leading generally to a more conservative 
184 This increased level of interest in RM is arguably also driven by the Big Four. 
185 See section 1.3 on Sarbanes-Oxley. 
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approach to tax planning within these MNCs. 186 TE 14 sees an important part of his 
job as being to point out to Management the impact of being aggressive or 
conservative, and the risks and rewards: `That's what makes tax a lot of fun'. '87 
Likewise TE 26 referred to issues that `you might have left bubbling or you might 
take a view on, you now need to air and discuss and give guidance to the CEO as to 
whether it's appropriate to go with this'. In the context of the increase in 
documentation now required for RM purposes (due largely to SOX) TE 24 said, `you 
better be able to show that you've done this work and that you're managing that risk 
and everybody, you know the Board of Directors, the Executive Management want to 
see it'. 
The following quotations reflect the apparent move towards conservatism in tax 
planning. `I think CFOs generally now are a bit more accepting ... [and they] like to 
think more conservative. ' (TE 17) 
A lot of the plans and ideas that were floating around a few years ago may still 
work but mightn't be acceptable at a business, political level ... I would say 
culturally over the last seven or eight years the mindset of Management and 
CFOs is very much narrower. (TE 26) 
TE 15 referred to tax plans being `a lot more vetted' now (evidenced by the increase 
in documentation requirements) whereas in the past `companies may have been a bit 
186Another contributing factor to this conservative approach may be the US regulations which were 
introduced in 2003 to curb abusive tax shelter schemes. These regulations require companies to 
disclose tax shelters (as defined in the regulations) in their tax returns. Promoters of tax shelters are 
also required to register transactions with the IRS and maintain lists of participants. These regulations 
have since been amended (following the American Jobs Creation Act in 2004) and arguably improved 
upon in response to taxpayer and tax adviser concerns. See Lipton and Walton (2007) for a summary 
of these amendments. 
187 Others felt `the fun' has gone out of tax. 
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more willing to try something... a bit more seat of the pants'. In light of this change 
he made a presentation to the Audit Committee. He needed to understand where that 
committee stood on the risk spectrum, and come up with some processes and a list of 
risks that need to be considered in the present climate. He said in the past there were 
things like the `Wall Street Journal' test. He now spoke in terms of having something 
analogous to a spider's web that would represent the different risks ranging from a 
public view (a concern for `legitimacy') to technical, to documentation and to the 
[CEO named] factor. In relation to the latter he stated, `the last thing you want, the 
rich, one of the richest men in the world feathering his nest with tax shelters doesn't 
really read very well'. 188 He also referred to considering the: 
Atmospherics.. . there's a lot going on 
in the atmospherics right now.. . where judges are reacting very differently to things that are grey... we don't know 
what they're going to be thinking two or three years down the road. The 
pendulum may have swung back, don't know, it may have landed in a sensible 
place. 
TE 12 referred to positioning and posture. `I think that in itself it's just ... how well 
you document it, how well you position yourself and your posture. I mean, if you're 
looking aggressive then you're going to be aggressive. ' 
While this increase in interest of Management changes the nature of tax executives' 
work to some extent, it also gives them more visibility internally and perhaps 
therefore more opportunities, which is evidence of the enabling and constraining 
188 While a tax shelter usually refers to some method of reducing one's taxable income, and thereby 
one's tax bill, some tax shelters are legal and legitimate but others may be illegal or certainly 
questionable in ethical terms. It is the latter to which this interviewee was referring in this context. In 
the US, efforts at preventing the misuse or unintended use of tax shelters include tax legislation and 
judicial doctrines (for example the substance over form doctrine). 
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action referred to by Dillard et al. (2004). Section 6.3 addresses the different tax risks 
currently facing tax executives in these US MNCs. 
There is evidence here to suggest that the uncertainties around some tax laws, 
combined with an increasingly regulated environment which has resulted in an 
increased interest in tax by Management, has led to a trend towards more 
conservatism in tax planning generally. Uncertainty in itself therefore appears to 
some extent to result in effective tax policy (McBarnet, 2001 a; Spilker et al., 1999) if 
the latter amounts to conservative or low risk tax plans. This, I believe, is subject to 
debate and represents a `tension' at the economic and political level of analysis. As 
regards increased regulation, SOX appears to have unveiled (in a new way) a formal 
authority structure (Fligstein, 1991) within the MNCs by pushing tax onto the 
Boardroom agenda, thereby attaching an increased importance to tax RM. 189 The 
latter, of course, is a clear example of the dynamics of institutionalisation (Dillard et 
al., 2004) as represented in this study's conceptual framework (see Figure 3.1). 
Concerns with legitimacy (Scott, 2001), both within and as perceived by the `public' 
with respect to tax executives' tax RM, are clearly very important and are evidence of 
the different audiences to whom their claims for legitimacy must be articulated 
(Perrow, 1985). In this message on the importance of the perception around the 
practice of RM, procedural legitimacy (Scott, 1987) featured more prominently in the 
interviews than the exact nature or quality of the practice itself. Being in tune with the 
189 Not dissimilar I suggest to the post-Cadbury Turnball environment as referred to by PWC (2001). 
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`atmospherics' of the situation is an important part of RM, which includes having 
one's ear to the ground, networking, knowing how judges are thinking and so forth. 
This all demonstrates the impact of the activities and actors present at all levels of 
analysis as depicted in this study's conceptual framework (section 3.4). 
6.3 Types of Tax Risk 
While a number of types/areas of tax risk were specifically identified by the 
interviewees (as detailed below), many of them spoke of fear of the unknown, of 
missing something through, for example, not being kept informed. TE 10 described 
this well: 
The biggest tax risks facing an organisation like [company name] are the ones 
we don't know and can't assess... what's out there that you don't really have 
visibility to... it's the great unknown that's the biggest risk. The rest of the 
stuff we manage. 
The primary tax risk areas identified by the interviewees are summarised and 
discussed below, and represented in Figure 6-1, the first four of which are grounded 
in specific tax technical domains. 
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ý-+ Transfer Pricing 
Technical 
Tax Risk 
Management Areas 
ý--º 
Non-Technical 
Permanent 
Establishment 
Tangibles / 
Intangibles 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Reputational 
Changing Nature of 
Business 
Compliance 
Taxation in Foreign 
Countries 
Financial Reporting 
Figure 6-1 Primary Tax Risk Management Areas 
Technical Issues 
o Transfer pricing (TP): 190 This was referred to by almost every company and 
for the most part it was first on their list. As evidenced by the following 
quotes, the MNCs appear to be `pawns' in the battle for revenue between 
different tax jurisdictions. `More and more countries are getting more 
aggressive on transfer pricing and so you have a transaction between two 
corporations in the group and each tax authority wants their fair share. ' (TE 1) 
`We don't want to pay on the same income twice or three times but you often 
get two or three jurisdictions who are fighting over the same profit. So to me, 
190 See section 1.3 also on transfer pricing. 
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to a multinational, that's the biggest issue. ' (TE 17) `Every government wants 
to have a bigger piece of the pie. ' (TE 18) `Now it's a tug of war around the 
world and you know you've got to pool the profits and you've got 25 
countries all saying we want our share... it's an extreme challenge. ' (TE 23) 
For TE 9, TP underlies the fact that their ETR is driven by `how much profit 
is booked in the factory in Ireland versus how much is booked in the US and 
so on'. A related issue mentioned was that foreign audits (as opposed to US 
ones), especially in Asia, Korea and Japan which are `becoming more 
aggressive', and were moving TP up the tax risk agenda (TE 3). Similarly, TE 
11 referred to many foreign tax jurisdictions taking `totally unreasonable 
positions' on TP and that the number of countries now seeking documentation 
is growing exponentially (40 countries require TP documentation which they 
categorise as `Tier I' risk). Interestingly, TE 8 believes his company's rapid 
growth has made them a `huge target' of tax authorities in this context. 
o Permanent establishment (PE)191 or `a son of transfer pricing. ' (TE 23. 
Interviewees referred to the risk of the subsidiaries doing something that 
jeopardises the integrity of the tax structure. In this context TE 12 stated: 
People like to move parts around all over the place and product around 
and you know it's more fun with that as long as we can keep track of it 
and I think that's where we would struggle the most. 
191 See section 1.3 also on the importance of the concept of 'permanent establishment' for tax 
purposes. 
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TE 16 referred to some countries (India was cited) sending conflicting 
messages to MNCs. The countries want them to do business there but then the 
tax authorities come after them on a PE issue. What did they expect? 
o Tangibles versus intangibles? TE 15 highlighted the constant risk concerning 
the inherent nature of their products, identifying in particular that their product 
(software) does not `fit into a nice mould' so they are `always grappling with 
the fact that we're in the grey anyway'. 
o Mergers and Acquisitions: Company Five executives specifically referred to 
the possibility of acquiring a company with tax liabilities they were unaware 
of (despite apparent due diligence). 
Non-Technical Issues 
o Reputational risk. As pointed out by TE 15, this is a risk that must be assessed 
even though it cannot be measured from a `pure tax opinion standpoint'. Not 
surprisingly, the bosses' attitude to risk tends to matter here as reflected in TE 
3's comment, `if the Board of Directors is conservative and we are in line with 
that, that's great. So I think it's more alignment, knowing what the bosses 
want'. This alignment seems to be more important in the post-Enron 
environment. The idea of going to tax court came up in this context and TE 
3's response reflected the company-size factor. His view was that large 
companies (he cited GE and IBM, neither of which partook in this study) do 
not mind going to court as they see it `as a cost of doing business' whereas 
smaller companies would probably prefer not to go to court. These 
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interviewees were also of the view that reputational risk was a bigger issue in 
the trade area than tax, because of the politics involved (e. g. the US losing 
business to China). `The politics involved with tax are just basically tax 
people... nobody really necessarily cares on a broader political level to the 
extent they would from a trade level. ' (TE 3) Interviewees were very 
concerned about the role of the media in the context of reputational risk. `We 
try not to do things that'll get us written up on the front page of the Wall 
Street Journal. ' (TE 22) `We take a very, very careful look at the risks 
involved and I guess the guiding principal is would you want this in the 
newspaper and if the answer is no... you probably shouldn't do it. ' (TE 5) 
You want to be able to wake up every morning and not see your name in 
the headlines of the Wall Street Journal as having done something bad. I 
think that is absolutely the truth with regard to the tax department as well. 
We feel very strongly that we never want to be the poster child for some 
bad thing. (TE 2) 
The potential impact of the media on tax planning also clearly exercised 
Advisor 1: 
With the number of financial media and the number of financial 
journalists clamouring around trying to fill column inches, with bullshit 
most of the time, you really have to plan against a background of an 
assumption that whatever you do may be subject to media commentary, 
and as a consequence, you need to apply the smell factor and the smell 
test to a particular transaction or scheme or tax plan in the context of 
potentially being exposed in the media, and ... in a manner which you 
might not necessarily want it to be exposed. You have no control over 
what way a journalist perceives something. 
Similarly, KPMG (2005) stated: 
Tax has news value now and, although often unfounded, `naming and 
shaming' attacks on alleged tax avoiders can damage their reputations in 
the eyes of important stakeholders, which can lead to sharp short-term 
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share price falls and the unwelcome attention of more than one taxing 
authority. (p. 16) 
Of course one can sue the media for any incorrect data being published but it 
is likely some corporate image damage would already have been done by that 
stage. TE 8 cares about reputation a lot: 
We tout our uncompromising integrity, it's a big thing for us and just 
within the tax function, as I told you, I think our reputation helps us a lot. 
So I care about our tax reputation too. It is a big thing for us. 
TE 22 believes reputational risk is `huge'. TE 15 is concerned about the 
`[CEO named] factor' as referred to in section 6.2. Can such a high-profile 
CEO actually impact negatively on a company's tax planning activities? TE 
24 is concerned because of their Cayman Islands-based structure and 
particularly about the impact of a negatively-toned article having a negative 
impact on the stock price. TE 18 is more concerned about his personal 
reputation because SV is so small, but he did acknowledge that personal and 
company reputations are inextricably linked, `if I keep my nose clean, the 
company keeps their nose clean. I mean in that sense I am the company. ' 
o Changing nature of the business which brings new risks to be managed which, 
if not adequately resourced, can become enhanced. Company Five executives 
spoke of moving into the service industry, while Company One executives 
spoke of moving into retail. These businesses can be very quick to market and 
may present new areas of risk. 
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o Compliance risk. This incorporates completing returns and ensuring the 
correct amount of tax is being paid (companies do not want to overpay 
either). Interestingly, TE 14 emphasised that sometimes they knowingly take 
a compliance risk. This happens due to having minimal tax resources, which 
means they cannot get to everything. 192 A `business decision' is taken to 
prioritise what gets done and a calculated risk is taken on the rest. Very 
importantly, senior management are warned and informed about this risk and 
he tells them: 
I don't have a head count resource so this is being neglected, I do not 
have the time, the bandwidth or the resources to get to this. You need to 
know, so that when it comes back around you don't hold me responsible. 
(TE 14) 
If the risk is `significant enough' a reserve will be put in place but if it 
becomes `chronic' he will argue for more resources and then it becomes a 
management decision as to how to go forward. Advisor 3 also referred to the 
trade-off between the cost of compliance and the risk of sanctions. This type 
of trade-off seems to be particular to smaller firms for which the cost of 
compliance can be so significant. Linking this risk with reputational risk, TE 
21 said: `it reflects badly on ... the company as a whole if you're being fined, 
reported, that sort of thing' for non-compliance. 
o Taxation in foreign countries: A number of interviewees referred to local 
country issues. TE 7 identified some uncertainty around `how a country will 
take a look at how we should be taxed'. Concern was raised about Japan 
192 For example, VAT-specific compliance requirements for which they cannot afford to acquire the 
expertise to deal with. 
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(Companies One and Two), China and the Eastern Bloc, `where the tax rules 
aren't all that worked out and they don't necessarily have a rational way of 
dealing with these sorts of questions' (TE 15). 
TE 12, while recognising that movement into other countries is often driven 
by labour (cost and availability), comments that `tax is the place where you 
can make the mistake that costs you more than the labour saved you'. I think 
this is a very significant point when companies are looking at longevity of 
structures. The constantly changing tax laws around the world present tax 
risks: `what may have been in total conformity with law and regulation at one 
point in time, due to legislative changes or court rulings and court 
interpretations, might change'. (TE 5) 
o Financial reporting risks which incorporate the relatively new SOX reporting 
requirements, `a brand new risk' (TE 14). If tax is materially incorrectly 
reported such that a restatement is required, that can be embarrassing and `the 
company's reputation is shot with its analysts, with its investors, with its 
employees' (TE 14). This issue is thus linked to reputational risk. Setting tax 
reserves (a `cushion') is clearly RM in action as Advisor 3 stated: `The 
reason companies have tax reserves is because there are risks out there'. The 
quarterly reserve-setting process has, as a result of SOX, apparently become a 
painful and extremely heavy administrative burden and is recognised as `a big 
issue in the Valley' (TE 24). Effectively, in this process, the company is 
251 
Tax Risk Management 
being overseen by the auditor, who is being overseen by the PCAOB. 193 The 
impact of PCAOB was clear, with one interviewee identifying it as now 
having the most influence in this area. `We do what the people who measure 
them [the auditors] count and that oversight body can put them out of 
business, so they do what that body tells them to do. ' (TE 8) SOX extends tax 
risk to processes as explained by TE 1: 
I think that has increased the implications of tax risk tremendously and so 
it's not... just risk on tax issues, it's risk on your processes and so 
Sarbanes Oxley is looking at your processes for putting together reserves, 
tax reserves for example, and so you have got two issues there: it's one 
are your reserves right but the other thing is were your processes you used 
to get to that also appropriate. So you could have the right answer on your 
reserves but if you have poor processes to get there, then you could have 
a 404 failure even though your reserves are right on. 194 
SOX has, according to many of the interviewees, pulled resources from 
planning and value-add activities to administration and is not very popular 
among the interviewees. It's an `overkill' (TE 15), `killing a fly with an 
elephant gun' (TE 23), `the obvious eight hundred pound gorilla in the middle 
of the room' (TE 1). SOX has led to `a bunch of terrified people' (TE 2) and 
is largely perceived as the consequence of the actions of a few `bold' 
individuals/companies and the others are `paying for their sins' (TE 5). 
TE 8 was clear on how SOX came to be. `Why we have Sarbanes Oxley is 
because of Enron. So the rest of us weren't doing that stuff, so it's too 
bad... we all got tarred with that brush. ' 
193 Some interviewees referred to more changes expected in this process through new FAS 5 rules also. 
See section 1.3 and footnote 13 for explanation of PCAOB. 
194 See footnote 13 on SOX and S 404. 
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There was certainly some scepticism around whether or not SOX will reach 
what it set out to achieve: TE 18 believes that government will see soon that 
`it wasn't worth it... it's already starting to move'. TE 14, extremely annoyed, 
commented, `it's not going to stop the larger companies from doing these 
things, but it is going to be an excessive burden financially on the small 
companies'. Similarly, TE 2 stated `I am not sure that all the policies and 
procedures in the world would have stopped some of these major offenders'. 
Importantly, there was some concern expressed over the copying or borrowing 
of SOX-type regulations by other countries in which these MNCs are 
operating: 
My sense of it is that each government will view some type of rigorous 
documentation program as good, good no matter what. I know that 
Sarbanes Oxley has every multi-national scared and many other countries 
are adopting very strict Sarbanes Oxley-like rules. (TE 2) 
Other risks referred to very briefly included Subpart F195(referred to by Company One 
executives only), strategic risk (is tax aligned with the corporate objective? ), use of 
tax attributes (as discussed earlier), cost and legal risk. 
These findings support the existence of all three types of tax risks identified by PWC 
(2001): operational, planning and compliance, with which tax executives are dealing. 
195 As noted by Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew and Shevlin (2005) the Subpart F CFC rules 'are 
designed to prevent firms from forming paper foreign corporations in tax havens to record income 
from passive investments, sales, services, shipping operations, or oil-related activities. In general, these 
rules work by subjecting Subpart F income to U. S. taxation as if the income was repatriated to the U. S. 
parent when the income is earned, rather than when the subsidiary distributes cash to the parent' 
(p. 295). 
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However, the interviewees were very concerned with reputational risk, a friction 
(Scholes and Wolfson, 1992), at both a personal and corporate level. I think 
`reputational risk' overlaps conceptually with `legitimacy' (Scott, 2001; Carruthers, 
1995) in the NIS literature. The role of the media in this context was particularly 
striking, making the media now, I believe, an important `actor' at the organisational 
field-level of analysis. The media is a rather powerful player and is something of a 
subtle catalyst in this apparent trend towards conservative tax planning referred to 
above. It may well be the media that is responsible ultimately for a change in the 
attitude (McBarnet, 2001a) of some tax executives to the law, succeeding in a way 
that numerous tax law changes, including the introduction of `super principles' 
(McBarnet, 2001b), have failed in the past. The public, a well-recognised audience of 
legitimacy claims within NIS through its interest in the media, in this context may 
well be having a greater influence on the nature and practice of tax planning than was 
originally considered possible. 
Financial reporting risks, largely resulting from SOX-imposed requirements, are 
evidence of how a company's auditors, who themselves are overseen by and 
accountable to the PCAOB, demonstrate the penetration of significant organisational 
field-level actors on the organising logics (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) of the 
practice and process of tax RM. The PCAOB is an important actor identified in the 
descriptive framework (see Figure 3.1). The general consensus certainly is that SOX 
has given rise to much tension in the various relationships between all levels of 
analysis as depicted in the framework and its success has been received with some 
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scepticism. The reactions to this are ongoing, continuing the dynamics of 
institutionalisation. 
Foreign tax authorities have been clearly identified as important economic and 
political level actors, giving rise to many concerns for US tax executives. There are 
uncertainties around dealing with foreign tax authorities, particularly around the idea 
of foreign authorities copying already unpopular US tax rules and practices. Transfer 
pricing and SOX were highlighted as areas within which mimetic isomorphic 
behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b), often a response to uncertainty, at 
international level, is in evidence or being considered, with associated tax policy 
implications (see Eden et al., 2001 on transfer pricing and Carpenter and Feroz, 2001 
on GAAP). 
6.4 Risk Profile 
All interviewees were asked to describe the tax risk profile of the company. The risk 
profiles, as described by them are summarised in Table 6-1. 
There are clearly some issues around the use of language here. For example, what 
does `conservative', `aggressive' or `cautiously aggressive' mean in this context? 
While a detailed discussion on this matter is beyond the scope of this study, it was 
clear that the interviewees were drawing on the same types of words to describe their 
companies' risk profiles. There appears to be a recognised and accepted vocabulary 
around risk profiles. Using these terms therefore (without a detailed discussion on 
their precise meaning) in this discussion is justified. However, the additional 
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comments on some of the companies' risk positions that follow here do bring some 
clarification to the various meanings. 196 
TE 2 believes it is his company's conservative approach that meant he did not 
(fortunately, according to him) get `on board with some of these ideas that these 
investment bankers brought through years ago and there are a lot of firms, there are a 
lot of companies that have been caught by that'. 197 
Table 6-1 Risk Profiles 
CI Conservative 
C2 Conservative 
C3 Risk averse 
C4 Risk averse? 
C5 Aggressive but not `slimy'? 
C6 Very ethical and pretty risk averse 
C7 Not huge) aggressive 
C8 Conservative 
C9 At 75 on a scale of 0 to 100 
(100 being very aggressive) 
C 10 Not answered directly 
CII Fairly conservative 
C12 On the conservative side 
C 13 Pretty conservative--- 
C14 Conservative 
C15 Cautiously aggressive 
196 Relatedly, whether or not a tax plan is considered aggressive, the distinction between tax avoidance 
and tax evasion remains a critical one in this context. See section 1.3 for a brief reference to this 
distinction. 
197 This interviewee was referring to potentially illegal tax planning ideas, often referred to as `off-the- 
shelf tax plans which have no commercial substance. 
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While the Company Four executives did describe the company's risk profile as `risk 
averse', it was very quickly qualified which might lead one to question the 
appropriateness of the profile descriptor they used: 
We take very aggressive positions but then we get rulings to shore those up. 
So ... when I first came and our prior CFO was here, his attitude was he 
wanted to set the precedents in Europe, in other countries, not get stuck 
behind a bad precedent from another country. (TE 7) 
I then asked if they actually set out to be a leader in that sense to which he replied, 
`Yes, from day one, back in July of 1999'. So `risk averse' for this company 
incorporates what they consider to be `aggressive' tax plans but ones for which they 
have sought rulings on, which, I assume, no longer makes them aggressive. Not all 
interviewees might agree with this interpretation of `risk averse'. TE 10 was keen to 
point out: `to be really frank we're a very conservative company with the highest 
business ethics on the face of the earth'. 
TE 8 was happy to describe his company's profile as aggressive but was very anxious 
to distinguish that from being `slimy'. They did not do `very aggressive 
transactions.. . when everyone was accused of 
doing particularly aggressive 
transactions and we also haven't swung to the other side'. He did add that they do 
not: 
Shy away from doing sophisticated tax planning and in fact my strategy on 
credibility with government authorities and I think they would still tell you 
that [his company] is an aggressive, I use the word now, [his company] is 
doing tax planning, they know that and when they look at that they say hey 
that's pretty clever but it's never slimy. 
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So does this align sophisticated tax planning with aggressiveness? These are difficult 
distinctions to make without clear definitions and examples. Importantly, the 
reference here to RM in the context of having a `strategy on credibility with 
government authorities' highlights the facts that such a `relationship' exists between 
these companies (through their tax executives) and government authorities and that 
importance is attached to it. Chapter Seven addresses the nature of this relationship 
and its wider theoretical implications. 
While, for the most part, the interviewees referred to their companies' profiles, there 
was also evidence to suggest that the head of tax brings his/her own personal profile 
to the table and essentially only stays with a company that has an overall risk 
culture/profile that matches his. For example, TE 14, who said his company's profile 
was conservative, added that he has been pretty conservative throughout his entire 
career. He gave the clear impression that he simply would not choose, or certainly 
would not stay in, a company whose tax profile was aggressive (in his eyes). 
Therefore, some people `pick' the risk culture that suits them and others try to create 
or influence a culture towards the one that suits them. The conservative approach 
taken at his company was also explained in terms of its size and therefore the cost of 
a mistake: 198 
I take a risk with [my company] and it could cost more money than this 
company would want to spend on a mistake and [another named much larger 
SV company] might go out and attempt to be more aggressive. [My 
company's] gross revenue is five days worth of sales for [the other named 
company], so that is a size perspective and... a two million dollar mistake in 
198 There is some evidence therefore to suggest that there is a relationship between company size and 
aggressiveness, but the full nature of this relationship is difficult to ascertain. 
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[the other named company] is rounding whereas a two million dollar mistake 
at [my company], I'm fired. Big difference. (TE 14) 
Interestingly, TE 15 introduced a numeric scale to describe the company's tax risk 
profile: 
I don't think its tax conservative.. .1 would say you know if you're from zero 
to 100 and there's the aggressive and ... the middle of the road is 50, we're at 
75... when the guy comes in and talks about you know `I really want to use 
Cayman Islands' with some particular sort of structure with zero tax and ... 
two guys and a mailbox. I don't think that's the type of thing this company 
would fund, whereas some companies might be very excited and willing to do 
that. 
While the use of such a scale brings some clarity to a company's risk profile, I think 
there are still issues around defining what different points on the scale really mean 
without more concrete examples. Understandably, the interviewees were not prepared 
to go into more details on the exact transactions they were entering into and the tax 
risks attaching to them. 
TE 24 provided some explanation of the term `cautiously aggressive'. Within the 
constraints of the law this company will `operate to whatever tax benefit we think we 
should. So we don't give anything away but we don't stretch'. Is he an advocate of 
the `letter of the law' approach but also applies the `smell test'? Company Eleven's 
conservative approach comes from the top levels of management who are `very 
conservative' and don't want to see [the company's] name `in a bad way on the front 
page of the Wall Street Journal' (TE 19) (see section 6.3 on the impact of the media). 
They have not gone with some of the tax planning techniques they have been 
approached with over the years, `we just can't get beyond the look of the smoke and 
mirrors thing'. 
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TE 21's comment demonstrates well the difficulty around the use of language in this 
context: 
I think that it would be more on the conservative side than the aggressive side 
in that you know if we can come up with good tax plans ... we'd need to be 
sure that they're pretty water tight before we'd push the boat out. 
To `push the boat out' could, but need not necessarily, be aligned with tax 
aggressiveness, which may question the appropriateness of using the term `on the 
conservative side'. 
The above statements show that these individuals consider their risk profile to be 
mostly conservative, with a limited number of responses moving into the `cautiously' 
or moderately aggressive classification. They were all very keen to distance 
themselves from non-commercially-based tax planning activities. It would be 
interesting to have somebody else classify the tax risk profiles of these companies, for 
example the IRS, the auditors or tax advisors. Advisor 3's comment generally on 
what he believed is the stereotypical profile of `tax people' arguably supports the risk 
profile descriptions revealed in this study. They `tend to be more analytical than your 
average Joe, so I would think if we threw a dart at the general public, the average 
person would be more seat of the pants than your average tax person'. 
These findings address Maydew's (2001) call for understanding differences in levels 
of aggressiveness in tax planning among firms. Some understanding has been 
provided here, for example as to why some companies chose to be `leaders' (Dillard 
et al., 2004), as opposed to `late adopters' in terms of implementing innovative - or 
what might be considered `aggressive' - tax-based structures (albeit on the back of 
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an advance ruling). They consider it in their best interest to set the precedent rather 
than taking the risk that someone else may set a precedent that doesn't suit them, a 
`bad' precedent from their perspective. 199 These SV-based companies also find 
themselves in a particular situation where the products and business environments are 
changing rapidly and some companies simply do not have the time to wait for others 
to pursue certain tax-based structures first. In that sense these `leaders' chose to 
manage their own destiny. The influence of the media (an important organisational 
field-level actor) was again evident here as a driver of risk profile. The personal risk 
profiles of the tax executives themselves also play a role. There is evidence that `tax 
risk clienteles' exist whereby if tax executives do not agree with their companies' 
appetite for risk, they either align themselves with it or move on to another company 
whose appetite for risk matches their own. While many of the companies in this study 
could be categorised as `growth companies', there was no evidence to suggest that 
such companies would be less aggressive (Shackleford and Shevlin, 2001). 
6.5 Mechanisms of Tax Risk Management 
A range of mechanisms, practices and processes (identified in italics in this section) 
are employed by tax executives in these MNCs to assist them in managing the various 
tax risks discussed in the previous section. These are summarised in Figure 6-2. Some 
companies seek advance rulings from the Revenue Authorities (more popular 
apparently outside of the US, as securing them in the US seems to be a relatively 
19 Where there is ambiguity about the legitimacy of a particular tax based structure, once the Revenue 
Authorities give their approval, typically that becomes a precedent to be followed or adopted `safely' 
by other companies and therefore without much risk attached. 
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lengthy process). TE 7 told of how they took this approach in some large EU 
countries when they took positions which they described as `contrary to what we call 
"brick and mortar" positions' and used these rulings as their defence in the smaller 
countries. They were adamant that they `led the charge in Europe' on some issues and 
had companies like Google, and PWC/Deloitte partners calling them `to kind of, like, 
nose around the edges of what we were doing and how we did it'. 200 TE 3 enters 
advance pricing agreements (APAs) with respect to TP in foreign jurisdictions. 
Advance Rulings 
Financial Modelling! 
Cost Studies 
ý---º External Advisors 
Formal Opinions 
Risk Management 
Mechanisms/Processes 
ý 
Documenting 
Cost Studies 
Audit Committee I 
Board Meetings 
"Follow the Leader" 
Engagement Letters 
"Smell Test' 
Figure 6-2 Risk Management Mechanisms 
TE 14 referred to engaging in financial modelling and obtaining advice from external 
advisors. Advisor 1 spoke of the tension between the tax advisor and the client with 
200 This describes well how the organisational field works and how tax plans are diffused. 
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respect to risk management. At times the client just wants an informal opinion but 
sometimes they want an `insurance bond'. These formal opinions constitute part of 
RM practices for some companies whom the client `would intend to rely on if things 
went wrong and relying on the professional indemnity cover that Big Five or Big 
Four firms have' (Advisor 1). Unsurprisingly, Advisor 2 also mentioned this but 
thought the clients wouldn't like to admit it: 
It's almost like an insurance policy, getting a sign-off by one of the Big Four. 
In terms of their risk management, it means that they have done their due 
dilikence and PWC has signed off on it, or KPMG or whoever. 
TE 25 referred to internal culture and personalities within the organisation driving 
this need to have back-up from an external advisor. It is perhaps to do with: 
The conservative nature of the people who are here now, part of it is because 
of the pain the company had to go through to fix the things that didn't happen 
years ago, that this is never going to happen again. So we have kind of gone 
from one extreme to the other. 201 
TE 6 spoke of the importance of documenting everything `so that we're not caught 
unawares if we are on an audit and we have to go back and ... fill in the gaps'. SOX 
requires all controls and procedures to be documented and tested and TE 6 portrayed 
this as a good thing arising from SOX. Being SOX compliant amounts in part to RM 
in practice. TE 12 referred to having cost studies to mitigate risks where the concern 
is not so much with audit but with saving the company from penalties. He needs to be 
able to show that he used some due diligence on rates and percentages used 202 
Company Nine executives referred to their meetings with the Audit Committee to 
201 This point is also connected with this company's overall approach to RM and its efforts towards a 
strategic alignment of tax. 
202 While needing to `show' that some RM processes are carried out is important, the quality of such 
processes is less clear. 
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establish their position on risk and agree the various risks to be assessed when 
considering tax plans. TE 24 has also recently presented to its Audit Committee on 
RM, as this committee had heard that tax was putting various processes and 
procedures in place. 203 Once in place, this company will engage in Enterprise Risk 
Analysis. SOX has to be given credit, he believes, for driving all of this. He 
emphasised however, that these new procedures will not really change things. 
Perhaps this exposure to the Audit Committee is a good thing for tax, presenting 
opportunities and helping to push tax up the corporate agenda. Only a small number 
of interviewees referred to going to the Board itself on RM within tax. The need for 
this seems to revolve around the amount of money involved, with TE 22 going to the 
Board `for large dollar amounts', maintaining risk and quantum go hand in hand. 
One tax executive stated that part of his organisation's RM strategy is to follow the 
leader. 204 He referred to a small number of large SV-based companies that are 
considered leaders ('innovators' per Dillard et at. 2004) which have `implemented 
everything that other companies want to implement'. (TE 14) TE 21 deals with cost 
and legal risk by getting Engagement Letters from the service provider, which cover 
the cost and the scope of the project. 
Despite having formal mechanisms in place to facilitate dealing with risk, 
interviewees referred to the continuing need to apply `judgement', which amounts in 
203 Practices like this one would constitute `good practice' in accordance with the HMRC's and 
KPMG's (2005) recommendations towards putting tax on the boardroom agenda - see footnote 22. 204 Mimetic isomorphism. 
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many cases to applying the `smell test' (TE 3 and Advisor 1) when dealing with 
uncertainties around the interpretation of tax laws. This is inextricably linked with 
debate around abiding by the letter of the law versus the spirit of the law (McBarnet, 
2001b; Porter, 1999a). Interestingly, Advisor 1 described essentially a pecking order 
of approaches to this. The preferred solution is one that: 
Meets the client's requirements, that is, within both the purpose and the word 
of the legislation because it is less likely to be seen as aggressive and less 
likely to find disfavour amongst the Revenue Commissioners in whatever 
jurisdiction. 
The next level solution could leave one more exposed, with a reliance on a technical 
interpretation of the law, perhaps involving `contriving' a situation to bring oneself 
within this technical interpretation, which is at odds with the purpose of the law. The 
exposure here would be to the possibility of actions against the taxpayer under anti- 
avoidance legislation (specific or GAAR in some countries). 
The evidence indicates there is a wide range of mechanisms and processes employed 
in MNCs to manage tax risk. These range from seeking opinions from external 
advisors 205 (a `guarded opinion' perhaps as per Hoffman (1961)) recognised as actors 
in the organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b), to applying a `smell test' 
or perhaps as noted earlier, assessing the `atmospherics' of the situation. Some 
interviewees referred to `followers' and `leaders' in this context (Dillard et al., 2004) 
providing general support for PWC's (2001) position that competitors have a 
significant influence on acceptable risk and RM processes, which lends itself clearly 
205 See McBarnet (1991) on the practice of `opinion-shopping' with a view to securing the opinion one 
wants. 
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to institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). Despite employing the 
various processes and mechanisms referred to here, it was difficult to ascertain 
whether such `rational' processes are more about the way RM is presented to the 
outside world as opposed to actually reflecting the practice of RM (Carruthers, 1995). 
In this case they may best be described as loosely-coupled systems which relate to the 
different environments in which the tax executives operate (Scott, 2001). 206 Many of 
the interviewees would argue that RM per se has not changed, but is just documented 
better now. Perhaps it is a little too soon to comment on whether such documentation 
is mythical (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). In any case I suggest the `smell test' may 
often best account for (although not articulate nor explain) how a decision is made in 
an area involving tax risk. 
6.6 Formalisation of Tax Risk Management 
All of the interviewees clearly recognised the importance of tax RM, particularly in 
the increasingly regulated post-Enron environment in which they operate, however, 
rather surprisingly none of the companies have a formalised, documented tax RM 
strategy or policy in place. Only one spoke of a corporate-wide RM formalised 
policy, with which tax is aligned, being in place. Despite this, all interviewees felt 
that they have an understanding of the risk profile of the company, and all but one 
could state what that profile is (see section 6.4). For TE 3, RM is simply `set really by 
the tone of the CFO'. Advisor 1 also attached significance to this: 
The tone at the top is always an important factor... if the tone at the top is 
compliant then it is less likely generally that you are going to find non- 
206 These environments include auditors, shareholders, general public etc. 
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compliance down below. If the tone at the top is to have an absolute focus on 
minimising cash tax, then it is clearly more likely that certain compliance 
issues and that certain aggressive stances are going to be taken and less likely 
that directors will be able to sign off on. 
This has significant implications for SOX compliance which requires such sign-offs. 
TE 2 admitted not having a RM policy but added: `you are making me think a lot, 
maybe we should'. TE 9 is comfortable with not having a formalised written up RM 
policy: 
We may not have a written policy, but we certainly talk about that a lot and 
we know how we think about it, we talk about what kinds of aggressive tax 
things we don't want to do and why we might not want to do them. 
TE 10 referred to having controls in place around reviews and compliance as opposed 
to having a documented RM policy. Interestingly he told of a recent conference at 
which he spoke on tax RM and recalled how far off [his company's] view was from 
the company represented by the other speaker. His company's goal is to file correct 
tax returns and have no tax audit adjustments. The other company's view on the tax 
return filed is that it is `the opening offer to the IRS', and the final position is for 
negotiation. The other speaker thought this interviewee was out of his mind. This is 
arguably further evidence of tax risk clienteles of which policy makers should be 
aware. 
Some of the companies just did not see a need to have a formally documented tax RM 
policy. In TE 18's view it would be very difficult to have one. `I think what happens 
is it gets measured by our reserves. ' Company Thirteen does not have a formal RM 
policy in place, nor do its tax executives know of an overall corporate RM policy 
being in place. However, there is a checklist of questions they go through which 
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reflects their RM approach and has probably developed over time through experience. 
These questions are: 
How is it going to show up in the financial statements? How is it going to 
show up on a tax return? How is it going to look for tax accounting purposes? 
... what kind of documentation are we going to 
have? What advisors are we 
going to have to talk to? What opinions are we going to have to get? What 
issues are being raised here?... is it manageable risk? Is it just, a matter of... we 
pay a little more in taxes if they decide to do this or is it something that is 
going to create a bigger issue down the line for us? TE 22 
Exceptionally, as previously noted, Company Fourteen has an overall company risk 
policy with which tax aligns itself, which basically indicates that the company will 
not violate any country laws, will engage in responsible reporting and so forth. 
Contrary to PWC's (2001) recommendations, these findings suggest that companies 
have not formalised their tax RM policies. Importantly however, all of the 
interviewees do perceive themselves as engaging in tax RM through various 
mechanisms (see section 6.5), but do not see the need for having a documented, 
formalised tax RM policy in place. They cannot be charged therefore with any 
decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) in that regard. The CFO, through his role in 
setting the tone in terms of a company's approach to tax RM (albeit evidently not 
through formalisation of a tax RM policy), was clearly reinforced here as an actor 
within the tax arena with significant power, the exercise of which is itself an avenue 
of institutional reproduction (Powell, 1991). 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the key findings in relation to Research 
Question Three and its associated objectives. Tax RM is clearly important to these 
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MNCs and their in-house tax executives. This importance is driven in part by the 
recent increased attention being given to tax by Management generally (CFO, Board 
of Directors etc. ). This latter, in turn, is in response to the increasingly regulated post- 
Enron environment within which these MNCs are operating, together with the 
associated media attention. Continuing uncertainties around some tax laws however 
ensure a continued need to address tax RM. Overall, the evidence suggests a trend 
towards a more conservative approach to tax planning generally being adopted by 
these MNCs. There was a strong message from the interviewees on the importance of 
the perception around the practice and processes on RM. The interviewees identified 
specific technical-type areas of risk (ranging from transfer pricing to mergers and 
acquisitions) as well as non-technical areas (ranging from reputational to tax in 
foreign countries) that need to be managed. Interviewees described the risk profile of 
their companies as mostly conservative, with a limited number of responses moving 
into the `cautiously' or moderately aggressive classification. The CFO was identified 
as a key influencer of a company's tax risk profile, and some tax executives choose 
companies who share their own personal philosophy on risk and RM. 
In the rapidly changing business environment within which these MNCs operate, 
some interviewees have chosen to be `leaders' or `innovators' of tax planning ideas 
(albeit subject to advance rulings in some cases), not having time to wait for others to 
set the precedents. Different mechanisms of RM are employed by the interviewees, 
ranging from obtaining advance rulings to the engagement of external advisors. 
Applying the `smell test' and assessing the `atmospherics' of the situation however 
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remain important less formal RM mechanisms that are in place. Notwithstanding the 
importance of tax RM to the interviewees, they do not have a formally documented 
tax RM policy in place and do not perceive such formalisation as important or 
necessary. 
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7 Tax Planning and the External Environment 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings in relation to the fourth research 
question. Research Question Four states: What is the nature and impact of the 
relationship between the tax planning functions within MNCs and the external 
environment? (See section 3.2 for associated objectives). 
Section 7.2 identifies key actors in the economic, political and organisational field 
levels of analysis as depicted in the descriptive framework presented in Figure 3.1. 
These actors are present in the external environment within which in-house tax 
executives engage in the practice and process of tax planning. Section 7.2.1 deals 
specifically with the work of professional institutes/organisations and their interaction 
with in-house tax executives. Section 7.2.2 outlines the `relationship' between the 
Revenue Authorities and in-house tax executives, while section 7.2.3 addresses other 
external influences on in-house tax executives. Section 7.3 addresses the extent to 
which the MNCs invest in external affairs and direct lobbying with respect to tax 
legislation. 
7.2 Actors in the External Environment 
This section presents the findings relating to the members and actors of the economic, 
political, and the organisational field levels of analysis as depicted in the descriptive 
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framework in Figure 3.1. It was considered very important to describe this wider tax 
arena, as perceived by the interviewees, who are themselves important actors at the 
organisational level, before going on to examine the nature, and impact of the 
relationship between the tax planning functions within MNCs and the external 
environment. 
There was significant consensus as to a number of key members/actors of the external 
environment: professional institutes/organisations, Revenue Authorities, media, peer 
companies, the European Union (EU), auditors, tax advisors, the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and Congress, as discussed below. 
7.2.1 Professional Institutes/Organisations 
These findings suggest the interviewees are themselves members of an extremely 
well organised professional world. In comparison to the situation in Ireland, for 
example, TE 26 commented: `At US level the whole tax professional world is a much 
more structured, organised world'. Appendix 6 lists the various professional institutes 
referred to by the interviewees. The interviewees and/or some of their tax team 
executives are members of these organisations. The appendix contains a brief 
description of the raison d'etre of these organisations as per the organisation's 
website (where one exists). These institutes are important actors at the organisational 
field level of analysis. A number of these organisations/institutes were discussed in 
some detail in the interviews and the principal findings of which are summarised 
below. 
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It was clear from the interviews that the tax executives of the MNCs, with one 
exception interact at significant levels with professional institutes such as the Tax 
Executives Institute (TEI), the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and so 
forth. Some of the interviewees are more actively involved than others in the running 
and agenda setting of these institutes. 207 The institutes vary in terms of their impact 
on the practice and process of tax planning in the MNCs in this study. It emerged 
throughout the interviews however that there are a number of key roles provided by 
these institutes. The interactions between the tax executives, the institutes, and the 
economic and political level actors (e. g. IRS, Congress) arguably impact significantly 
on the practice and process of tax planning in the MNCs, and on tax policy within and 
outside of the US. These roles/interactions, as supported by the raison d'etre of these 
organisations, (see Appendix 6)208 revolve around the provision of continuing tax 
education, networking opportunities, lobbying or business advocacy work, research 
and an array of avenues which facilitate the sharing of information among the tax 
community in SV, all of which are discussed below. 
In relation to education, the TEI was recognised by many of the interviewees as a 
particularly excellent provider of tax education in a `continuing education process' 
(TE 3), through its `highly informative' (TE 5) and very well attended seminars. TE 
207 For example, in relation to the TEI, some of the interviewees are or have been president of the SV 
Chapter and some are Board members. One interviewee is the former head of the international TEL 
organisation. 
208 For example, `open dialogue regarding tax policy', `exchange of ideas with government tax 
officials', `sharing', 'networking programs', lobbying governments' are all phrases used to describe 
what these institutes do and facilitate. 
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6 finds it `fantastic' for technical updates. TE 3 believes the SV TEI chapter `is 
probably more active than any other one in the country'. 209 TE 11 agreed: 
We have probably the most active chapter in the country. We will get 
anywhere from 125 to 200 people to our seminars. A lot of those are on the 
international area because a lot of the companies here are US exporters so 
they've got a lot of outbound international. 
Rather interestingly, TE 19 added, `it's interesting to see, just by how many people 
attend, how hot a topic is'. TE 14 recognised the quality of the seminars. `And its 
good technical stuff... we get a high tech tax update monthly.. . from a local 
perspective, it's great'. 
Attendance at the educational seminars and conferences hosted by the various 
institutes facilitate networking. TE 7, on attending TEI seminars commented, `it is 
good for networking just because you're seen, the people in... the Valley here are 
going to go to those'. 
TE 8 posits such networking can even result in obtaining cheap tax advice: 
We go to the conferences and I think it's nice, very helpful to know other tax 
people, they will give you their tax ideas free as compared to the firms that 
will charge you for them. So I think we get as many ideas from other tax 
payers and so we are big on the Tax Executives Institute. 
Other tax executives referred to the seminars providing, `an opportunity to meet and 
we get hot items, hot issues are always discussed'. (TE 14) 
209 The TEI has various chapters around the US. The interviewees attend the SV/Santa Clara chapter 
seminars. TEI has more recently put in place chapters in Europe and Asia. 
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A place where people can interact and network and establish relationships 
where they can pick up the telephone and call somebody or just at these 
seminars because they see each other once or twice a month on this stuff. 
(TE 3) 
A small number of the interviewees, despite recognising some potential benefits of 
networking, did not themselves network very much for different reasons. TE 24's 
explanation is interesting (particularly considering an NIS perspective): 
I think TEI has got value because you meet a lot of people and knowing 
people is helpful... I've met a lot of people over the years and it's good, you 
know, if you have somebody you know well and you can call. Unfortunately 
the people I know are all retired or are retiring and so I've lost, I'm losing my 
base rapidly. 
TE 20's explanation revolves around time pressure when attending a seminar and 
personality: 
I personally am not good about it because if it's a half day seminar I am 
usually anxious to get back here and get back to work and I don't really have 
time for the networking... .1 personally 
don't take as much advantage of it as I 
should...! think some people are better at that just personality wise. 
Similarly, TE 2 explained: 
You're going to think I am anti-social. I really don't network very much ... I 
can see in certain situations I have gone out and talked to other tax directors in 
the Valley to see what their groups are doing on a certain issue, how do you 
address X, Y and Z. But generally speaking, I go to these seminars, I don't run 
around trying to meet other people, don't do that kind of day-to-day 
benchmarking or discussion. I know that other people in our department are 
very active in that and I see the benefit of it but again it's just not something 
that I do. 
There was evidence to suggest a significant level of networking activity generally 
between the tax executives in SV and beyond, outside of the more formal fora 
provided through attendance at seminars and conferences, resulting perhaps in 
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`networks of power' with important implications. TE 11 referred to his VP Tax being 
`fairly well known in the tax circles'. He described a key player in the High Tech Tax 
Institute as `a real mover and shaker in the tax community'. TE 18 described the tax 
community in SV as being `a very robust tax community, very, very'. TE 12 referred 
to using a `private network' when researching the best tax plans and structures 
sometimes shying away from formally engaging external advisors. Advisor 2's 
comment is particularly insightful in the SV context: 
In the US what does surprise me is, particularly within an industry and here 
we are talking about technology... people within the industry tend to talk to 
each other, so they would all know each other,... they move around as well 
which is why they all know each other. 
TE 18 referred to the existence of `clubs, social clubs with the head of tax in those 
companies to find out what's going on over there'. Interestingly TE 20 suggests 
networking is part of the job: 
As a tax director or VP of tax or whatever you are, in that position, you are 
much more visible and you are really looked at as knowing what is going on 
within the industry ... if one CFO talks to another 
CFO from another company 
and that CFO says, `oh yes our tax group did this, this and this'... If the CFO 
comes and says "well why didn't you implement this planning idea? "... You 
say, "`I guess I didn't know about it"'. So, you need to know and I think more 
and more so especially with Sarbanes Oxley, you need to be... much more in 
touch with what the business is doing, certainly within the company but also 
relative to, I think, to the rest of the industry, what other companies are doing, 
because you are really responsible for all of that (sic). 
Similarly, TE 18 when referring to CFO roundtables emphasised the need to: 
Keep your fingers on the pulse of those guys... so you know what's being said 
out there so you know how to react. You also know if you find out who, 
which Boards your CFO sits on in other companies because... whatever 
happens over there it'll come right back. 
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The benefit of networking was addressed by TE 22: 
It gives an idea of what other companies are doing and you know one tax 
director said `I'm not a very good tax director in that I don't come up with 
very many ideas on my own... but I'm very good at using other people's 
ideas'. And I think that's a lot of us you know(sic) ... What are you doing? What works? What doesn't work, you know? 
Notably, he went on to express his desire to keep some tax plans out of the network, 
`... sometimes you wish they wouldn't take it public but you know because it's a good 
idea and you don't want anybody to know about it'. (TE 22)210 TE 16 described the 
workings of a rather elitist network of tax experts: 
We're on a number of tax mailing lists where tax, leaders of tax groups 
communicate. So, if there's an issue that you know one big company has 
come out with they sort of hop it out and it goes to the top tax guys at big 
companies.. . so there is a fair amount of communication among the Tax Directors sort of circuit as to, you know, current issues that are going on. 
In relation to lobbying or `advocacy work' (TE 11), some interviewees felt the TEI's 
contribution was more around education and networking than lobbying: 211 
Is it moving items? No, I would say that more where you see policies being 
set instead of procedures is like more of the Tax Directors' Group... TEI only 
effects change when there's major pronouncements that are coming down and 
they will speak to those pronouncements and they'll give out their opinion on 
something. 
TE 13 did however applaud the TEI's `very masterful writers who will write up on 
behalf of the Institute and submit that to the IRS or submit that to the Congress'. TE 
14 described the TEI from a national perspective as: 
A watchdog for all of us. When legislation is coming out they have a board of 
advisors and they're reviewing the proposed legislation... They will, as an 
organization, say `We with all of our thousands of members across the 
country, this is how we view this particular issue'. 
210 When I was in practice there was always this balance on some tax plans between telling clients but 
perhaps not too many and not the `wrong' ones. 
21'Lobbying seems to be conducted at a national organisation level as opposed to chapter levels within 
the TEI. 
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Lobbying is at the forefront of the Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group (SVTDG) 
activities. Its relatively high annual membership fee of $10,000 is to cover its 
lobbying activities: 212 
It's the lobby fees. They're not trying to make money. What they're having to 
do is pay the person in Washington DC that will take their lobby message to 
whoever it needs to go to... they represent some huge companies and 
Washington listens to huge companies. (TE 14) 
TE 3 explained how this group operates to satisfy all members in this context: 
There are certain issues that are important for some people, other issues for 
the others and we were all pretty much equals in that process. So we put 
together a set of recommendations, we were very good about being equal. We 
do a great job. 
When asked whether they manage to always have a single voice on things, he replied, 
`I think it's in part because we like and we respect each other and we just always have 
operated that way'. I got the impression that many of these people are `friends' as 
well as tax colleagues and these friendships go back a long way. One interviewee 
however was not so content with the relevance level of issues being addressed by this 
group for his company: 
A lot of small companies in that group... It's not like there is something wrong 
with them but I find... I have the same issues in a lot of cases that General 
Motors and Ford have. So therefore I care more about being in a big company 
group in a lot of cases. (TE 8) 
TE 16 referred to the important lobbying avenue of the US India Business Council, 
which he said is coordinated with the US Chamber of Commerce. He has been going 
to meetings (in his capacity as a member) with various tax authorities and Indian 
212 TEI annual membership costs only $200. 
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foreign dignitaries raising concerns about US business issues. Through this forum he 
gets to meet US-based executives from non-US development offices (e. g. Ireland's 
Industrial Development Authority). 13 
In relation to the sharing of information between tax executives from different 
companies, TE 18 posited `there's an awful lot of sharing. I mean we really are in a 
lot of this together'. TE 19 referred to a certain amount of concern around `what's 
everybody else doing and what is the current thinking and we get that through 
different seminars and different groups that we belong to'. Advisor 3 believes the 
TEI is `very influential... it is the professional organisation for in-house tax people. 
So it is a very useful forum for in-house people to share information. ' The SVTDG 
facilitates the sharing of information in a more focused and relevant way as it has 
only 38 members from the largest companies in SV, and all facing many of the same 
issues: 
If you've got $500 million in sales you know you don't have time, you don't 
have the resources and your issues generally aren't as complex. So you're 
really looking at companies like, you know, $1 billion and plus or $2 billion 
and plus. Well there's probably only 30 of those... The guy at a start-up he's 
got different problems you know. He's trying to figure out how to file his tax 
returns ... to make sure he meets payroll and... 
if you had the top 30 Silicon 
Valley companies involved, if you had [named four large SV based 
companies].. . well you know as you get 
further down their issues are just you 
know, it's just there isn't as much to share. (TE 17) 
According to TE 3, the SVTDG gets together once a month and: 
Shares problems, concerns.. . and that 
is where a lot of sharing takes place. 
There are competitors in that group and one guy in particular who I have 
213 This has broader inward investment policy implications for countries such as Ireland i. e. 
strategising by physically placing your inward development promotions staff within the cluster. The 
latter is beyond the scope of this study. 
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known for years is good about calling and asking what have you done in 
France for example on this particular issue. 
He did mention however that some companies are not as forthcoming as others in the 
group. Manufacturers Alliance (MAPI) was specifically identified as being really 
effective for sharing information among tax executives: 
It's one of the best I've ever seen at a relatively low cost... and what you do is 
you can just send an email out and there's this list that goes out to the MAPI 
tax list and it shoots out to the 200 people that belong across the country and 
which are the tax directors... and you send this email out with a question, what 
are you guys doing about this? And boom! In 30 minutes you get back 50 
replies. `Here's what I'm doing'. (TE 3) 
The High Technology Tax Institute based at San Jose State University appears to be a 
very impressive working model facilitating education, networking and sharing of 
information, and rather exceptionally engages academics with practice. It appears to 
be a very well respected forum in SV, with many of the interviewees having 
presented at its conferences and sitting on its advisory board. `It's... really... very 
good and because it's here's in Silicon Valley it doesn't cost very much money'. (TE 
16) 
There was a definite sense throughout the interviews that the extent of sharing of 
information that goes on in SV is particular to tax. TE 9 addressed how this sharing 
of information works between competitor companies: 
It even surprises me sometimes. There is even some degree of information 
sharing, shall we say, between obvious competitors... if hypothetically... [a 
named company] has a good idea, it doesn't necessarily hurt them if we take it 
but if they are getting something in return ... most of the information sharing 
would tend to be let's say within a [named company]. For example, I have 
known the people at [that company] and [our Sr. VP Tax] has known the tax 
people at [that company] for twenty years or more.. . there is a lot of history 
there and there is a lot that we can share.. . there can be sensitivities there 
280 
Tax Planning and the External Environment 
because we are a customer of them and sometimes the business relationships 
between a company like [our company] and [their company] or a [another 
named company] for example, major suppliers to [our company], can be, there 
can be real tensions in those relationships about contracts and prices and stuff 
like that. But we seem to be able to put that aside generally on the tax side. 
TE 5 emphasised caution around sharing information with competitors. `There is a 
limit to how far you can go... it's touchy, you have to be careful.. . you can't talk about 
pricing at all, no pricing, no market shares, any of that kind of stuff. ' 
Some interviewees, who according to them, are perceived as leaders felt others are 
more interested in them than the other way about, suggesting the sharing of 
information does not necessarily operate in both directions to equal benefit: `[Our 
company] can be very arrogant but you know a lot of times people want to know what 
we're doing'(TE 11). One interviewee referred to a fair amount of communication 
taking place among the tax directors as a, `sort of circuit... periodically I see an email 
coming my way.. . from some other tax 
director who has popped this out and says an 
agent is asking this question about this, you know ... has anyone seen that? ' (TE 17) 
Some companies look to take the lead from other companies when deciding on 
whether to pursue a particular tax plan: 
There was dozens of times in the process of putting [the Irish structure] in 
place that the question would be `Is this/has this been done by other 
companies or are we the first out of the box? ' I am not, for a company the size 
of .... I am not at a risk taking position. 
(TE 14) 
Likewise TE 12 in this context said, `We do look at, we do talk with other companies 
in similar situations for ideas on how they approach a problem'. On peer company 
influence TE 1 said: 
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Well, there is probably some influence because we do on certain issues we'll 
go out and benchmark. So if we are trying to figure out what we are going to 
do in a certain area ... we may call up some people we know at other 
companies, on an informal basis, nothing formal, but not a formal study like 
you would do a sort of more scientific study, call up two or three people at 
other companies and say, `Hey, what are you doing about this issue? '. And 
that might have some influence on the decision that we make ... I think it is a 
relatively small tax community here in Silicon Valley and I think we are 
always keeping an eye on what other companies are doing and I think it does 
have an influence on decisions. 
TE 3 provided an explanation of the willingness to share information: 
Maybe various influences on that, one of which is that we are by ourselves in 
the corporation and so there is not much sharing other than what we have 
here. So we have TEI, we have the Silicone Valley's Tax Directors Group. I 
look at the operations accounting guys and they have issues across divisions, 
so they share on divisional issues but for us we can't share with anybody other 
than people on the outside. 
His colleague added `our engineers for example wouldn't fraternise with competitors' 
engineers like the tax people'. The first colleague (TE 3) did add however, `We don't 
advertise that so if the CFO knew that we talked to our colleagues, but that's too bad'. 
TE 8 provided some explanation also: 
It is so much fun to... I think tax people just like to talk about their tax 
stuff... and I know the rest of finance doesn't do this... I don't know what it is 
but tax people have always loved that stuff. 
Very importantly, some of the interviewees are very prominent active members of the 
institutes. TE 9, when speaking of his company's tax executives' involvement said, `I 
think you would be hard put to find another company, except possibly for [a named 
company], that has been consistently more involved and played a prominent 
leadership role in TEI'. 214 
214 Makes them well positioned to drive agendas around education and lobbying and are therefore 
`powerful'. 
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Apart from his company's involvement in the TEI and SVTDG, TE 8 added: 
We are big on MAPI ... has three tax councils and we have two people, myself 
and someone else who is active in that... one of my people is vice chair of the 
National Association of Manufacturers Tax Committee. We somewhat play in 
the National Foreign Trade Council, all the trade associations, The American 
Electronics Association, the ITAA which is a computer manufacturers 
association, we are on their tax committees. In the state of California... Cal 
Tax is big... we are on their tax and we try to do the same thing in other 
countries too, that's only more recently and the Tax Executives Institutes now 
has a chapter in Europe and one in Asia and we are very active in those. 
TE 8's company (through its tax executives) is well positioned to exercise some form 
of influence over tax policy development and the development of practices and 
processes within in-house tax departments generally in SV. It's a similar story with 
TE 10: 
We belong to, we believe in being very proactive, changing laws, getting 
things to go our way so we are very externally focused. We belong to an 
enormous number of organisations. We run a lot of organisations and we do a 
lot of work to make it that, you know, [our company's] agenda gets to the 
right places. We do an enormous amount of that in the US, we do some of that 
overseas also to a certain degree ... I'm a member of the Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group. I'm on the board of our local Tax Executive Institute 
Chapter. I'm a member of the American Electronics Association Tax 
Committee which sits here, the SIA Tax Committee which sits here, all of 
those. And then a bunch of organisations in DC and other study groups... I'm 
on the Board of San Jose State's Hi-Tech. 
He went on to describe his relationship with FASB to reflect the extent of how 
externally focused [his company] is: 
There's a guy named Donald Thomas from the FASB, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, who is writing... certain tax position papers, for 
the FASB on how they're going to change all of their accounting and 
everything. We're on his speed dial. We get all his copies before they go 
anywhere and he calls us for, you know, opinions all the time. He comes out 
and visits us too. So, that's the kind of stuff we encourage, we want to help. 
(TE 10) 
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TE 23's story about another SV tax executive's motive for involvement in 
representative organisations is equally insightful: 215 
I had a friend, I wouldn't say he's a good friend, I'm just giving you an idea. I 
had a friend who was a Tax Director of a company here, a very large 
company, and you know he gets asked to join a number of organisations and 
it's a company that is you know quite aggressive in tax planning and 
... somebody I remember asked him `you 
know, how do you decide which 
organisations you know you will be, you will join or you'll be active in? ' He 
says, "I don't join an organisation unless I can control it". He says "`Well, I'm 
not interested in just being a member of an organisation, I want an 
organisation that I can influence to represent the best interest of my 
company"' and that's probably not an isolated viewpoint. So, you know where 
you think there's this so called supportive tax community, there are a number 
of people who are that way but there are a number of organisations who are 
participating.. . solely for the purpose of advancing their own company. 
Perhaps importantly, seven of the 38 members of the SVTDG were among my 
interviewees and four other companies from which I had interviewees, have company 
colleagues as members. TE 10's perspective on his staff getting involved with 
professional institutes is `I push my people to do that'. In some contrast however, TE 
24 chose over the years not to be active within the institutes. He believes you have 
got to look at where you want to spend your time and for him it was never on TEI 
work. Interestingly, but not at all surprisingly, he added, `I think none of my people 
have any interest in that. They don't want to be active'. He did add, `Maybe you 
should do more but I didn't do that and I accept responsibility but I was working for 
my company, they were paying my salary'. Time and budget constraints also account 
for the lack of involvement in these institutes by some executives. TE 18 for example 
would love to be a member of the SVTDG but cannot because `we're so lean here'. 
215 TE 23 would not perceive himself as a major networker or `player'. 
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Importantly, smaller companies are quite happy with the big companies pushing the 
agendas of the representative groups. TE 14 from one of the smaller companies said: 
So, the one good thing about being a small firm in this Valley is that my best 
interests generally will be taken care of by... the larger firms.. . they will fight for what they need and generally what they need is good for me... and that's 
one of the reasons why I stay in software... because of the Valley Coalition for 
Software... I have never found that something that the TEI puts out that I 
know that [named two VPs Tax in large SV-based companies] are behind or 
involved with somewhere. It has never been, I've never said `Oh what are 
they doing? ' It's like "yeah, you go". 
While many of the institutes/organisations listed in Appendix 6 carry out research on 
tax and tax-related matters to varying degrees, it appears to be the primary role of a 
for-profit organisation, namely, the Corporate Executive Board Company. To reap the 
rewards of this research it costs $20,000 to join and $30,000 per annum 216 While this 
company conducts research on many business areas, it is its tax roundtable that 
interests the in-house tax executives. TE 19 described this roundtable as a `think 
tank'. TE 8 likes this one because: 
They do a lot of research and I get reports from them all the time but I am 
also, that is the only group where I can get to sit down with the guy from 
General Electric on occasion and General Electric has got a great tax 
department and they don't go to TEI meetings and they don't go to MAPI 
meetings but they go to this meeting. I resisted it but now I am a member, it's 
expensive... they run other groups too. They run a CFOs group and a 
controllers group and a treasurers group.. . they ask probing questions. They 
will do exactly what you did and publish it as research. 
A lot of this research revolves around finding out what other tax executives are doing, 
through conducting extensive interviews and surveys. 
2162005 rates. 
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Unsurprisingly, the external advisors interface with the institutes if at all possible. 
They attend and are often invited speakers at seminars and conferences run by the 
institutes. According to TE 13: 
Even the law fines want to be associated with the Hi-Tech Institute and the 
TEI. Almost any seminar you go to you've got Baker McKenzie. You've got 
DLA Piper, you've got Fenwick & West and PWC, E&Y, all of them will 
come either through the Hi-Tech Institute of Dr Karlinsky or through TEI. 
The potential benefits that the TEI (and others) can bring to SV-based MNCs is 
without doubt enhanced by the clustering of the technology sector physically in the 
Valley, as supported by TE 17's comment: 
It's very unique here because in most areas... the types of businesses in New 
York and Chicago are so varied that... when stuff comes in and issues are 
discussed you know it's brokerage, it's just so many different areas. Here, it's 
primarily one industry, it's technology. Therefore, a speaker... can come in 
focused on technology issues and all the companies are interested. If you were 
a bank out here TEI would be almost useless to you because they never talk 
about your issues. But if you're a technology company TEI is just... it is an 
amazingly really effective group. 
The interviewees are members of the different institutes for different reasons. It may 
be educational in which case the TEI seems to be very effective. It may be industry 
driven, for example the semi-conductor industry association's tax sub-group would 
only be of interest to those companies operating within that subsector of technology. 
It could be size-related, in which case a smaller group of VPs from the limited 
number of large companies would be of interest and value such as the SVTDG or the 
for-profit Corporate Executive Board. They all score highly however with respect to 
facilitating networking. While the different groups may have different priorities, TE 
24 wisely pointed out that you do need to belong to a lot of them `because you never 
know where your value is going to come'. 
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Professional institutes and organisations are clearly very important external 
influences (sources of normative and coercive isomorphism) on all of the 
interviewees. In many cases the interviewees and their staff are members of various 
such institutes. Some institutes appear to have a technical tax focus across a broad 
range of sub-industries within the IT sector and provide a significant educational, 
lobbying and networking platform, as is the case for the Tax Executives Institute. 
Others, such as the Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group appear to be a more select 
group whose concentration is very significantly on lobbying. Yet other organisations 
are tax groupings within particular sub-industries in the IT sector, for example, the 
American Electronics Association. While all of these organisations provide valuable 
networking opportunities, each one also provides something unique to its members. 
These various groups are clearly important constituents of the organisational field 
level referred to earlier. 
The combination of networking, relationship building, continuing education, the 
dissemination of research findings, the sharing of information generally apparent 
between tax executives in SV, and lobbying activities all of which are facilitated 
through the workings of various representative institutes and organisations (members 
of the organizational field) constitute `multiple isomorphic pressures' (Edelman and 
Suchman, 1997). These contribute to our understanding of the origins of homogeneity 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b) of tax plans, `prevailing industry practices' (Suchman 
and Edelman, 1996: p. 939) and processes within these MNCs. The roles being played 
by the various institutes, combined with contemplation of the language of `tax circle', 
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`tax community' and `social clubs' as used by the interviewees, suggests the 
existence of potential `networks of power' in SV with respect to tax, a central notion 
within the endogeneity of law perspective (Suchman and Edelman, 1996; Edelman et 
al., 1999 etc. ). The apparent intensity of social interaction (through formal and 
informal fora) between these tax executives results in a `social reality' (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966) very peculiar to the tax world of SV-based MNCs, whereby 
rationality is constructed and evolves, in part, at the external environmental level 
(Edelman et al., 1999). 
Many of the representative organisations are extremely involved in lobbying, 
representing an interplay between organisations and legislators that reflects a `highly 
endogenous and reciprocal' relationship (Suchman and Edelman, 1996: p. 938) 
resulting at times in a softening of regulation that counters corporate interest 
(Edelman et al., 1999), or new regulations that serve their interests. Through lobbying 
activities which employ both `symbolic capital' and `social capital' (Covaleski et al., 
2005), the representative groups and their members could never be accused of being 
`passive pawns' (Scott, 2001) when it comes to tax laws. Their strategic responses 
(Oliver, 1991) appear to be managed in a coherent and effective manner, thereby 
making them `active players' (Scott, 2001) in the construction and configuration of 
tax laws (Edelman and Suchman, 1997). The findings demonstrate the exercise of 
power and influence at the institute level and at the level of certain individuals 
(typically a long standing Sr. VP Tax of the largest companies), the `elites' of tax in 
SV, driving agendas within the institutes. Some individuals appear to purposefully 
and craftily use the `clout' of the representative groups to serve their own interests, 
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which it would appear, frequently serves the interests of many others in SV. The latter 
may again explain homogeneity with respect to tax plans and practices in SV-based 
MNCs which is not surprising perhaps as many of these companies face similar 
business contexts and tax challenges. This play of power is an important element 
within institutional analysis (Scott, 2001), and the level of respect and extent of a 
hearing that these representatives and individuals appear to receive from key decision 
makers up to Congress level calls into question the effectiveness (to some extent) of 
the state as a source of coercive isomorphism (Scott, 2001), which according to 
Fligstein (1991), can alter the (tax) environment through its laws profoundly. There 
was also evidence of an endogenous relationship extending to compliance and 
standards with one company at least being consulted by FASB for assistance on one 
of its position papers. 
The findings certainly suggest the level of information sharing between executives in 
peer and competing MNCs is particular to tax, even within the SV area, out of which 
there appears to be `leaders' and `adoptors' of tax plans (Dillard et al., 2004) happily 
co-existing. This suggests tax is still a `black box' item in business. 217 I would argue 
however, that the sharing of information, particularly with regard to tax plans and 
technical advice on dealing with ambiguity in tax laws, serves to provide a necessary 
`legitimacy' to one's tax positions, essentially amounting to an RM measure (see 
Chapter Six on RM). Sharing of all types of information however, always gives one a 
217 Although tax is more visible recently in the post-corporate scandals environment as noted in 
Chapters One and Six. 
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sense of social legitimacy, which is core within NIS (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; 
Scott, 2001 etc). 
7.2.2 The Revenue Authorities 
All in-house tax departments have to deal with/liaise with the IRS and different 
Revenue Authorities around the world at some stage. It emerged throughout the 
interviews that worldwide Revenue Authorities are important actors in the external 
environment, and they have potentially a significant impact on the practice and 
process of tax planning in these MNCs. The Revenue, for the most part is typically 
responsible for tax collection and enforcement but would also have some input into 
future tax policy direction arising directly out of their tax collection and enforcement 
roles. 18 The evidence suggests the IRS in particular is a very important economic and 
political level actor, warranting this separate discussion on the `relationship' between 
it and the MNCs in this study, through the tax executives. 
TE 9 described the relationship with the IRS, clearly demonstrating it as something 
that is to be valued and needs to be managed: 
We never get confused as to where our loyalties lie and what our 
responsibilities are... we don't let the tax authority govern what we do, they 
are not our boss but still they are important. It's a relationship, there are 
certain things you could do that would do so much harm to that relationship 
relative to the benefit you got from it, that you don't want to do it. 
Similarly, TE 13 stated: 
I want to develop a good relationship with the IRS so I will never do anything 
which would jeopardise because it's not my money, right? I want to do the 
right stuff for the company and for the government and I'm like a semi- 
218 Based on my experience in tax practice. 
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government agent I call myself. 
Somewhat similarly, TE 16 seems quite concerned with how they are perceived by 
the authorities, `the governments, the Revenue, the authorities out there, you know 
how they're perceiving you and how you're being looked at'. TE 5 referred to tax 
authorities and `the positions that they take, how they enforce the laws, I mean that is 
a huge impact on what we do'. 
Many of the interviewees referred to having a `good' relationship with the IRS. For 
TE 3 this amounts to being professional and being able to have good conversations 
around technical issues. He summed up nicely the process of IRS officials coming to 
trust him and his team over time which again emphasises the importance perhaps of 
developing relationships over time with people (even from the IRS): 
It's an interesting process. I have been through three or four cycles since I 
have been here and they usually come in, very suspicious, `here is a big 
company, lots of income, there must be something bad going on'. When they 
get into it and they realise that we try to do a reasonable job, we will be a little 
bit aggressive in certain areas, fine, we are not going to hide it from them and 
we develop a working relationship where we can have those sorts of 
conversations on what I would hope, as quick as possible, on technical issues, 
because that is more fun... It's not contentious on our part ... the whole 
relationship is good but there are individual issues that can get pretty heated. 
(TE 3) 
This relationship facilitates what is at times necessary debate among tax professionals 
from both sides on `grey areas' within tax. TE 11 described the VP tax as being `very 
tied into the IRS'. 
TE 8 referred to this relationship being part of his tax strategy (see Chapter Four), 
and knows everyone in SV wouldn't agree with it. He thinks that generally IRS 
officials are `extremely professional and honest and forthright and hard working...! 
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think we work hard to maintain that relationship. We do things to foster that 
relationship and we think that helps us'. (TE 8) He described how close a relationship 
with IRS officials can be: 
Tax guys like to think of the ethical responsibility of pointing out a math error 
that the government has made in the tax payer's favour. Now I think our 
ethical standards say you are supposed to disclose. But even if they didn't 
require me to disclose I always would point out a math error because, and it's 
clearly not in my best interests, but I think long term I am going to gain lots 
by pointing out those math errors ... I never actually have a personal 
relationship with any of these people and in part most of them are prohibited 
by their own ethics to have personal relationships. But I do... you try to get to 
know these people, you ask them about their spouses and their children and 
when someone gets married you congratulate them, you don't send them a 
gift. (TE 8) 
He doesn't want the IRS officials to be compromised either which he says may lead 
to them being less effective or needing to show themselves as being tough on [his 
company]. TE 19 thinks a good relationship with the IRS `goes a long way'. 
There was some evidence of a perceived increase in the level of aggressiveness 
within tax authorities towards taxpayers, which TE 8 attributes to being in response 
to the greediness shown by Enron and so forth: 
I think some companies got too greedy and therefore the word got out that all 
companies are greedy and that was a mistake, we all got tarred with that 
brush. Why we have SOX is because of Enron. So the rest of us weren't doing 
that stuff, so it's too bad. 
Likewise TE 11 said: 
They've been clamping down and clamping down. They're much, very high 
in the compliance mode right now. So, they went from tax payer rights in '98, 
now the pendulum has swung all the way the other way and the IRS after 
Enron and everything else is going after a lot of aggressive corporate tax 
shelters and so on. 
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He referred in this context to more reporting requirements being imposed by the 
IRS. 219 He also referred to the fact that `a lot of foreign tax auditors are taking totally 
unreasonable positions'. TE 12 thinks `the IRS has definitely taken a lot more 
aggressive posture'. TE 14 spoke of the continuing theme recently set by the 
Commissioner of the IRS whereby `enforcement is a number one priority for him'. 
TE 15, clearly unhappy with the situation believes the IRS and Revenue Authorities 
globally are all getting much more aggressive, and it is partly driven by the need for 
revenues: 
They're all broke-the strategy works in many, many companies. Because 
you know the people don't have the budget, they don't have the resources; 
they don't have the highly qualified tax departments so they throw their hands 
in the air. Whereas, with larger companies we tend to have the resources 
where we can push back. But in addition, you know that's the edict that's 
coming out of the Commissioner, it's coming out every, (sic) from every tax 
jurisdiction which is `play hardball, these guys are scumbags'. No, when 
Commissioner Everson gets up and says "we'll go public with the guys that 
don't come in under whatever scheme" they want you to come in under. 
What's that? You're not getting a fair hearing any longer. 220 
TE 22 also referred to the IRS having recently 'gone after public accounting firms, 
gone after law firms, they've gone after brokerage houses' which he posits partly 
explains why service providers have become 'a lot more conservative with the advice 
or proposals that they bring to corporate clients these days'. 
TE 15 referred to the need for the IRS (and other organizations, such as the OECD) 
to be in constant dialogue with the companies to understand how their business 
models work. They would argue that tax laws generally do not change fast enough to 
219 Reference made to M3 and Circular 230. 
220 This interviewee was referring to recent public statements made by IRS Commissioner Mark W. 
Everson. 
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reflect what is going on in the software business, which is changing at a rapid pace. 
`Those conversations need to be going on more and more and more and unfortunately 
some of the organisations that really should, the OECD etc, they're not moving fast 
enough. ' (TE 15)221 
Interestingly, TE 8 referred to the importance of being open and sharing information 
with the IRS. As a demonstration of this, he showed me the rather complex 
diagrammatic representation of his company's worldwide structure -a very big wall 
chart with many lines connecting the various entities - all rather meaningless if one 
has not been walked through the detail by someone who knows it. We were off tape 
at this stage of the interview, but he did make a point of the fact that he shows the IRS 
officials this diagram on the basis that if they see he is willing to share that kind of 
information with them, he must have nothing to hide. 222 
TE 10 referred to the importance of his company being one of 18 participators in a 
pilot Compliance Assurance Program (a real time audit) being run by IRS. The 
rationale for participating is insightful: 
Well, first off I'm really getting tired of having to analyse reserves and all of 
this stuff on the accounting side so the more current you are, the less hassle 
you have on the accounting side, and as I told you our goal is to get the return 
filed properly the first time. So, if that will get us there I'm thrilled... the other 
point is the IRS always want pilot programs to be a success; I can't see a 
downside to this. 
The IRS have been `helped' by this company in other ways: 
221 There are policy implications around the need for timely legislative changes. 
222 Arguably this constitutes an aspect of the `game playing' referred to by Picciotto (2007). 
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We have helped the IRS totally design and re-streamline their audit processes. 
And some of their programs were actually programs they basically stole from 
us working with our local IRS team and then turned into national programmes 
to the point where they even copied my files. I want a royalty from them, I 
haven't seen it yet but it's very flattering. (TE 10) 
Similarly, TE 8 utilises the facility of Advance Pricing Agreements223 when offered 
by the Revenue Authorities, because, in addition to providing certainty, the tax 
authorities who offer these arrangements: 
Like people to use them and so I think I build credibility with them by using 
their tools. Other people disagree with that and this isn't my strategy, this is 
the way we manage the department of about a group of ten of us and we came 
up with this strategy. I didn't come up with this myself. 
TE 13 described an incident in which he: 
Worked well with the IRS team... in this case it took us a lot of convincing, a 
good relationship with IRS team.. . our relationship with the IRS was 
excellent. I think in the Valley you won't have any other company where 
you've got these issues ... or whatever and trying to resolve 
it amicably with 
the IRS. 
He also referred to taking opportunities to meet important IRS officials at conferences 
and so on: 
This is a chance to meet the Commissioner... . he's kind of flying in from 
Washington making presentations. All you have to do is shake his hand and 
say `How are you doing-really nice, you guys are really helpful' and send 
him an email. I actually got emails from IRS that had the guy who was 
heading up, (sic) he's left now, started his own practice. A lot of times what 
happens is the IRS workers will have their own practices or they leave but you 
still keep in touch. (TE 13)224 
223 Such agreements were identified as tax risk management mechanisms as discussed in section 6.4. 
224 Borkowski (2005) addresses the impact and challenges (for the IRS) arising from the loss of IRS 
officials to the private sector. Further consideration of this is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Only TE 24 spoke negatively about the notion of having a good relationship with the 
IRS, arguing that business and the IRS are very different with very different 
objectives and it is nonsense to expect that they could be `partners'. This is, he said 
where he vehemently disagrees with some TEI members. 
The relationship between the TEI and the IRS was also emphasised. According to TE 
11, the TEI `has a very good reputation with the IRS... it can speak for industry ... is 
very influential with the IRS'. TE 22 posited `it's a group of corporate tax 
professionals that weigh in with the IRS on the nuts and bolts of tax planning and tax 
compliance and so they respect us'. TE 1 said the TEI has: 
A fair amount of leverage with the Internal Revenue Service. So, as individual 
companies if we go to the Internal Revenue Service and complain about this, 
that or the other thing, it's one thing, but if TEI goes, the Internal Revenue 
Service does listen and I think they have made some changes as a result of 
input from TEI. 
Having a `good relationship' with the IRS (and Revenue Authorities generally) 
through inter alia, open dialogue, was (with one exception) considered to be very 
important. This importance stems particularly from a concern for building credibility 
with and thereby achieving `legitimacy' in the eyes of the state (Carruthers, 1995). 
Interviewees were not explicit about the benefits of such legitimacy beyond believing 
it `goes a long way'. Participating in IRS pilot programs and other initiatives such as 
advance pricing agreements was clearly identified as a mechanism through which this 
legitimacy is achieved. Specific evidence exists in relation to the endogenisation 
(Edelman and Suchman, 1997) of the IRS audit process, a process which in itself also 
achieves legitimacy (perhaps on both sides). IRS officials frequently attend the same 
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conferences as the tax executives themselves, providing opportunities for tax 
executives and IRS officials alike to draw on good communication and relationship 
skills (Wilson, 1995) in developing and maintaining this apparently important 
relationship. The relationship between the IRS and these tax executives is clearly a 
recursive one, representing the dynamics of institutionalisation between key 
economic, political and organisational level actors (Dillard et al., 2004). 225 
7.2.3 Other External Influences 
A number of other external influences emerged throughout the interviews which are 
addressed briefly here. Some of these influences, (for example the media), have 
already been highlighted and discussed in other contexts within this thesis (see 
section 6.3 for example) and will be revisited in this section only to the extent of new 
findings on such influences. 
TE 3 referred to being influenced by certain individuals outside of the organisation 
which included lawyers, but also more generically, `I suppose people who I respect 
more than others on an individual basis.. . your colleagues and people who you just 
have a good relationship with professionally'. The influence of the media was a 
recurring theme throughout the interviews (see section 6.3 also). Advisor 1 
emphasised the role of the media (and the general public) on tax policy maintaining it 
influences `what is acceptable and what is not acceptable' tax policy. He used certain 
not so kind words when referring to the influence some economic journalists have. 
225 Tax advisors at the organisational field level also interact with the IRS on their clients' behalves, 
but addressing that particular relationship was not an objective of this study. 
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They have this influence he believes `because politicians fear public perception'. TE 
19 said they pay attention to the news so there is `a pulse on the media' at her 
company. Two views to the contrary on the influence of the media were provided. TE 
8 stated: 
I know the New York Times tried really hard, big on tax shelters and Forbes 
did and I think most of the investors just yawned at that stuff... They got more 
excited about Enron than they did, which was not tax-driven as much as just 
out and out fraud, but we didn't. I don't think anybody really worries as much 
that `oh my gosh, the Wall Street Journal is going to write an article that 
says[his company] is involved in a tax shelter'. Most people go "ho hum" on 
those things now. We try to avoid it but I don't think it's impacting what I do. 
TE 21 did not see the potential media impact as `a big player' in tax planning 
suggesting really that if they were not comfortable with it in the first place they would 
not run with it i. e. `the law is the law'. 
TE 23 referred to the influence of tax legislators: 
Well, I mean clearly the lawmakers are a significant part of it. I mean, they're 
what constantly complicates our lives and really have very little understanding 
of, you know, what a reasonable tax is and what is really reportable and 
manageable and auditable. 
TE 2 also spoke briefly of the influence of the EU. `Yes, things like shifting of the 
presidency of the EU, because that is relevant, I think we have definitely been paying 
attention to that recently'. Advisor 1 views the EU as `a hugely significant player 
now in terms of influencing what can and what cannot be done' and will become an 
increasingly significant influencer of tax policy. He views it as probably a lot more 
influential than the Revenue (in Ireland) as almost everything the Revenue does or 
seeks to do, has to be in accordance with EU law. This trend is clearly important for 
these MNCs having such a presence across the EU, including Ireland in many cases. 
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TE 22 referred to the fact that they monitor the OECD and works through 
organisations (like the TEI) to comment. Advisor 3 identified a company's auditing 
firm as having the most direct impact on its tax planning: `They are the ones they 
negotiate their reserve with'. TE 9 sees the auditor as a `huge' external influence 
`because of the increased audit scrutiny and pressure and interaction'. His colleague 
described them as `a pain' in this context appearing extremely aware of the potential 
impact they might have on his own position within the firm: 
They influence a lot of what we do and they talk to the audit committee and if 
they say I've got a material weakness... some companies have said `the 
auditors have identified a material weakness and here is our remediation plan' 
and they have fired their tax director. That is a big influence. I don't want 
them to have a remediation plan around here that says they fired me. (TE 8) 
TE 11 stated: 
You know whatever you do you're going to have to run it through your audit 
firm. And they're going to have to... sign off on it on how you account for it 
so that definitely has, is, a big influence. 
Very brief reference was also made to the external influences of the tax advisors226 
(TE 20), SEC (TE 19), 227 `the marketplace... the financial analysts' (TE 21), the 
Treasury department and the Congress (one committee on the Senate side and one on 
the House side) (Advisor 3). Important external influences operating at the economic, 
political and organizational field levels of analysis have been identified in this section 
and are incorporated in the descriptive framework presented in Figure 3.1. 
226 Notably, all interviewees draw on the Big Four accounting firms for tax advice and on a core group 
of large legal firms, including Baker McKenzie, Fenwick and West. All companies in the study are 
audited by one of the Big Four accounting firms also. 
227 Identified by TE I as 'a key external influencer because the SEC has become a lot tighter in a lot of 
areas. We have to be more rigorous in what we do because there is always the risk of an SEC enquiry 
regarding your tax reserves or whatever. ' 
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7.3 External Affairs and Direct Lobbying 
Section 7.2.1 addressed the involvement of the MNCs in lobbying indirectly via the 
various professional institutes and organisations of which the tax executives are 
members. This section is concerned with the extent to which and the processes by 
which these MNCs engage directly in lobbying on tax policy matters. 
A number of these companies have external affairs personnel, usually based in 
Washington DC, with whom company tax executives are in regular contact. These 
peoples' brief in relation to tax is to lobby for particular tax policies and object to 
others. Company Nine has a `legislative analyst' among its external affairs people 
based in Washington, whose focus is exclusively on tax legislation. Company Four 
has government relations staff, who `work very closely with tax'. TE 8 described his 
company's position whereby one of the tax staff `spends more than 50% of his time 
on legislative matters, both the state and the federal and he is in Washington a lot. 
And we have a close relationship with Government Affairs, another department here. ' 
Having a physical presence in Washington appears to be important: `[our company] 
has a Washington office. I think that helps in Washington, so the relationships are 
there, introductions are made. ' (TE 8) 
One company has within the tax group a Director of External Affairs who works very 
closely with [the company's] Government Affairs people and he is a member of many 
different trade groups. When talking about this person's work TE 11 said, `he doesn't 
like to call it lobbying but he spends a lot of time in Washington and in different 
states connecting with congressional staffers etc'. TE 19 referred to her company's 
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external affairs person (though not tax exclusive) who does `testify before Congress 
on different issues affecting our industry or company, not necessarily tax specific'. 
TE 22 referred to his company's `lobbyist that works on US issues in Washington DC 
and we have another lobbyist that works on Sacramento and California issues'. They 
also write directly to the IRS or senators on occasion. 
On a continuous basis therefore, many of these companies are liaising directly with 
politicians at Washington DC in relation to federal tax policy matters. Relationships 
are formed and these external affairs personnel are having an influence on tax policy. 
At times, some companies pursue a change in tax legislation (or propose a new piece 
of tax legislation) which specifically suits them and perhaps them only. TE 3 for 
example, referred to a couple of occasions where they essentially went it alone in 
crafting and proposing legislation that would be beneficial to [his company] only. TE 
8 referred to having an input into the Homeland Investment Act (part of the American 
Jobs Creation Act 2004). TE 10, when referring to the work of his external affairs tax 
staff member said, `he does an enormous portion of state stuff. So California State, 
they come to him to write laws'. 
Lobbying directly with politicians however is a big investment in time and money. It 
suits many of the companies therefore, to pursue their lobbying activity through 
membership of various professional institutes and representative bodies. TE 22 
summed this up: 
If we have the issues somebody else usually has the issue too... it hasn't been 
too often where there's been an issue where we've taken it on by 
ourselves... there was one issue separately years ago that we worked with 
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another company up in Portland in Oregon and we were successful but it was 
a lot of work and it took actually a couple of years. 
TE 18 however, (from one of the smaller companies which does not have an external 
affairs function) said, `Well, I influence policy, you don't have to be that big to 
influence policy but you have to be willing to put your money where your mouth is. ' 
My findings suggest that generally only the very large companies can go it alone, 
they can afford to and it is worth their while. The latter has clear implications for tax 
policy development and for understanding who is driving the tax agenda. 
The politicking that goes on through the external affairs and lobbying activities 
suggests a very political aspect of tax law making, with vested interests on both sides. 
As TE 14 said: 
The legislation is political. All of the politicians want something. US 
legislation is too political. The legislators don't legislate, they are politicians. 
It's funny to hear them say, to think that they are statesmen, there is not a 
person in Washington DC who is a statesman. Statesmen care about their 
country... If you were to read this tax code, there are so many carve outs, there 
are so many special interests that are being met that it really does stagnate the 
ability to proceed. 
Four of the five largest companies in this study are very active in engaging in direct 
lobbying, with dedicated external affairs executives placed in Washington, with a tax 
brief. These are perceived as powerful and political: 
That's one of the banes in the US that you know ... there's so much influence by a small circle of corporations or other individuals in getting tax laws 
enacted, those laws, they affect us all but they're in place to optimise the 
needs of a few organisations ... that's how the game's played and you've got 
to be somewhat accepting of that if you want to be in the arena... I'd say 
there's maybe four or five companies in this Valley that shape legislation 
because they're focused on it, they're bright companies and they've got the 
resources. (TE 23) 
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The interviewees from these companies had clear views on the attributes (in italics 
below) of an effective lobbyist/external affairs person. 228 TE 3 emphasised 
communication skills and the ability to build good relationships with the `right' 
people: 
Even though he is not a tax person, he is able to simplify complicated things 
and communicate with people. It's an excellent skill and he has developed 
good relationships with tax and other government affairs people. He doesn't 
style himself as a tax person but he is able to get to the nut. 
Similarly, TE 8 said his tax staff member involved in lobbying `has a skill of 
explaining tax matters simply', and pointed to the fact that he is not a very good 
technical tax person. TE 3, who is with the smallest of these four companies 
insightfully added: 
I think you can be as effective as the big guys if you are willing to spend a 
little bit of time and work within political, understanding that their job is 
politics. So if you can work with those people in that environment, you give 
them something and you get something in return and if half of them are 
supporting one thing, half the other, [our company] is a big US 
manufacturer.. . that can play. 
Empathy and recognising some element of trading in the process, therefore, is 
extremely important. TE 8 emphasised the importance in the `game' of not just going 
to Congress in times of need: 
There are times when we will assist the legislature and the IRS on regulatory 
matters but it might not be something we really care about. You can't just go 
to Congress when you really care, they want to see you there all the time. 
He sees this as linking with his concern about maintaining credibility with the 
government authorities (as discussed earlier, see section 7.2.2). 
228 1 interpret `successful' in this context to mean having the desired impact on tax policy. 
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Another key factor is access to the right people: 
Well, I think a lot of the effectiveness in politics back in Washington is 
access. Can you get in to see somebody and once you are in there.. . can you develop a trust there because they don't want to get burned? If you burn them 
once, you are gone... if you connect with the right guy they are perfectly 
willing to play with you. (TE 4) 
TE 10 appears to have no problem getting access to key government decision makers 
all over the world: 
I do a little tour of the Far East and I'll go see the, you know, ministers of 
finance in, you know, five different countries and check with the tax folks etc. 
When I go to Ireland I go to visit all of the people from Sean Dorgan to the 
finance people etc. etc.. Always, we're constantly relationship building 229 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, his explanation as to why he gets access to these people is: 
Well, a lot of that had to do with you build a plant there, they like you... and 
even in just investigating (sic). For example, we have never built a plant in 
Singapore but we've talked to them many times. And when I go to Singapore 
I usually visit, I try. I do personally an enormous amount of public speaking 
all over the world and recently, for example, I was speaking at a Tax Council 
Policy Institute in DC on kind of global issues. I asked the Singapore Minister 
for Finance if Singapore would like to actually come do a presentation on 
this .... I've helped people along, you 
know, countries along even. 230 
TE 24 also spoke of dealing directly with government ministers in Asia. He had just 
come back from such a meeting in Beijing. He also mentioned the fact that he secured 
very special tax breaks in Singapore, and many other companies since then have 
secured this, which he takes a lot of credit for. In the context of discussing a site 
selection process, TE 11 described how they put together a `negotiation plan' which 
revolves around direct and indirect taxes, obtaining certainty, finding ways to meet 
compliance obligation in that country and many other issues. This plan seems to be 
229 Sean Dorgan was head of the Industrial Development Authority, at the time of these interviews. 
This Authority is responsible for attracting foreign investment into Ireland. 
230 This interviewee was silent on what exactly was being negotiated. 
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the negotiating document with which they go to the government of the particular 
country involved. Certainty is the important thing: 
So, you know, get as much agreed upfront as possible and... understand that 
you're never going to get everything you want but try and maximise your 
wish list, you know, and some of that's around planning... how do you keep 
the tax cost low in these jurisdictions? (TE 11) 
Very importantly he added, `when you're bringing a large factory with a lot of 
technology you do have a lot of clout with the government'. His colleague, when 
pointing out the fact that they have tax holidays in some foreign countries claimed, 
`you know, we're very close to the government' in these countries. 
It is important to recognise that not all of the interviewees were engaged in direct 
lobbying. Interestingly, TE 2 who is with one of the largest five companies in the 
study stated: 
I am not really active in lobbying. I don't. It's not me. It's never been me, it's 
not something that interests me. I could see its value.. . and I think that there 
are occasions where something is being proposed where I feel strongly and I'll 
say something but it's just not part of what I do. 
TE 18 related a story which demonstrates well the `power' of a SV-based company 
and the game of negotiation with its wider political implications. He was trying to 
negotiate favourable terms with Dutch officials and when he wasn't getting his way 
he said to them: 
Silicon Valley is a very small place. We talk to each other all the time through 
the Tax Executives' Institute...! talk to people from [listed four of the largest 
SV-based companies] all the time, they're just down the street right! You 
think that when I get back and I talk to these people... do you think when I sit 
there and I tell them what my experience here is do you think they're going to 
want to talk to you? I said, `I'm embarrassed... I'm Dutch and I have a desire 
to want to be here and you guys aren't rolling out the welcoming mat to me'. 
(sic) And so what happened was I got back here, all of a sudden I got a phone 
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call from the Dutch.. . the Dutch Development Board, their bosses are flying 
over and they want to meet with you, they want to take you out for lunch. 
That's what they did. They came over and said, "well, we're sorry" and 
they've got a presentation going at Tax Executives because they want to go 
ahead and turn it around because of what I said. (TE 18) 
External affairs incorporating direct lobbying with legislators/Congress staff is 
essential business for some of these companies. The larger companies invest a 
separate dedicated human resource to this activity which suggests there are benefits to 
it. The larger companies in this study clearly have done so, and utilize their `power, ' 
to demand and secure access to the `right' people. Once access is secured, the 
associated benefits are made possible, which makes them even more powerful. The 
evidence strongly suggests some of the benefit lies in having a real input into shaping 
tax legislation in one's company's interest, but this is not necessarily in every 
companies', or perhaps even more importantly, the taxpayers' or the wider society's 
interest. These companies are involved in proposing tax legislation, and reacting to 
proposed tax legislation (Edelman et al., 1999), both of which are core elements of 
the endogenisation of tax law making which is highly evident in this study. It 
incorporates the active resistance to certain tax laws by the regulatee (McBarnet and 
Whelan, 1992). The language used by the interviewees of `negotiation plan', `game', 
`play' is I suggest, also the language of endogeneity and is considered `rational' by all 
of the `players' involved. 
This study gives some flavour of the dynamics of interaction between key economic, 
political and organisational field level actors, which gives rise to the need for some 
debate around the wider tax policy implications. Specifically, the regulatees appear to 
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have a significant level of influence over the tax regulations that they themselves 
must ultimately adhere to. Legislators do appear through meeting with, and listening 
to, the external affairs executives of the MNCs to respond to parochial interests of 
targeted firms (Edelman and Suchman, 1997). The question of whether the degree to 
which this takes place, the means through which it takes place, and who the main 
influencers are, is understood in the wider taxpaying community should be addressed. 
The question of who should be judge and jury over the whole process also is an 
interesting one. This would require further research from other perspectives primarily 
that of the legislators/Congress staffers. Only then could one get a sense of the extent 
to which Covaleski et al. 's (2007b) `second order effect' is at play (whereby 
regulators anticipate regulatee responses) which arguably brings some balance and 
pragmatism into the process. All of the latter would, of course, demonstrate clearly 
the constraining and enabling interaction (Dillard et al., 2004) between the different 
levels of analysis as portrayed in the framework used in this study, resulting in a 
necessary level of stability in the tax terrain generally which is in everyone's 
interests. These large powerful corporations also have great potential for shaping new 
laws and `rational' accepted compliance processes and procedures in countries with 
less established tax regimes or where law enforcement is weak, but looking to entice 
these MNCs to set up operations in their respective countries. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter identified key actors in the external environment namely the economic, 
political and organisational field levels of analysis (see Figure 3.1) with which in- 
house tax executives interact. While tax executives in SV are members of various 
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professional institutes/associations, among the more influential professional 
associations in SV are the Tax Executives Institute and the Silicon Valley Tax 
Directors Group. The various institutes provide a significant educational, lobbying 
and networking platform, thereby influencing tax planning in practice, thus 
explaining some degree of homogeneity of tax plans and prevailing industry 
practices. The findings suggest the level of information sharing that takes place 
between the tax executives via the various networking and education opportunities 
afforded through active membership of such professional associations, is unique to 
tax, even within the SV area. The Revenue Authorities were identified as an 
extremely influential actor in the economic and political level of analysis with most 
interviewees attaching a high level of importance to their `relationship' with Revenue 
Authorities around the world. Having a `good relationship' with the Revenue 
Authorities is clearly an important aspect of gaining credibility and helps achieve 
`legitimacy' in the eyes of the state. There was evidence to support the recursive 
nature of this relationship and its sometimes endogenous nature with respect to the 
IRS audit process. 
Other external influences identified included the media, the EU, the auditing firm and 
Congress. Finally, external affairs and direct lobbying activities were shown to be 
essential business for some of these MNCs. Some of these companies are actively 
involved in proposing tax legislation and responding to proposed tax legislation, both 
of which are core elements of the endogenisation of the law making process. 
Attention is drawn to the potential wider policy implications of the dynamics of 
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interaction between key economic, political and organisational level actors as was 
found to take place in this study. 
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter One, this study is concerned with understanding tax planning 
in practice, identifying and taking account of the multiple arenas within which it 
operates, thereby highlighting its social and institutional dimensions (Hopwood and 
Miller, 1994). Empirically, it focuses on US MNCs. This study addresses four 
specific research questions as follows: 
Research Question One: How is the tax planning function organised and conducted in 
MNCs? 
Research Question Two: How is the performance of the tax planning function 
measured in MNCs? 
Research Question Three: How is tax risk managed in MNCs? 
Research Question Four: What is the nature of the relationship between the tax 
planning functions within MNCs and the external environment? 
These research questions were operationalised by addressing a number of objectives 
within each question (section 3.2). Section 8.2 summarises the key findings and 
implications of this study. Section 8.3 highlights the empirical and theoretical 
contributions provided by this research and section 8.4 makes some recommendations 
for further study arising from the findings, observations and limitations of this study. 
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8.2 Findings and Implications 
The key findings and implications are presented here, drawing on the major themes 
which emerged in the course of addressing the four research questions and associated 
objectives as set out in section 3.2. 
Power 
The role of `power' (for example, Perrow, 1985; Dillard et al., 2004) and powerful 
actors both within and outside of each MNC was a recurring and important theme in 
understanding tax planning in practice. The tax function itself and its leader must be, 
and be seen to be `powerful' in order to be taken seriously within an MNC. Sources 
of such power include the title held by the head of tax (the more prestigious the 
better), reporting lines (directly to the CFO in US is most powerful), length of time 
working in the one company (can build up `institutional knowledge' over time), and 
raw tax knowledge and expertise gained through qualifications and experience (the 
tax `knowledge experts'). Resources at a tax department's disposal, often driven by 
such factors as the power of the head of tax and the overall financial position of the 
company, is a critical source of power in this context. Resources available to the tax 
planning function in the MNCs in this study varied, representing a source of 
heterogeneity (Powell, 1991) with respect to the practice and process of tax planning 
among multinationals. Securing adequate resources is an ongoing challenge in light of 
tax needing to, and being best positioned to, respond to the ever-changing external 
business and regulatory terrains (Wilson, 1995; Porter, 1999b). These frequently 
311 
Conclusion 
provide sources of external shocks ultimately resulting in deinstitutionalisation and 
reinstitutionalisation of tax planning practices and processes. 
The CFO emerged as one of the most powerful organisational actors in terms of tax 
being an integral part of how these companies do business. He is very well positioned 
to engage in the necessary political processes associated with the institutionalisation 
(Covaleski et al., 2007) of tax planning in practice, and thereby is a key player in 
setting the tax culture of an organisation. A new CFO can give rise to 
de institutionalisation and re institutional isation of tax plans, practices and processes. 
The attitude of the CFO to the tax planning function impacts significantly on the 
degree to which it is embedded within an MNC's business activities generally 
(section 4.6.4). 
A significant level of power and influence is also at play at the professional institute 
level (see section 7.2.1) and at the level of certain individuals such as the `elites' of 
tax in SV as reflected in their respective lobbying activities. They often secure what 
could be considered privileged access to important decision makers at Congress level 
in their efforts towards the endogenisation of tax law. Policymakers need to be aware 
of who the powerful players are when `negotiating' tax laws in the endogenisation 
process. 
Tax Strategy and Embeddedness 
There are variable practices among MNCs around the formalisation of tax strategy, 
and there is limited evidence of strategy needing or seeking Board approval. Some tax 
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executives were not convinced that having a formalised documented tax strategy adds 
value. The various tax strategies/mission statements found to be in place reflect a mix 
of quantitative (as per Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Porter, 1999a) and qualitative 
goals, which collectively reflect the roles of policeman, service provider and business 
partner alike provided by tax executives (Wilson, 1995). There was some evidence of 
frictions (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992) within a tax strategy, for example, where a 
company aspires to minimising cash taxes while maximising EPS. Whatever the 
degree of formalisation of a company's tax strategy, the tax executives strongly 
supported the idea that tax should not drive business decisions (section 4.6.1). 
Strategic alignment of tax is supported in practice through reporting directly to the 
CFO, having as senior a title as possible in the organisation (two internal sources of 
power identified above), and having regular meetings and updates with business 
units. Policymakers would be ill advised however, to focus on examination of a 
company's formalised tax strategy to gain real insights and understanding of a 
company's tax planning activities and processes. 
Tax and other Departments 
Findings in relation to the relationship between tax and other departments and 
business units were mixed and insightful. Despite acknowledging the value of having 
a sound knowledge of the business (Wilson, 1995), tax executives have only limited 
business knowledge, frequently obtained on a `self-service' basis. Only a small 
minority of companies have formalised business partnership relationships to facilitate 
tax executives understanding the true nature of the business. On the other hand, 
educating non-tax personnel on the role of tax and its value add capability, while 
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recognised as important, tends to take place over time in a rather ad hoc reactive 
manner, achieving varying degrees of success. There are some natural tensions and 
exercises of power (Fligstein, 1991) between tax and accounting personnel. A smooth 
and effective working relationship between tax and accounting personnel demands 
empathy as well as good communication (PWC, 2001; Wilson, 1995). It is difficult to 
see how tax executives can operate as `business partners' (Wilson, 1995) without 
being more formally integrated operationally into BUs and other departments. 
However, such integration may be more likely now, due to the increased attention in 
tax RM by Management. As noted in section 6.2, this increased attention is in 
response to the increased level of regulation (for example, SOX) in this post-Enron 
environment. 
Non-tax Costs and Frictions 
The findings of this study in relation to non-tax costs raise a number of significant 
issues or shortcomings concerning non-tax costs as dealt with in the Scholes and 
Wolfson paradigm (1992). A core aspect of that paradigm is the consideration of all 
parties, costs and taxes in the pursuit of effective tax planning. Their framework 
attempts to understand the impact of taxes on business activities generally. 
Specifically, they purport that their framework can be used to understand how taxes 
affect decision making, asset prices, equilibrium returns and the financial and 
operational structure of firms (see section 2.2.4). Research to date which draws on the 
Scholes and Wolfson paradigm is positivistic, primarily focuses on the impact of tax 
rules on a firm's or individual's behaviour, and has a working assumption that non- 
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tax costs and frictions (for example, transaction costs), are identifiable and 
measurable. 
As noted in Chapter One, aspects of this paradigm were drawn upon from the very 
beginning, but methodologically I pursued an interpretive approach to understanding 
tax planning in practice. This resulted in findings which inter alia, advance our 
understanding of the impact of taxes on business decisions generally. While these 
findings support, in principle, the inclusion of all parties, taxes and non-tax costs 
(Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Yancey and Cravens, 1998; Fallan et al., 1995) in any 
theoretical framework being applied in a quantitative manner, they also raise a 
number of significant issues or shortcomings concerning non-tax costs as dealt with 
in the Scholes and Wolfson paradigm. Their framework fails to capture significant 
non-tax costs which vary over time and across organisations. Scholes and Wolfson 
tend to incorporate only measurable non-tax costs, for example, restructuring costs or 
the restricted borrowing level that might be imposed by lenders through loan 
covenants. Not all relevant non-tax costs or frictions are measurable, which in itself 
perhaps questions or challenges the use of the word `costs' which may well conjure 
up the notion of something that is measurable. Importantly, this study has found that 
tax executives are concerned with reputational risk (section 6.3), which is inextricably 
linked with the core NIS concept of `legitimacy'. Understanding the extent to which a 
tax executive is concerned with personal or corporate reputational risk (as is done in 
this study) clearly enhances our understanding of the effect of taxes on business 
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activities, yet it is not measurable, 231 and cannot be captured in any quantitative 
model. It is only through talking to the tax executives themselves that such frictions 
can be known and understood. Reliance on publicly available data alone, as is the 
case with Scholes and Wolfson-based empirical studies cannot tell the whole story, as 
non-tax costs transcend such data. 
Chapter Seven sets out in detail the findings in relation to how tax management is 
organised and managed in the context of its external environment. Many of the 
companies in this study incur significant costs which do not feature in the Scholes and 
Wolfson framework, such as networking, research and lobbying (both directly and 
indirectly via representative bodies), time and expertise in proposing and drafting 
responses to proposed tax law changes. Some of these costs are `endogeneity costs' 
i. e. costs incurred through engaging in the endogenous process of tax law making 
(section 2.3.4). Only some of these costs, which essentially represent an investment in 
tax planning, are easily quantified such as professional institute membership fees. 
Notwithstanding this, they cannot be ignored in any analysis of a company's 
investment in tax planning. Measuring the specific return on investment in tax 
planning through employing these mechanisms is virtually impossible due to the 
unavailability of the data required to do so. 232 
231 For example, some interviewees spoke of how the potentially negative local perspective on a 
particular tax structure (in say Japan) ultimately led them not to go ahead with a structure that is 
actually economically efficient. 
232 Companies are unlikely to provide data on lobbying and networking costs or on the extent to which 
such costs can be directly related to specific amounts of tax saved etc. 
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The findings of this study in relation to non-tax costs has implications for future 
engagement with the Scholes and Wolfson paradigm and for one's methodological 
approach to research on understanding tax planning in practice which incorporates 
how tax affects business decisions generally. These findings also point to the need for 
Revenue Authorities to adopt a range of approaches in their attempts to understand 
business better, and specifically the role of taxes in business. 
Performance Measurement 
In relation to performance measurement of tax, a number of interviewees emphasised 
qualitative rather than quantitative measures. Although PM was recognised as an 
important, albeit difficult function, there was no consensus on the degree of formality 
around the PM process. Importantly, while tax executives are quite exercised about 
the ETR, many of them do not see it as an appropriate measure of performance as it is 
not totally within their control, and its use as a measure of performance may 
encourage aggressive tax planning. Notwithstanding this, the ETR cannot be ignored 
and educating around a stable or fluctuating ETR outside of an `acceptable range' to 
certain internal actors such as the CFO and the CEO, and external actors such as 
market analysts (a source of coercive isomorphism) is paramount in securing 
legitimacy and credibility. A company's ETR relative to its peer companies' ETR is 
more important than the actual ETR itself and explanations of why they are different 
are frequently required of tax executives and also by internal and external interest 
groups. This clearly frustrates tax executives as many of them perceive it as a rather 
meaningless measure and an invalid measure of performance. Additionally, this raises 
concerns about its manipulation (through creative accounting or flexible accounting 
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standards (Bauman and Shaw, 2005)) in serving the need for such legitimacy perhaps 
at the expense of shareholder wealth. Fetishing of the ETR continues however by 
CFOs, market analysts and others, despite the reservations highlighted in this study 
by tax executives in practice about what drives the ETR and who controls it (see 
section 5.3). Notwithstanding this, it is critical that academic researchers using the 
ETR as, for example, a measure of effectiveness of tax planning (Mills et al., 1998; 
Rego, 2003) at best recognise and seek to compensate for its shortcomings, as 
identified by tax executives in practice, and proceed with great caution. However, the 
appropriateness of using ETR in academic research as a measure of effective tax 
planning must be questioned in light of these findings. 
All except one of the companies in this study measure performance of business units 
on a pre-tax basis. A post-tax basis is `institutionalized' (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) 
in that one company, having been introduced by a very powerful internal actor over 
20 years ago. Interestingly, this company is perceived as a `leader' (Dillard et al., 
2004) with respect to other tax-based activities in SV (see Chapter Seven). However, 
it has not been followed in this respect by other companies in the SV, thus 
questioning the notion of a `sheep mentality' existing among tax executives in SV- 
based MNCs. Tax executives are keen to remain the exclusive tax knowledge experts 
in their respective organisations, thereby maintaining control of the tax function. 
Despite not being terribly close to the business, and not always understanding the 
business (as evidenced in section 4.6.5) they feel they are best positioned to address 
the tax implications of the business activities both in terms of expertise and character. 
Arguably, it is something of a contradiction to demand of the business units to 
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consider tax (through early consultation with the tax executives) in their strategic 
business decision making, yet not reward them for doing so (through, for example, a 
post-tax PM system). Tax executives are themselves thereby contributing to the 
`black box' mentality frequently observed in relation to tax. 
Risk Management 
Inherently uncertain tax laws and an increasingly regulated environment have led to a 
heightened awareness of the need to identify and manage risks around tax planning. 
The result is undoubtedly a trend towards a more conservative and process-driven 
approach to tax planning generally, and indeed most tax executives in this study 
described their company's tax profile as `conservative' or `risk averse'. Uncertainty 
in itself results in effective tax policy (McBarnet, 2001a; Spilker et al., 1999) if it 
translates into conservative or low-risk tax plans, which are subject to debate and 
represent a `tension' at the economic and political level of analysis. 
33 Increased 
levels of regulation, such as SOX have pushed tax into the Boardroom agenda, 
thereby attaching an increased importance to tax RM within organisations. Concerns 
with legitimacy (Scott, 2001) both within the organisation and as perceived by the 
`public' with respect to the tax executives' RM is clearly very important and is 
evidence of the different audiences to whom claims for legitimacy must be articulated 
(Perrow, 1985). 
While tax executives have to manage a range of operational, planning and compliance 
risks (see section 6.3), many of them are particularly concerned about reputational 
233 Arguably, uncertainty itself is therefore a `friction' which may constrain tax planning. 
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risk, 234 which is a friction (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992), both at a personal and a 
corporate level. The role of the media in this context is particularly striking, operating 
somewhat as a subtle, yet powerful catalyst in changing the attitude (McBarnet, 
2001a) of some tax executives to the law, leading to the trend towards conservative 
tax planning referred to above. Uncertainties around dealing with foreign tax 
authorities featured prominently in the context of RM, particularly around the idea of 
foreign authorities copying already unpopular US tax rules and practices. In order to 
deal adequately with proposed and new tax regulations in non-US countries, many 
US MNCs need to address their current US-centric tax organisational structure (see 
section 4.2), whereby physically locating tax executives outside of the US may well 
be necessary, as opposed to desirable, purely from an RM perspective. 
A range of tax RM mechanisms are employed across MNCs ranging from seeking 
opinions from external advisors, to applying a `smell test' or assessing the 
`atmospherics' of the situation. Competitor and peer company influence are 
significant in terms of deciding on appropriate and legitimate RM mechanisms or 
processes. It is difficult to know however if such `rational' processes are more about 
the way RM gets presented to the outside world as opposed to actually reflecting the 
real practice of RM (Carruthers, 1995), in which case they may best be described as 
loosely coupled systems which relate to the different environments in which the tax 
executives operate (Scott, 200 1). 235 Many of the interviewees posited that RM per se 
234 As noted in section 6.3 there is a conceptual overlap between reputational risk and the striving for 
legitimacy as per the NIS literature. 
23 These environments include auditors, shareholders, general public etc. 
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has not changed, it is just documented better now and perhaps it is a little too soon to 
comment on whether such documentation is ceremonial (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). 
The increased level of investment in RM (in time and money) in response to 
increased levels of external regulation needs to be evaluated by the regulators. Is it 
achieving what it set out to achieve, and if so, at what cost? This SOX-type regulation 
appears to be very regressive and policy makers should not continue to impose 
regressive regulation without at least assessing its effectiveness. 
The External Environment 
The tax executives in SV are members of a wide range of professional institutes and 
organisations. These are very important external influences on tax planning practices 
and processes within MNCs. The combination of networking, relationship building, 
continuing education, the dissemination of research findings, the sharing of 
information generally apparent between tax executives in SV, and lobbying activities 
all of which are facilitated through the workings of various representative institutes 
and organisations constitute `multiple isomorphic pressures' (Edelman and Suchman, 
1997). These contribute to our understanding of the origins of homogeneity 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b) of tax plans, `prevailing industry practices' (Suchman 
and Edelman, 1996: p. 939) and processes within these MNCs. The roles being played 
by the various institutes, combined with contemplation of the language of `tax circle', 
`tax community' and `social clubs' as used by the interviewees, suggests the 
existence of potential `networks of power' in SV with respect to tax, a central notion 
within the endogeneity of law perspective (Suchman and Edelman, - 1996; Edelman et 
al., 1999). The intensity of social interaction (formal and informal) between these tax 
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executives results in the construction of a `social reality' (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966) that is peculiar to the tax world of SV-based MNCs, where rationality is 
constructed and evolves, in part, at the environmental level (Edelman et al, 1999). 
The lobbying activities of these institutes represents an interplay between 
organisations and legislators that reflects a `highly endogenous and reciprocal' 
relationship (Suchman and Edelman 1996, p. 938) resulting at times in a softening of 
regulation that counters corporate interest (Edelman et al., 1999), or new regulations 
that serve their interests. Some tax executives purposefully and craftily use the `clout' 
of the representative groups to serve their own interests, which frequently also serves 
the interests of many others in SV. 
Some companies in SV invest heavily in external affairs and direct lobbying with 
legislators/Congress staff, which frequently amounts to the endogenisation of tax law 
(Edelman et al, 1999). It gives rise to real non-tax costs (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992) 
which need to be taken into account in attempting to understand tax planning 
activities. The costs of such lobbying and the related return, typically in the form of 
desired tax legislation is difficult, if not impossible to measure, but simply cannot be 
ignored. Legislators do meet with, and listen to, the external affairs executives of the 
MNCs and frequently respond to parochial interests of targeted firms (Edelman and 
Suchman, 1997). The degree to which this takes place, the means through which it 
takes place, and who the main influencers are, as understood in the wider taxpaying 
community, should be addressed. Large powerful corporations who invest in direct 
lobbying on tax legislation also have potential for shaping new laws and `rational' 
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accepted compliance processes and procedures in countries with less established tax 
regimes or where law enforcement is weak, but who are looking to entice these 
MNCs to set up operations in their respective countries. 
The IRS (and Revenue Authorities generally) was identified as a key actor in the 
external environment. Tax executives typically regard having a `good relationship' 
with the IRS as important, which stems largely from a concern for building credibility 
with and thereby achieving `legitimacy' in the eyes of the state (Carruthers, 1995). 
The tax `organisational field' in SV is a relatively stable environment, propped up by 
a set of regulations imposed from the economic and political level. Although they 
sometimes are uncertain, there is a very powerful and stable organisational field in 
place, in which there are a number of recognised powerful and influential leaders of 
tax who, through very well developed and maintained relationships with actors at the 
economic and political level, manage to secure tax laws (and the implementation 
thereof) that suit most companies in SV most of the time. 
8.3 Contribution 
In addition to the above findings, this study makes a number of significant and unique 
contributions to knowledge empirically and theoretically. 
At an empirical level, this study involved interviewing the `elites' of tax planning in 
practice i. e. senior tax executives in US MNCs. Securing access to such individuals is 
exceptional and the insights gained as a result are equally exceptional. As described 
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in Chapter Three, the carefully selected interpretive methodological approach adopted 
in this research provides a new and rich perspective on tax planning in practice, 
highlighting some shortcomings of the positivistic approach (section 3.3.1). 
At a theoretical level, this study involved developing a conceptual framework 
(Chapter Three), which (i) provides a rich descriptive framework of the tax arena 
within which tax planning takes place, drawing particular attention to powerful actors 
in the organisational field level of analysis; and (ii) uniquely combines relevant 
theoretical constructs from tax planning (for example, Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; 
Douglas et al., 1996), NIS (for example, Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1991; Scott, 2001) and endogeneity of law literatures (for example, Suchman 
and Edelman, 1996; Edelman et al., 1999). The strong explanatory power of this 
framework was in evidence throughout this study as detailed in Chapters Four to 
Seven inclusive. A small number of examples are worth noting here. Resources given 
to tax such as having a VP tax in place, regardless of the exact nature of his activities 
or real power vested in him, can facilitate the company being seen to take tax 
seriously, and thereby act as a symbol of `legitimacy' (Scott, 2001). The endogenous 
nature (Suchman and Edelman, 1996) of tax law making positions the state as `a 
negotiable contracting party' (Roberts and Bobek, 2004) as opposed to an `uninvited 
party to all contracts' (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). Professional qualifications and 
general work experience in themselves were shown to be unlikely sources of 
heterogeneity (Powell, 1991) within the tax planning arena but represent powerful 
sources of normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). Transfer pricing 
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and SOX were highlighted as areas within which mimetic isomorphic behaviour 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b), a response to uncertainty, at international level is in 
evidence or being considered, which has tax policy implications. Understanding has 
been enhanced as to why some companies chose to be `leaders' (Dillard et al., 2004), 
as opposed to `late adoptors' in terms of implementing innovative or what might be 
considered `aggressive' tax based structures. Such `leaders' and `adoptors' happily 
co-exist in the wider tax arena. Possible decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) was in 
evidence with respect to tax strategy reflected in the fact that some interviewees 
referred to a tax strategy being in place but was rarely if ever referred to or updated. 
Finally, this study draws attention to tax policy implications of its findings, thereby 
informing tax policy debate (Shevlin, 1999), through inter alia, providing information 
which enhances a state's understanding of taxpayers' motivations and behaviour. 
8.4 Future Research 
There are a number of fruitful research opportunities arising from the findings, 
observations and limitations of this study. This study focussed on the views of 
currently employed tax executives in SV-based US MNCs. It could be extended to 
include the views of retired tax executives. Such executives would have many years 
of experience and would be able to relate the story of change in this domain. Such 
interviewees may also feel freer to speak since they would be no longer working for 
any employer/company and therefore no longer a `player' in the tax arena in SV. 
It would also be valuable to gain the views of other actors in the economic, political 
and organisational field levels of analysis on the various aspects of tax planning 
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addressed in this study. For example, ask the market analysts about their 
understanding of factors impacting on the ETR, and the importance (or not) of the 
ETR to them in their job. One could talk to the regulators about their perceptions 
around tax risk management processes in MNCs, and discuss the impact of corporate 
lobbying on tax legislation with members of Congress. 
To further investigate the exact way in which, and the extent to which, 
endogenisation of tax law takes place, it would be useful to perform an historical 
analysis on publicly available data and correspondence between the regulator, 
representative groups and regulatees concerning the bringing into law of specific 
pieces of tax legislation, such as the Homeland Investment Act. 236 Such an 
investigation could shed additional light on the negotiable nature of tax law, and 
specifically assess the extent to which Covaleski et al. 's (2007b) `second order effect' 
is at play (whereby regulators anticipate regulatee responses). 
The findings from this study could be drawn on by researchers pursuing the 
positivistic approach to tax planning research by incorporating, for example, 
important non-tax costs (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992) identified here such as lobbying 
and networking costs. 
The primary research method employed in this study, namely face-to-face interviews, 
combined with the nature of the subject matter at hand, meant that the findings are 
236 Part of the American Jobs Creation Act 2004. 
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inconclusive with respect to decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) of tax practices 
and processes in US MNCs. Pursuit of an alternative methodology incorporating the 
review of, for example, documented risk management (specifically in response to 
SOX requirements) or performance measurement processes, combined with the 
findings of this research should result in critical insights on the extent to which 
decoupling of such processes takes place and why. 
Finally, different theoretical perspectives could be pursued to explain the findings of 
this study, for example, examining the performance measurement findings through 
the lens of earnings management literature. 
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Appendix 1: Guide for Preliminary Interview with Tax Advisors 
Firstly request permission to tape the interview and explain confidential nature of the interview and 
importance given to anonymity. 
1. Introduction and explanation of key research question and planned methodology: 
How do US MNCs (operating in Ireland) create, formulate and administer their tax 
plans on a worldwide basis? (Tax plan: the tax aspects/structure of any business 
activity or plan). 
Interviews with international tax directors/VPs for tax in the ICT sector. 
Emphasise that my main interest is in tax planning but some limited reference to tax 
compliance will be necessary. 
2. Provide an overview of how you think the tax function is organised in these 
companies (reporting lines, is there a tax director on the Board, describe the process 
of the tax function etc). 
3. Typically, what in-house company personnel do you give tax advice to in these 
companies? Who are the decision makers? 
4. What is your view of the importance of the tax function in these organisations (at 
all levels ranging from the tax personnel to non tax personnel to board level)? 
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5. Tax and the Organisation 
Tax and strategy-role of tax in business decisions in companies, to what extent are tax 
personnel consulted, what types of business decisions merit a tax input. Should tax 
matter more/less? If not, why not? Do your clients have a tax strategy? Do you assist 
them putting one together? How is it married to the overall business strategy? How is 
the strategic role for the tax function defined, mapped out, implemented, managed 
and monitored on an ongoing basis in complex ever-changing environment? 
Organisation of the tax function-compliance versus planning, outsourcing 
(determinants of, and are you in this business? ), use of external advisors, performance 
measurement of tax personnel, post v pre tax performance measurement of non-tax 
personnel, use of IT, use of ES. 
Value-Added Tripod-in-house tax professional as policeman, service provider or 
business partner? Any other way of looking at it? How can in-house tax professionals 
add value? Importance of business knowledge, tax expertise and relationship skills? 
Resources? Tax powerhouses? 
6. The Tax Planning Process 
Technical nature of tax planning-how are these companies approaching tax planning 
technically (all parties, all costs, all non-tax costs, type of analysis, global approach, 
flexibility, anticipating future tax law changes around the world, working within the 
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letter of the law versus the spirit of the law? Income shifting? Income reclassification 
etc. Types of tax plans, opportunities looked for? Key aspects of good tax plan? Are 
there key areas for tax planning e. g. jurisdiction, contractual forms, transfer pricing 
etc? Board level involvement? Formalised approach? Role of tax advisors? ). Trying 
to get a real understanding of how you manage the tax planning process-qualitative 
versus quantitative? How best to do this? 
Do you see tax planning as creative? (Innovations literature) 
What type of modelling is done by tax planners etc? 
Judgement and Decision Making(DM) in tax planning - different levels of decision- 
making, describe the tax DM process, rational versus political versus garbage-can etc. 
Sources of information? DM paradigm of organisational design leading to setting up 
decision units taking into account centralization, specialization and flexibility. Who 
are the real decision-makers? How best to get to understand this? 
Risk Management and Tax Planning - Types of risk? Why do they exist? Do your 
clients have a tax risk policy? Do you advise them to have one? Do you assist them 
putting it together? Its key aspects? How does it marry with overall company risk 
policy? Impact of SOX? Tax aggressiveness? Dealing with uncertain tax legislation 
(current and future)? 
7. Is tax legislation (national and international) getting more complex? If yes, is this 
good/bad for tax planning? 
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8. What are the characteristics of a good tax planner? What's required for effective 
tax planning and tax management? 
9. Top 5/6 tax planning areas/topics facing these companies? 
10. How has this particular tax advisory environment changed over the last 10/15 
years? 
11. Discuss the link/interplay between accounting rules and tax planning? 
12. What do these clients want most from you when giving tax-planning advice? 
13. What are greatest challenges facing you as tax advisor to these companies? 
Greatest frustrations? Opportunities? Importance of tax planning? Are tax advisors 
kept in the loop? 
14. Now that you know what I am trying to achieve, what are the most 
interesting/important areas we have discussed and who in your view should I talk to 
in these companies to answer my research question? 
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15. Are there any aspects of the tax function that I have not referred to that you think 
I should? Any way I could make this research more interesting for you? In what way 
do you see academic research in taxation being relevant to your work, if at all? 
16. Are there any specific aspects of the tax planning function/operation which I can 
explore through interviews which could not be investigated/explored by reviewing the 
financial statements? 
17. Possibility of obtaining contacts in US MNCs in information technology sector, 
preferably at international tax director level. 
18. What type of information do you think international tax directors will give me? 
19. What do you think of the idea of meeting a number of people in an organisation as 
opposed to one person in different organisations? 
20. Explore aspects of institutional theory e. g. what institutions are involved? What 
are the institutional dynamics? Importance of social culture and environment? Tax 
practice as form of legitimacy (to maintain support from external groups), changes in 
organizational practices in tax, effects of social expectations on organisation and its 
tax practices, decoupling, 3 levels of institutions etc. 
Finally many thanks for your participation! 
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Appendix 2: Guide for Preliminary Interview with In-House Tax Executive 
Firstly request permission to tape the interview and explain confidential nature of the interview and 
importance given to anonymity. 
1. Introduction and explanation of key research question and planned methodology: 
How do US MNCs (operating in Ireland) create, formulate and administer their tax 
plans on a worldwide basis? (Tax plan: the tax aspects/structure of any business 
activity or plan). 
Interviews with international tax directors/VPs for tax in the ICT sector. 
Emphasise that my main interest is in tax planning but some limited reference to tax 
compliance will be necessary 
2. Briefly explain your position and provide an overview of how the tax function is 
organised in your company (reporting lines, is there a tax director on the Board, 
describe the process of the tax function in your company etc). 
3. Discuss the link/interplay between tax and the accounting function in your 
organisation. 
4. Who do the in-house tax professionals see as their `customers'? 
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5. What is the company's view of the tax function in your organisation (at all levels 
ranging from the tax personnel to non tax personnel to board level)? 
6. Tax and the Organisation 
Tax and strategy-role of tax in business decisions in your company, to what extent are 
tax personnel consulted, what types of business decisions merit a tax input. Should 
tax matter more/less? If not, why not? Does you company have a tax strategy? How is 
it married to the overall business strategy? How is the strategic role for the tax 
function defined, mapped out, implemented, managed and monitored on an ongoing 
basis in complex ever-changing environment? 
Organisation of the tax function-compliance versus planning, outsourcing 
(determinants of), use of external advisors, performance measurement of tax 
personnel, post v pre tax performance measurement of non-tax personnel, use of IT, 
use of ES. 
Value-Added Tripod-in-house tax professional as policeman, service provider or 
business partner? Any other way of looking at it? How can in-house tax professionals 
add value? Importance of business knowledge, tax expertise and relationship skills? 
Resources? 
7. The Tax Planning Process 
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Technical nature of tax planning-describe your approach to technical tax planning (all 
parties, all costs, all non-tax costs, type of analysis, global approach, flexibility, 
anticipating future tax law changes around the world, working within the letter of the 
law versus the spirit of the law? Income shifting? Income reclassification etc. Types 
of tax plans, opportunities looked for? Key aspects of good tax plan? Are there key 
areas for tax planning e. g. jurisdiction, contractual forms, transfer pricing etc? Board 
level involvement? Formalised approach? Role of tax advisors? How are the 
boundaries of tax planning set? ). Trying to get a real understanding of how you 
manage the tax planning process-qualitative versus quantitative? How best to do this? 
Do you see tax planning as creative? (Innovations literature) 
Judgement and Decision Making in tax planning- different levels of decision-making, 
describe the tax DM process, rational versus political versus garbage-can etc. Sources 
of information? DM paradigm of organizational design leading to setting up decision 
units taking into account centralization, specialization and flexibility. How best to get 
to understand this? 
Risk Management and Tax Planning- types of risk? Why do they exist? do you have a 
tax risk policy? Its key aspects? Are controls in place? How does it marry with 
overall company risk policy? Impact of SOX? Tax aggressiveness? Dealing with 
uncertain tax legislation (current and future)? 
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8. Is tax legislation (national and international) getting more complex? If yes, is this 
good/bad for tax planning? 
9. When you seek the opinion from an external tax advisor what are you looking for 
most from him/her? 
10. What are greatest challenges facing the tax function in MNCs? Greatest 
frustrations? Opportunities? Importance of tax planning? Greatest recent changes? 
11. What are characteristics of a good tax planner? What's required for effective tax 
planning and tax management? 
12. What training and development do in-house tax professionals receive? 
13. Now that you know what I am trying to achieve, what are the most 
interesting/important areas we have discussed and who in your view should I talk to 
in your company and US MNCs in general to answer my research question? 
14. Are there any specific aspects of the tax planning function/operation which I can 
explore through interviews which could not be investigated/explored by reviewing the 
financial statements? 
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15. Are there any aspects of the tax function that I have not referred to that you think 
I should? Any way I could make this research more interesting for you? 
16. In what way do you see academic research in taxation being relevant to your 
company, if at all? 
Finally many thanks for your participation! 
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Appendix 3: My copy of Interview Schedule (includes probes) 
Introduction 
Briefly introduce myself, outline the main purpose of the interview (refer to the 
document sent to interviewee in advance), request permission to tape the interview, 
explain the importance of anonymity and that confidentiality is assured. 
1. Background and organisation of the tax planning function 
(i) Who manages and provides the tax planning function in your company? 
Potential probes 
How do you define the tax planning element of the tax function (as opposed to the tax 
compliance element)? Clarify the planning/compliance boundary. 
How many people involved? At what level are they within the organisation? What is 
their background typically? What skills have they? Where are they based? 
What are the reporting lines? 
Have you any former tax advisors or IRS officials working in your tax department? 
How has this changed the operation of the department? 
Where are tax plans created and administered? Is there a tax person on the Board? 
Who is responsible for what? 
Is your tax department a cost or profit centre? Is it a service centre or strategic 
support? 
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Is the tax planning function well resourced? Is it sufficiently resourced to be a 
`business partner'? Has SOX led to increased resources for the tax function? 
How much time (%) is spent on tax planning by in-house tax professionals? 
(ii) Who are the customers of the in-house tax department and describe the 
interaction (in nature and process) between this department and its customers? 
Potential probes 
Internal and external customers? Can you order them in terms of importance? 
Why is this the order? What processes are in place to ensure your customers 
(particularly the most important ones) are satisfied? Are there tax user group meetings 
and do you receive feedback from these meetings? 
Do you get opportunities to communicate to your internal customers through 
roadshows or seminars? 
Does practice differ from written down rules/procedures governing your interaction 
with internal customers? 
Do you provide (written) guidelines on tax issues for business units? How do you 
spread the tax message within your organisation? 
What do you do to build and maintain sound working relationships with the Board, 
the heads of other functions and with operating managers to keep them `tax aware'? 
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2. Tax and Strategy 
(i) What is your company's tax strategy or objective(s)? 
Potential probes 
Is it formally documented? What determines your company's tax strategy? Why? 
How was it decided on and by whom? The Board or CFO or tax department? 
Should `tax' have a role in implementing overall business strategy? 
Is the tax function well-embedded in the organisation? 
How does it complement overall business strategy? How could this be improved 
upon? What processes are in place to ensure it complements overall strategy on an 
ongoing basis? 
In what types of business transactions is the tax team involved and at what stage in 
the business decision-making process do they become involved? Can you give me an 
example? 
Do the tax personnel understand the business? What efforts are made to ensure they 
understand it? 
Has your company's tax strategy changed? Why and how did this come about? Who 
made it change? What were the implications for processes/roles? 
Does your company have a tax code of practice? Why? What does it state? Can I see 
it? How is its implementation monitored? 
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(ii) How important is the tax planning function in your company? 
Potential probes 
What/who determines the level of importance? Has the level of importance changed? 
Why? 
What is CEO's and CFO's view of tax and what are the implications of these views 
on tax planning in your company? What are their backgrounds professionally? 
How embedded are these views? 
How could the tax planning role be elevated within your company? 
How is it viewed by other internal business units? 
3. Performance Measurement 
(i) How is the performance of the tax planning function measured in your 
organisation? 
Potential probes 
Is your effective tax rate (ETR) the most important measure? How do you calculate 
it? 
What is a good ETR? Why? Do you work towards a target ETR and who sets that 
target? How is it determined? Does working towards a specific ETR ever lead you to 
be overly creative? 
Who carries out the performance measurement? 
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How often? Are they in the best position to measure your performance? 
What does your Board expect of you? Are the benchmarks clear? 
Do competitors influence these measures/benchmarks? How important is it to `keep 
out of trouble'? Any changes in performance measures? Why? How has the 
practice/process of tax planning responded? 
What are the rewards/penalties for good/bad performance respectively? 
Does practice match the official line on performance measurement? 
How are performance targets set? 
Are timescales set for tax planning projects and do they act as benchmarks? 
What information is collected in order to measure performance and who collects it? 
To what extent are things outside of your control taken into account e. g. changing tax 
rates? Are all of your customers involved in performance measurement? Are there 
conflicts between the various benchmarks used by different stakeholders/customers 
and how do you deal with such conflicts? 
Are social and corporate governance obligations becoming (more) important 
measures of performance? 
(ii) Are other business units measured on a post or pre tax basis? 
Potential probes 
Why? Do you see this changing? Why? 
Would a post-tax basis be favoured in your company and by whom? 
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How does the current measurement basis impact on the relationship between tax and 
other business units? 
How is this relationship managed on an ongoing basis? 
Possible extra question 
What is the purpose of performance evaluation of the tax planning function? 
Potential probes 
Is it for control/developmental reasons or simply to impose pressure? 
4. Tax and Accounting 
(i) Describe the interplay between the tax planning and accounting functions in 
your organisation. 
Potential probes 
Is tax personnel a separate and distinct group from accounting personnel? 
Why is it organised this way? Should it be changed? Could it be? 
Do tax and accounting personnel keep each other informed sufficiently? 
What processes/practices are in place to ensure this interplay is effective? 
What is the most important aspect of this interplay? 
Do tax and accounting personnel perceive each other as internal business partners? 
Examples of good/bad interplay between these functions? 
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(ii) Describe how the interaction between financial reporting and tax planning is 
managed in your organization? 
Potential probes 
Investors want high income reported whereas corporate taxpayer likes to see low 
taxable income? Examples of how accounting considerations (non-tax costs) resulted 
in not opting for a tax minimisation plan? 
When a tax plan is being created or considered, how in practice are the accounting 
implications addressed and managed? 
Has the interplay between tax and accounting changed? How and why? 
In what ways have tax requirements shaped your accounting systems and practice? Or 
visa versa? 
Are there structured activities and reviews of the impact of tax decisions on the 
financial reporting of material tax issues? 
(iii) How is the tax reserve figure decided upon? 
Potential probes 
Describe the decision making process and who is involved? Is it contentious? Why? 
Examples? 
What procedures govern your interaction with the auditors? Describe this interaction. 
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Possible extra question 
Are there book-tax reconciliation disclosure requirements which impact on tax 
planning? 
5. Risk Management 
(i) What are the main types of tax risks facing your company? 
Potential probes 
Specifically describe the tax planning risks e. g. technical imperfections, over- 
aggressiveness, incorrect implementation. 
How concerned are you about reputational risk (company or personal)? 
How would you describe your company's tax risk profile - conservative/aggressive 
etc? How/who determines this and has it changed over time? 
How do you deal with uncertainty in existing and future tax law? 
How is judgment applied in uncertain situations? 
(ii) What is your company's tax risk management policy? 
Potential probes 
Is it documented? Who drew it up and approved it? 
In what way does your risk management practice help you deal with uncertainty in 
tax laws? 
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What processes are in place to ensure its implementation? Does it work well? 
What internal controls/processes are in place in relation to taxation and how has SOX 
changed these? Are they enterprise wide? 
What internal control framework are you using? The integrated framework published 
by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (SEC 
endorsed)? This has 5 parts i. e. control environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, information and communication, and monitoring. 
Are your internal controls documented? How? Policy manuals, process models, 
flowcharts, job descriptions, documents and forms? 
What is the real value in practice of having an extensive tax risk management policy? 
Does practice always reflect the policy? 
Do other players in the `organisational field' influence your approach/attitude to risk? 
Are your tax advisors part of your risk management strategy? 
Does the media have any impact? 
Is the tax reserve setting process (referred to earlier) an important part of tax risk 
management? 
How important is your external advisor to your risk management strategy? 
Examples of good/bad risk management in practice in your company? 
Is engaging in technically robust tax plans a part of your risk management policy or is 
the `smell factor' more important? 
How does the existence of super-principles or GAAR influence your approach to tax 
risks? 
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Does the Board set out acceptable parameters for the adoption of tax risk and monitor 
compliance with these parameters? 
Is tax within the scope of the internal audit? What does it consist or. Is there any 
other external independent review of the tax function? 
Are procedures in place to review current transactions for change of law implications, 
for consistency of technical argument and for concentration of risk? What are these 
procedures? 
(iii) What are the greatest recent changes in tax risk management and how have 
such changes impacted on your tax planning practices and processes? 
Potential probes 
Have they made you more/less conservative? Have they resulted in more 
administration? Describe the impact of SOX on your company's tax planning 
activities? 
Has it changed your approach/attitude to dealing with uncertainties in tax law? 
Is it just more administration with/without real impact on tax planning? 
Is SOX a constraint on tax planning? 
Explain the administrative burden of SOX on your tax function? E. g. are ye minuting 
every meeting with tax advisors now? 
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Possible extra question 
How does your tax risk management policy complement/originate from the 
company's overall risk management policy? 
Potential probes 
What processes are in place to ensure both policies are aligned? How is this 
alignment monitored? 
6. Outsourcing and External Advisors 
(i) Does your organisation outsource the tax planning function? Describe the 
process of outsourcing the tax function in your organisation and how it is 
managed. 
Potential probes 
Why? Is there a culture of outsourcing in your organisation? 
Is the increasing administrative burden (due to SOX etc) leading to an 
increase/decrease in outsourcing? 
Do internal tax executives bring more to the table than external consultants? How? 
What types of issues do you tend to engage an external advisor for? 
(ii) Who chooses your external tax advisors and what process and rules govern 
this task? 
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Potential probes 
Are they tax lawyers or tax consultants from the Big Four? 
How has SOX impacted on your choice of external advisor and quality of tax advice 
being received? Has it increased/decreased your costs? 
How many advisors do you use? 
What do you do to ensure your external advisors understand your business, strategy 
and structure? 
Possible extra question 
Describe how you use external tax advisors? 
Potential probes 
What are you looking for most from them in a tax opinion? Stamp of approval? 
Assurance that other companies have employed a similar tax plan? 
What do you depend on them for? 
Do you have rules or policies governing the engagement of external advisors? 
Are consultancy fees agreed in advance? 
Are they proactive? 
Are you increasing or decreasing your use of external advisors for tax planning? 
Do your external advisors rate their own letters of advice in terms of likely success of 
the tax plan they are advising on? Do you rely on this rating? 
Do tax advisors tend to approach you with `flavours of the month' tax plans or 
turnkey, one-size-fits-all projects? 
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Any significant changes in your relationship with external advisors? Are there pre- 
clearance procedures in place now which are necessary if you want to obtain tax 
advice from your auditors? What is the impact of this on tax planning? 
Do your advisors rate their letters of opinion in terms of chances of success? 
Do you rely on their professional indemnity cover? 
7. Technical Approach to Tax Planning 
(i) How do you arrive at the best tax solution for a particular business 
transaction or decision? Please use an example to describe the process e. g. 
employee compensation plan, choice of organisational form, choice of location, 
income shifting, income reclassification? 
Potential probes 
What practices and processes are in place which constitute (in part at least) your 
technical approach to tax planning? 
At what stage did you engage external advisors? For what purpose? 
Can you and do you obtain advance IRS rulings? 
Did you consider all taxes, all parties and all non-tax costs and what did this involve 
in practice? How? 
How would you classify the decision-making process e. g. rational/satisficing/political 
etc? 
Are you constantly looking out for income shifting/conversion opportunities? What's 
the practice? I 
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How flexible are your tax plans and how do they cater for the consequences of the 
ever-changing tax laws around the world? 
Did you use financial modelling? Any other techniques or analysis? Do you use 
expert systems and/or decision support systems? 
How are the boundaries of tax planning set? 
Where do you get your tax planning ideas from? Other companies? 
Do you look for advance rulings? How is such a decision reached? 
Do you like to be `first out of the box' when it comes to creating/implementing new 
tax planning ideas? Are there `leading edge' companies in this regard? Who would 
want to lead and why? 
(ii) What types of tax plans need Board approval and what is involved in getting 
this approval? 
Potential probes 
Any changes in this practice? 
Is there any other level of outside tax department approval necessary below Board 
level for lower scale tax plans? How does that work? 
(iii) How are your global tax plans managed and monitored on an ongoing basis? 
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Potential probes 
How do you keep abreast of the changing tax laws around the world, assess their 
impact on your existing structures and assess the possible tax planning opportunities 
arising there from? Is there a specific process in place? Examples? 
Has this task changed over the years? 
Does someone have responsibility for ongoing monitoring of bilateral tax treaties and 
assessing the impact of any changes on existing or planned business decisions? 
Are primary (regulations and Court rulings) and secondary authorities (e. g. CCHs 
Standard Federal Tax Reporter or Tax Articles - any others? ) on tax rules monitored 
and examined regularly in-house? To what extent do you rely on these secondary 
authorities? 
Possible extra question 
How do you react to new tax legislation to ensure its impact on existing tax 
arrangements is assessed and that new tax planning opportunities arising there 
from are identified assessed and possibly implemented? 
Potential probes 
What impact has The American Jobs Creation Act 2004 had on your tax 
plans/arrangements? What is the process for dealing with such legislation? 
Do you have any preference for any particular approach to tax law e. g. exploiting 
gaps in the legislation, availing of express exemptions or adopting legal forms to fit 
inside the literal interpretation of the law? 
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Is your company receptive to `flavours of the month'? 
S. External Influences/Actors in the Corporate Tax Arena 
(i) Who are the external influences on your company's overall approach to the 
practice and process of tax planning? 
Potential probes 
Individuals? Competitors? Professional organisations? Media? 
Describe the type of influence. Who are the most dominant agents in the 
organisational field? Do you actively seek approval from these organisations? How 
do they penetrate the tax function in your organisation? 
(ii) What organisations/institutions facilitate networking among tax 
professionals and how do you and your team engage with such organisations? 
Potential probes 
Tax Executives Institute? European-American Tax Institute? ABA (American Bar 
Association)? Are you a member? 
Who are the most dominant agents in the organisational field? Do you actively seek 
approval from these organisations? How do they penetrate the tax function in your 
organisation? 
Why are you a member of professional organisations? Do you network? How often 
and in what way? What is its value in real practical terms? Examples? 
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How do you engage with the organisational field and social/economic field? 
Examples of successful engagements? How do measure success in this context? 
(iii) Who are the key regulatory bodies/participators influencing tax policy 
which applies to your organisation? Describe your interaction, if any with such 
bodies. 
Potential probes 
Government? EU? OECD? Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)? 
Congress? Do you interact with these organisations in order to influence tax policy? 
How and have you been successful? 
9. Miscellaneous 
(i) A company specific type question. 
Company I 
Describe the role tax planning has played in recent restructuring activities in your 
organisation. 
Company 2 
Describe the role of tax and the tax planning process involved in your organisation's 
recent acquisitions. 
354 
Company 3 
Describe the role that tax has played (if any) with regard to your organisation's (a) 
dividend policy and (b) business alliances. 
Company 4 
How does your organisation manage the tax uncertainties arising from dealings via 
the internet? 
Company 5 
Describe the role of tax and the tax planning process involved in your organisation's 
recent acquisitions. 
Company 6 
Describe the role of the Finance Committee with regard to tax planning. 
Company 7 
Describe the role of tax and the tax planning process involved in your organisation's 
recent acquisitions. 
Company 8 
Describe the role that tax has played (if any) with regard to your organisation's (a) 
dividend policy and (b) business alliances. 
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Company 9 
Describe the role of tax and the tax planning process involved in your organisation's 
recent acquisitions. 
Company 10 
Describe the tax planning process involved when your organisation sets up and 
participates in strategic alliances. 
Company 11 
Describe the role of tax and the tax planning process involved in your organisation's 
recent acquisitions. 
Company 12 
Describe the role of tax and the tax planning process involved in your organisation's 
recent acquisitions. 
Company 13 
Describe the tax planning role and process (if any) concerning your organisation's 
business agreements with distributor companies. 
Company 14 
Describe the tax planning role and process with regard to your organisation's 
investment in research and development. 
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Company 15 
Outline the ongoing role of tax planning where tax holidays and tax incentive 
programs are being availed of by a company over the next few years? 
(ii) Give some examples of changes over time in the practice and process of tax 
planning. These changes could be formal or informal, revolutionary or 
evolutionary. 
Potential probes 
Why do less than optimal tax planning processes/practices persist over time? 
Complex interdependencies/exercise of power/taken for granted assumptions/path 
dependent development processes? 
Possible extra question 
What are the greatest challenges and opportunities facing the practice and 
process of tax planning within your organisation? 
Note: There is a `Possible extra question' under some of the above headings. These 
questions were not included in the interviewee schedules but will be asked in 
interview, time permitting and if considered appropriate at the time. 
357 
Appendix 4: Research Brief for Interviewees 
Tax planning is important for many organisations but a very limited amount of 
academic research has been conducted on how tax planning is done in practice. My 
main objective is to investigate tax planning processes in multinational corporations 
(MNCs) in the Information Technology (IT) sector. This research will provide a 
particular insight into the practice and process of tax planning in this sector. This 
investigation should provide a rich understanding of how MNCs create, formulate and 
administer their tax plans. It should also provide some insight into the social, political 
and economic context within which the tax planning activities of MNCs takes place. 
Ultimately this research should provide some interesting findings for corporate 
taxpayers and contribute to tax policy debate. 
I will be conducting interviews with VPs for Taxes and/or International Tax Directors 
with fifteen US MNCs in the IT sector, and, given that I am based in Ireland, most of 
these MNCs have an Irish operation. The interviews with the various tax executives 
will be semi-structured and discussion on the practice and process of tax planning in 
an MNC will revolve broadly around the following themes: 
" The organisation of the tax planning function within the MNC 
" Tax strategy and its alignment with overall business strategy 
" Performance measurement of the tax planning function 
" Tax and Accounting, from both organisational and technical alignment 
perspectives 
" Tax risk management 
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" Tax outsourcing and the role of external tax advisors 
" Technical approach taken to tax planning within the MNC 
" External influences/actors in the corporate tax arena 
Discussion around these themes will explore the hows/whos/whats of judgement and 
decision making in a tax planning context and deal with changes in the tax planning 
function within MNCs. 
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Appendix 5: Final Codes developed in NVivo 
Principal Codes 
Background/Organisation 
Tax and Strategy 
Performance measurement 
Tax and Accounting 
Technical approach 
Risk measurement 
External influences/actors 
Theoretical Aspects 
Outsourcing/Advisors 
Educating/selling Tax internally 
Competitors' influence 
sox 
Big changes 
Challenges and opportunities 
Homeland Investment Act 
Wilson's tripod 
Miscellaneous 
Subcodes 
Resources 
Planning and compliance 
Customers 
Relationship with business units 
Staff profile 
Cost/profit/service centre 
Importance of tax/embeddedness 
Tax mission 
Impact of CFO/change of boss 
Tax understanding the business 
Effective tax rate 
Post v. pre-tax basis 
Personnel interplay 
Technical interplay 
Tax reserve 
Managing and monitoring global tax 
Tax v. non-tax costs 
Board approval 
Risk profile 
Relationship with/attitude to Revenue 
Networking and relationships 
External affairs/lobbying 
Organisations/institutes 
Media 
Audit company 
Leaders and innovators 
Isomorphic forces 
Power 
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